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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
‘Now, we don’t have problems with the government, we have a political instrument [the 
Movement Toward Socialism] and now we’re in power,’ said Aniceto when he recounted to 
me his struggles as an agrarian union leader in the department of Santa Cruz, Bolivia, during 
dictatorships and neoliberalism.  To understand the process of getting ‘power’ as referred to 
by Aniceto, we need to go back to the nineteen eighties, when, driven by an awakening of 
democracy after a long period of dictatorship, agrarian unions like his started to organize at 
national level.  They grouped in the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores de 
Bolivia (the Sole Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers, or CSUTCB) created in 
1977 to strengthen themselves.  Together with indigenous, cocalero (coca grower), and 
popular urban movements, they demanded an end to the structural inequalities in the country 
and called for their class and ethnic demands to be heard and for a more inclusive 
representation in the political sphere.  These movements were the drivers of a profound 
transformation of Bolivian society.  It sharpened with anti-neoliberal protests in 2000 and 
2003 that led to the resignation of two presidents and resulted in the rise to power of the 
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party under the leadership of Evo Morales.  
The election of Morales – an indigenous and cocalero leader – became the most important 
political milestone in Bolivia since the National Revolution of 1952.  Morales promised to 
represent the most excluded sectors of the country, challenging the foundations of liberal 
democracy and the economic development model promoted during neoliberalism.  The 
presidential election in December of 2005 was the culmination of a long period of 
demonstrations led by peasants and indigenous movements.  These protests intensified 
starting in 2000, with the ‘Water War’ in Cochabamba and especially with the insurrections of 
2003 in the ‘Gas War’, or what Bolivians remember as Octubre Negro (Black October) for 
the deaths of more than 60 people at the hands of the state.  During this period, the country 
experienced a popular resistance against neoliberal economic policies that resulted in the 
resignation and flight to Miami of its president Gonzales Sánchez de Lozada (‘Goni’) in 2003.  
With the Gas War, so named after popular opposition to the privatization of the gas sector and 
the export of oil from Chilean ports to the USA, political opposition reached its peak.  The 
repression of Black October sealed the fate of the president who had dreamed of turning 
Bolivia into a neoliberal economy but was unable to transform the flow of foreign investment 
into strategies to overcome historical social injustices in the country.  With Morales’ arrival to 
power in 2005, the MAS government proposed to re-found the country through the 
transformation of the state.  Crucial for rural development is the MAS proposal of an agrarian 
revolution to achieve the country’s food sovereignty, as opposed to the dominant food 
systems and visions of development imposed by Western nations. 
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I met Aniceto Segovia at the Conventional Soybean National Day fair in September of 
2010.  This fair, organized by agrarian unions in the municipality of Santa Rosa del Sará, was 
presented as an alternative to the dominant agricultural model, as the antithesis of the 
Exposoya (Exposoybean) fair, which promotes genetically modified (GM) soybean seeds and 
is organized every year by regional elites and agribusiness in Santa Cruz.  The fair began with 
a small opening ceremony presided over by leaders of agrarian unions in the region and was 
attended by the Vice Minister of Rural Development, Victor Hugo Vasquez.  In their opening 
speeches, the union leaders spoke of the importance of the fair to promote conventional 
varieties of soybean that were not harmful to the health of producers like ‘the GMOs are.’  
The vice minister recounted the efforts of the MAS government to support small producers, as 
these are seen as a fundamental cornerstone of the country’s food sovereignty, because ‘first 
[food] is for the domestic market and no[t] to export.’  After the inauguration ceremony, 
farmers had the opportunity to visit demonstration plots and information stands displaying the 
technological options for conventional soybean production.  Having also attended the 
Exposoya, I was struck by the similarity in the technology offered.  Although this fair was 
much more modest, almost the same agrochemical companies as in the Exposoya fair offered 
technical assistance and technology transfer consisting mainly of agrochemical packages for 
intensive production, this time adapted to conventional soybean seeds. 
When I asked Aniceto about the MAS government’s support for agricultural production 
and technological development for small farmers, he emphasized that this is where he sees a 
difference in el proceso de cambio (the process of change, as people call the MAS 
government’s rise to power), since this government ensures that the resources reach farmer 
organizations because ‘we [social organizations] are who know what should be done.’  He 
added:  
 
Now it depends on us, if we move forward as a social organization to present 
projects, the government is asking us to do projects, but unfortunately we lack 
technical designers so we cannot get and propose projects. 
 
Melean Espinoza, a provincial level union leader in his fifties, interrupted him to clarify 
and stress this last point, noting the following:  
But you need technical staff to advise organizations to obtain resources and for 
the projects to go well.  As general secretary [of the agrarian union], for 
myself, I need someone who can help me to see what we can do, how we 
organize ourselves, see what products we grow, what projects we pull for the 
unions.  We need training so that we can propose projects and achieve our 
goals, we have not studied so we cannot express ourselves, there are technical 
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words that we do not understand, we cannot do anything.  The government 
says that it wants to support small producers; however, the medium and large 
producers that are only 20 per cent [of the producers] are getting the projects. 
The rest? The other 80 per cent, where is it? Most of the beneficiaries [of 
public resources] are big producers, but the ones that produce 20 bushels, 50 
bushels of rice, those do not benefit from projects.  
 
The conversation with Aniceto and Melean and their contrasting views on the MAS 
interventions illustrate the central themes of this thesis: the issues of participation, politics, 
and technology in rural development projects.  On the one hand, Aniceto sees that the 
politicized social movements to which he belongs feel that, for the first time, they have power 
and are getting support for different development projects in the communities.  The 
development projects are seen as an opportunity to improve their living conditions and 
influence changes at local level.  On the other hand, Melean points to the capacity to translate 
ideas into concrete development plans.  Melean struggles with the need for efficiency in 
project interventions in terms of organizing, accessing, and distributing resources to obtain 
results that make concrete differences in people’s lives and to stimulate the participation of 
those that most need these projects.  How did a highly politicized programme like that of the 
MAS party in Bolivia come to implement rural development projects once in government? 
What are the differences between the MAS proposal on participation and other visions of 
more technical and instrumental views on participation and rural development? 
This thesis examines the contradictions and articulations between different views on 
participation in rural development and their practice in specific project interventions in 
Bolivia during a period of social transformation.  It aims to contribute to the debate on 
participation and its role in the empowerment of socially excluded people.  The first concern 
of this thesis is the role of different approaches to participation; these may either de-politicize 
or re-politicize development.  This is an issue of politics and power.  Participation in rural 
development interventions shapes and reproduces hegemonic processes or leads to alternative 
development (in Bolivia in the form of post-neoliberal options).  For some scholars, 
‘alternative actors’ like the social movements guarantee that alternative agendas are carried 
out (Deere and Royce, 2009).  However, my conversations with Aniceto and Melean above 
show some of the difficulties that these social movements face in defining the ‘how’ of the 
transformation process.  The second concern, strongly linked with the previous one, relates to 
the technological aspect of participation.  Participation and participatory methods are seen as 
central for putting development into practice, for developing relevant agricultural 
technologies that suit farmers’ needs, and as an alternative to overcome the difficulties of 
involving citizens and other actors in development initiatives (Neefjes, 2000).  The question 
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here is whether participatory methods are still relevant to promote technological change and 
rural transformation.  
In the following sections of this introduction, I present the principal features of the debate 
on participation and agrarian development, the main concepts that underline this thesis, the 
research questions and design, and finally the structure of the thesis.  The main lines of 
analysis and the argument of the thesis are further developed in the following four chapters 
based on three case studies.  
 
T h e  D e b a t e  o n  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  a n d  A g r a r i a n  D e v e l o p m e n t :  
S c o p e  o f  t h e  t h e s i s  
 
The agrarian development model in Bolivia during the 1950s followed the trend of other 
Latin American countries and was shaped around a move from a pre-capitalistic to a 
capitalistic agriculture (Trigo and Kaimowitz, 1994; Kay, 2006).  Modernization was seen as 
the solution to rural poverty problems in the country.  Farmers had to be persuaded of the 
inefficiency of their production techniques and had to adopt the techniques suggested by 
public experimental stations and research centres.  State intervention was justified by the need 
to invest resources in the transfer of technology without having a guarantee of adaptation, 
diffusion among producers, or the commercial mechanisms that would allow them to 
recuperate their spending (Godoy et al., 1993; Kaimowitz, 1993; Trigo and Kaimowitz, 
1994). 
By the mid-1960s and 1970s, there was increasing consensus that food security and 
economic growth could be achieved in developing countries through the promotion of the 
agricultural sector (Schultz, 1964).  Thus, investments by the Bolivian government during this 
period concentrated on the development of an agri-industrial sector in the lowlands of the 
country to increase agricultural supply, since this region showed better potential for 
agricultural production than the highlands.  Agricultural research in the highlands occupied 
second place in budget distribution (Godoy et al., 1993).  Rural development in the highlands 
was led by NGOs and depended on international cooperation. 
Participatory methodologies were introduced in agrarian development in Bolivia by NGOs 
as a counter-hegemonic discourse against capitalism and dictatorship in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Kruse, 1994).  The basis of these methods is generally attributed to Fals-Borda and Rahman, 
among others, who draw on popular models like those of Freire (1970) and promote them as 
an instrument to generate a more democratic and effective empowerment process.  
Participatory action research was one of the pioneering methods of participation applied in 
rural areas.  Fals-Borda, the leading advocate of this method, describes participatory action 
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research as a ‘process which combines scientific research and political action to bring about 
radical changes in social and economic situations and foster the power of the people for the 
benefit of those who have been exploited’ (Fals-Borda, 1985:85).  From this perspective, 
knowledge is the key to empowering people in order to change power relations for the 
construction of a people’s democracy.  Fals-Borda and Rahman (1991) claimed that 
participatory approaches would empower people to carry out social transformation processes 
that built on the rights of the excluded.  Participatory interventions focus on strengthening 
grassroots organizations, endogenous development processes, and radical transformation.  
In the 1980s, criticism arose about the low impact of the Green Revolution.  Among the 
criticisms was the claim that capital-intensive technologies worked well where ecological 
conditions were relatively uniform, e.g. in irrigated areas, and where delivery, extension, 
marketing, and transport services already existed and were efficient; but this did not hold in 
most hillside agri-ecosystems in Latin America (Pichón and Uquillas, 1998).  Lack of 
beneficiary participation was identified as a reason for the failure of many development 
efforts (Bentley, 1994).  Participatory methodologies were introduced as an alternative to the 
‘pipeline’ model of technology transfer dominant in the Green Revolution’s heyday.  The 
aims were to facilitate the adaptation of projects and technologies to local contexts and to 
raise the voice of the poor on issues that concerned their lives (Chambers et al., 1989; 
Bentley, 1994; Ashby and Sperling, 1995; Chambers, 1997). 
Participation became a keyword in contesting the hegemonic discourse of development.  
Major donors and development organizations working in rural areas began to adopt 
participatory research and planning methods, in recognition of the shortcomings of top-down 
development approaches.  The ostensible aim of participatory approaches was to make 
‘people’ central to development by encouraging beneficiary involvement in interventions that 
affected them, and over which they previously had limited control or influence.  Participatory 
approaches were expected to follow criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and 
equity in development processes and to serve as a mechanism to multiply the power of people 
to contribute to public decision making (Gaventa, 2004).  
Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) is perhaps the most important, or at least the best 
known, method used in participatory development.  It influences development interventions 
all over the world and many other approaches to, and methods of, development (Chambers, 
1992).  Chambers, its major advocate, defines PRA as ‘a growing family of approaches and 
methods to enable local people to share, enhance, and analyse their knowledge of life and 
conditions, to plan and to act’ (Chambers, 1994:953).  This method invites project 
implementers to listen to the voice of the poor and excluded.  PRA, and the different methods 
born under this umbrella, were presented as a tool for efficient planning and implementation 
of projects (Chambers and Blackburn, 1996): in other words, as a way to achieve public 
policy objectives and facilitate efficiency in development projects.  PRA was quickly adopted 
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by powerful organizations such as the World Bank, which saw in these methods the 
possibility of merging the knowledge of social and natural sciences and applying them to 
development projects.  To Cernea (1994), for example, participation meant not only 
consulting people about their desires, but also including certain techniques to ensure that 
different opinions of underestimated people could be heard.  He promoted the social sciences 
in World Bank interventions as ‘useable know-how’ for action and learning (Cernea, 1994).  
PRA has been applied in different rural development projects, especially in agricultural 
production and income generation for small farmers, participatory training, capacity building 
for civil society organizations and technology development, and participatory technical 
extension services, among others.  
In Bolivia, PRA methods have been widely used in agrarian development projects since 
the mid-1980s.  Since then, various NGOs have served as intermediaries between the state 
and international cooperation agencies.  Rural support projects aimed to mitigate the effects of 
neoliberal policies by facilitating the access of the poor to resources, skills, or income in order 
to escape from poverty (Kohl and Farthing, 2006:60–83).  These projects focused first on 
improving productivity in farming systems and then on strengthening market-oriented 
capacities and practices among small farmers and in improving their competitiveness.  
During the 1990s, as hundreds of participatory methods flourished across the world, 
critiques of their use in development projects emerged, especially by NGOs and mainstream 
organizations such as the World Bank and international development agencies.  These 
critiques questioned whether the participatory methods were fulfilling their original purposes 
of empowering the excluded, or whether, on the contrary, they were used to establish 
‘tyrannies’ in development projects (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  The main critiques of 
participatory development can be divided into three principal ideas.  First, use of these 
participatory methods tends to displace other legitimate forms of participation, limiting 
participation to spaces established in the projects and becoming a form of domination rather 
than a space of liberation (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  Second, the focus of participatory 
methods on local issues obscures the possibility of seeing structural problems affecting the 
excluded on a larger scale (Kapoor, 2002).  This leads to the romanticization of ‘the local’ as 
the space for solving development problems (Mohan and Stokke, 2000).  Third, the act of 
promoting the idea of participatory development to ‘uppers’ in the aid agencies led them to 
stress the importance of efficiency rather than empowerment (Parfitt, 2004).  
These critiques coincide in their concern about the power of these methods to de-politicize 
development.  To Rahnema, participation in the hands of powerful institutions serves to 
legitimate economic and institutional functions and to support a mainstream vision of 
development.  Therefore, he argues, participation had become a ‘Trojan horse’ to limit the 
possibilities of far-reaching social change (Rahnema, 1997).  Ferguson (1990) made an 
important contribution to this perspective in his well-known book The Anti-politics Machine, 
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which served as a starting point for a broader discussion on the risks of de-politicization of 
development through planned interventions.  Using a Foucauldian approach, he analyses the 
World Bank intervention in Lesotho, concluding that development programmes are an 
exercise in power to rewrite the subjectivity of the Third World’s poor, disciplining them 
through a series of participatory procedures.  He argues that de-politicization occurs when 
development projects that start with a political issue switch to technical solutions.  
Participation within this discourse can adopt many forms to serve the different interests of the 
project.  Therefore, relegating participation to a technical problem (increasing participation 
spaces to get the opinion of beneficiaries) obscures the politics of participation.  Along the 
same lines, Li (2007) shows that, through projects, different people or organizations adopt the 
role of trustee, assuming that they know what the best solutions are for people.  Arce and 
Long (1992) challenge the whole concept of ‘planned intervention’ and the models that most 
development agencies share when designing, implementing, and evaluating rural development 
strategies.  Nevertheless, these authors present a more moderate view, noting that 
development initiatives must come as much from above as from below, thus creating an 
interface between local and technical knowledge.  Scott (1998), meanwhile, confronts us with 
the risks of simplification as inherent in any externally planned intervention. 
Practitioners, and those that see opportunities in participatory methods, have tried to 
overcome these critiques by proposing a re-politicization of participatory development.  
Hickey and Mohan (2005:1), in their response to ‘the tyranny of participation,’ state: ‘[W]e 
were concerned with the extent to which participation could be re-politicised as a form of 
development theory and practice.’  Most of the authors in their edited volume agreed that 
participatory processes would be transformative if they adopted a political interpretation of 
citizenship and allowed critical analysis of the underlying causes of social exclusion, rather 
than trying to influence individual choices, through ‘capacity building,’ ‘change of attitudes,’ 
or specific development initiatives.  They aimed to broaden thinking about participation away 
from a focus on projects and techniques towards a wider political project of social justice 
(Cleaver et al., 2001; Hickey and Mohan, 2004).  The proposals included reinforcing political 
capabilities of the poor (Williams, 2004), adopting a focus on citizenship (Gaventa, 2004; 
Hickey and Mohan, 2005; Cornwall, 2005), and a political contract between the state and civil 
society to engage with underlying processes of development (involving uneven processes of 
state-, market-, and ‘civil-’ society formation) (Vincent, 2004).  These revisions sought to 
prevent development projects from being constrained within the frame of specific 
interventions in order to propose more radical participatory processes to influence decision 
makers to change policies.  The aim was to extend the notion of participation so that it would 
become a form of defending the rights of excluded groups.  
Although the proposals to re-politicize participation provide insights into new ways of 
influencing policies beyond the frame of specific development interventions, they do not 
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resolve the problem of de-politicization within these projects.  Furthermore, notably missing 
from this debate is a reflection on the changes in the participatory processes and technologies 
needed to implement projects.  In general, this separation of more radical and critical projects 
aimed at changing policies and more technical projects aimed at changing individual choices 
or material conditions establishes, implicitly, a dichotomy between what we might label as 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ politics.  ‘Real politics’ involves those participatory processes that are 
experienced through social movements and that are continuously questioning the causes of 
social injustice.  ‘Token politics,’ on the contrary, is a form of politics that uses participation 
to implement intervention projects for development in such a way that participation is no 
more than an instrument (a managerial or technical tool to develop specific projects or to 
design specific agrarian technologies).  Token politics ends with de-politicization, here 
considered a negative outcome.   
My conversation with Melean at the beginning of this chapter suggests, instead, that the 
ability to access power is not enough to decide what type of projects to do, or how to 
redistribute the resources for development or adapt the required technologies.  Productive 
aspects and technical questions cannot be subsumed under political positions.  Social 
movements in government also need to have adequate techniques to allow the selection and 
participation of disadvantaged participants in specific development projects, as well as the 
right technologies to use according to material (agri-ecological) conditions and needs.  In this 
same line, Bebbington (2010) recognizes a knowledge gap on the extent to which social 
movements, who come to occupy the state and become government themselves, pose 
alternatives to participation in concrete interventions as an instrument of management.  
The Bolivian situation, after the victory of Evo Morales and his MAS party, offers an 
opportunity to explore whether the fact of social movements getting into power creates 
alternative ways of implementing participation, or whether, on the contrary, they too construct 
processes of de-politicization or simplification when executing development projects.  In the 
following section, I outline the conceptual framework and the general argument of this 
research. 
 
F r a m e w o r k :  P o l i t i c s ,  t e c h n o l o g y ,  a n d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n   
 
Most scholars nowadays would not deny that there are interrelations between politics and 
technology.  Co-production has been used as a term to indicate that nature, science, and social 
dynamics shape the outcome of the interaction between science/technology and society 
(Jasanoff, 2003, 2005).  However, downplaying the role of expertise and technology in the 
decision-making process avoids the question of how technical project interventions deal with 
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politics (politics as the unending presence of conflicts and struggles in society).  Furthermore, 
underestimating the role of technology does not allow us to go beyond the dichotomy between 
‘good’ and desired politics and ‘bad’ politics led by technocratic project interventions.  To 
investigate the differences between a highly politicized view on participation, as presented by 
the MAS government, and a managerial and instrumental view on participation, as promoted 
by mainstream development interventions, it is necessary to flesh out politics and to make a 
distinction between politics and the technological aspects of planned intervention.  Thinking 
with Postero (2013b), I find the distinction between politics and policy offered by the 
agonistic views on democracy useful (Rancière, 1999; Moufe, 2005).  Rancière (1996) defines 
politics as a process of emancipation brought about by conflict or disagreement in which the 
different actors struggle to be heard and counted.  Using Tilly’s notion of politics (2002), I 
add that it is in this space of disagreement that the stories between ‘we’ and ‘they’ are 
constructed and that the power relations that keep these stories in place are defined.  
Participation in the political sphere is then a tool of emancipation and resistance through 
which different social groups try to change ‘the seemingly natural way of restricting who is 
included and whose voice is seen as legitimate’ (Rancière, 1999:27).  Politics is a different 
notion than policy.  Policy can be considered the implicit order that forms of participation and 
exclusion in the world assume (Rancière, 1999).  Participation in the policy sphere can also be 
seen as a tool or mode of governance, forming a fragile order which politics oppose.  For 
Rancière, both concepts can be analysed separately, although politics and policy are always 
‘bound up’ by power relations.  Social change occurs, according to Rancière, when those who 
should not speak have the possibility to speak, and when those who should not be recognized 
in the established order are recognized.  It is in the politics space that the course of social 
change, policies, and the scope of policies are defined, whereas policy is where material 
conditions for social change are defined and benefits distributed (Rancière, 1999). 
In this thesis, I use Rancière’s distinction between politics and policy to differentiate 
analytically between two views on participation: 1) participation as a tool for liberation and 
resistance in the political sphere and 2) participation as a technology, a governance tool to 
operationalize policies and to improve developmental effectiveness.  The majority of studies 
analysing the MAS government’s rise to power in Bolivia have focused on the first type of 
participation.  They tend to approach it by studying the effects on democracy and the role of 
social movements in the government.  For instance, Postero (2010a) focused on what the 
election of Evo Morales meant for Bolivian democracy; Postero (2010b) and Webber (2011) 
analysed the discursive changes of this government; Tapia (2011) and Zegada et al. (2011) 
focused on the transformation of the state from the state apparatus; and authors like Pearce 
(2011) and Grugel and Riggirozzi (2009, 2012) analysed the post-neoliberal model and its 
placement in the wider global economic context.  Although these studies are important for 
understanding how participation occurs in the political sphere, they pay less attention to how 
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these changes in politics are translated into changes in policy as the technologies to 
operationalize these political ideas.  The latter issue is precisely the major concern of this 
thesis.   
I adopt the view of technology given by Richards (2009:495) as ‘the human capacity to 
make (and unmake).’  Here, the participation schema is designed, built, maintained, and 
worked on by various human task groups.  These are shaped by the larger political project and 
vice versa, placed in a field where different kinds of power are being exercised.  Jansen and 
Vellema (2011:171) further elaborate the concept of technology, adding that the technology-
in-use and the associated objectives co-determine the technology as ‘situated action,’ since ‘it 
is not only the intrinsic characteristics of tools and artefacts that form the basis for explanation 
but the process of using them to make something.’  These definitions allow for a broader view 
on technology, by including not only artefacts and technical processes, but also forms of 
social ‘making’ of intervention and participation.  
Taking these definitions as a starting point, I would like to emphasize three aspects of how 
the notion of participatory technology is defined here.  The first is an instrumental use of 
participation to achieve better project outcomes, meaning how to operationalize policies 
promoted through development projects.  This refers to participatory technologies that allow 
mobilization of participants in projects and their involvement in the implementation of 
different project activities.  The second is the idea of methods that seek to strengthen the 
capacity of project participants to use ‘skills, tools, knowledge and techniques to accomplish 
certain ends’ (Jansen and Vellema, 2011:169).  These ends generally relate to objectives 
established within the framework of development projects and are necessary to evaluate their 
success.  Capacity-building processes might also include different intentions beyond the direct 
scope of the project, like the ability to negotiate in different areas of social life or to interact 
with the state.  Third, besides their intrinsic characteristics, all of these methods are placed in 
a field where different kinds of power are being exercised, meaning the product of politics or 
‘disagreement.’  In Bolivia, these participatory technologies have generally been applied by 
NGOs within a framework of research and development that proposes to i) link producers to 
the market, ii) promote social control of development projects through monitoring and 
evaluation, and iii) promote farmer participation in research and in the assessment of 
agricultural technology (Alvarez et al., 2008). 
In the political sphere, the MAS government moved away from the notion of civil society 
as ruled by neoliberal ideas and has made some efforts to move political participation to a 
place where civil society is the space for citizenship and participation.  The MAS government 
has implemented a political project that I call ‘neocollectivism.’  It puts the state at the centre 
of the debate and grassroots organizations in direct relation with it to achieve social justice.  
The state is not seen as opposed to civil society, as two different and autonomous spheres, but 
in a mutual relationship.  That is why Evo Morales likes to refer to his government as ‘a 
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government of social movements’ (Komadina and Geffroy, 2007).  To analyse this 
neocollectivism and its attempt to establish a direct relationship beyond the liberal definition 
of civil society, I use a ‘strategic relationship approach’ (Jessop, 2008).  This is based on 
Gramsci’s notion of civil society, in which the state is seen not as separate from society but in 
relation to it, and capable of guaranteeing existing production relations (Gramsci, 1971; 
Jessop, 2008), or in our case, endowed with the ability to transform hegemonic production 
relations. 
To characterize the political ideas of the neoliberal project and its policies or modes of 
governance, the Foucauldian concept of neoliberal governmentality is elaborated (Lemke, 
2001, 2007; Jessop, 2006; Joseph, 2012).  The French theorist Michel Foucault observed the 
emergence of a new form of governance led by liberal ideas of freedom.  This new way of 
exercising power (or ‘the art of government’) is not practised from the top down, but from 
within society.  It ‘operates through the promotion of freedom, governing from a distance...’ 
(Foucault, 2010:10).  Scholarship on neoliberal governmentality, based mainly in the global 
North, suggests that the mechanisms of self-governance, like participation based on ‘good 
governance,’ reform state rule through a range of techniques and an ensemble of new 
‘institutions’ to govern people in freedom, by telling them to be enterprising, active, and 
responsible citizens (Miller and Rose, 1990; Joseph, 2012).  Although neoliberal 
governmentality is often seen as a new definition of power, Joseph (2012:25–26) argued that 
this should not lead us to believe that it displaces sovereign and disciplinary powers as more 
direct and ‘coercive regulation’ (i.e. state power), but that different modes of governance can 
co-exist.  In this same line, Xu (2011) illustrates how, in China, authoritarian and sovereign 
power intertwines with neoliberal governmentality in the state management of unemployment.  
This book explores whether this is also the case in Bolivia at a time when a change is being 
attempted to shift the political project from neoliberalism to neocollectivism.  Figure 1.1 
shows the principal concepts used in this thesis.  
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Figure 1.1 Politics and Policy Spheres of Participation 
 
R e s e a r c h  Q u e s t i o n s  
 
The previous section presented the analytical distinction between two views on 
participation: on the one hand, a politicized view on participation as a means to empowerment 
and social transformation, and, on the other hand, a view on participation as a managerial tool 
for efficiency in development project intervention.  This research uses the case of Evo 
Morales’ Bolivia to ask: 
What are the differences between participation as a politicized view of empowerment and 
social transformation and participation as a managerial tool for efficiency, and how do these 
two approaches conflict and articulate in rural development projects in Bolivia? 
This research question will be answered by addressing the following three broad key 
research questions:   
1) How does the MAS government shape participation as a political project? 
2) How does participation as a managerial tool contrast with participation as a political 
project? 
3) What are the articulations between these two approaches to participation? 
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R e s e a r c h  D e s i g n  
 
The thesis is based on qualitative research to investigate the differences between two views 
on participation and how they are translated into practice through rural development projects.  
Qualitative research involves the collection and use of a variety of empirical materials, for 
example, case studies, interviews, artefacts, and observations that describe routine and 
problematic moments and meanings in people’s lives (Rose, 1997; Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000).  The fieldwork was carried out over 18 months, divided into three phases: i) an 
exploratory phase from March to July 2010, ii) a case studies phase from August to December 
2011 and February to March 2012, and iii) a follow-up and feedback phase in August 2012. 
In the exploratory phase, I aimed to take a first look at the main rural initiatives in the 
country, become familiar with the Bolivian context, and select relevant cases to allow me to 
answer the research questions.  My first contacts were two national NGOs with which I had 
previously collaborated on development and research initiatives in 2005: PROINPA based in 
the city of Cochabamba and CEPAC based in the city of Santa Cruz.  These two NGOs 
introduced me to the world of rural development in the country, and they put me in contact 
with key actors in this sector.  In this phase, I visited different governmental and non-
governmental institutions that do interventions for rural development in the departments of La 
Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz.  I also spent three weeks in the city of La Paz, the nation’s 
political capital, interviewing politicians, government officials, former government officials, 
NGOs, and intellectuals about the processes of change in the country and the different views 
on rural development. 
In the second phase of my fieldwork, I used the extended case method to understand how 
the two approaches to participation operate in specific project interventions.  The extended 
case method is a case study approach in the tradition of interpretative science.  It has been 
used to expand and inform existing theories through the intensive study of specific cases 
(Burawoy, 1998; Yin, 2009).  Rather than attempting to eliminate contextual effects as in 
positivist science, Burawoy proposes an alternative – a reflexive science model that builds 
upon context as a virtue or strength from which it derives its principles of intervention, 
process, structuration, and reconstruction.  To Burawoy, case studies are useful in connecting 
the abstract with the particular, as they allow a detailed examination of an example for the 
purpose of informing theoretical abstraction: ‘It specifically facilitates moving between micro 
and macro scales’ (1998:5).  I chose to use the extended case method in three case studies: 
Company in Support of Food Production (EMAPA), Rural Alliances Project (PAR), and 
Promotion and Research of Andean Products (PROINPA) Foundation. 
EMAPA and PAR are the MAS government’s most important rural development 
intervention projects in terms of funding (EMAPA) and coverage (PAR).  The MAS 
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government sees these projects as two of the principal pillars that contribute to reaching ‘food 
security with sovereignty,’ which is the basis of its proposal for rural development.  Chapter 2 
delves into more detail about these pillars.  EMAPA is the primary initiative to strengthen the 
role of the state in rural development.  It was created as a public company in August of 2007.  
Its goal is to support agricultural production and the commercialization of small farmers’ 
production.  This company supports producers in the buying/selling of agricultural goods, 
buying of agricultural products, basic transformation of production and commercialization, 
provision of services for the production system, provision of technical assistance, equipment 
rental, storage, and other services relating to agricultural production (EMAPA, 2008).  PAR, 
financed by the World Bank, is structured as a series of alliances that link the services that the 
private sector can bring with the processes and institutional weight that the public sector 
offers to create strong alliances between actors across agricultural supply chains.  The 
programme offers financial support to farmers’ organizations and other services, such as 
assistance with business plan development prior to investment.  
PROINPA, a former public research programme privatized during neoliberalism, is one of 
the most important rural development NGOs in the country.  I analyse the experience of the 
application of the participatory plant breeding (PPB) methodology in Morochata-
Cochambamba to overcome potato late blight, one of the most devastating crop diseases in the 
country.  I also focus on the participatory monitoring and evaluation (PM&E) methodology 
and on the participatory methodologies linking small farmers with markets in the Padilla 
Association of Chili and Peanut Producers (APAJIMPA) in Padilla Municipality-Chuquisaca.  
The work with APAJIMPA was intertwined with that of Fundación Valles as the latter served 
as a second-level organization to fund other NGOs, including PROINPA.   
The selection of fieldwork sites combined different factors: i) the importance of these sites 
in terms of investment and duration of selected project interventions, 2) the willingness of the 
institutions involved to carry out research on these sites, and 3) the active involvement of 
small farmers in project interventions.  Figure 1.2 shows the fieldwork sites by project 
intervention. 
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Figure 1.2 Location of research sites 
Note: EMAPA: (a) San Pedro, (b) Santa Rosa del Sara, and (c) Yapacaní municipalities; PAR: (d) El 
Torno, (e) Valle Grande, (f) Comarapa, and (g) Lagunillas municipalities; PROINPA: (h) Morochata 
and (i) Padilla municipalities 
To understand the context of these research sites, it is necessary to describe Bolivian 
geography.  Bolivia is a landlocked tropical country divided into three regions: the Andean 
highlands (known in Spanish as el altiplano) with altitudes between 3200 and 6500m, the 
valleys or Andean slopes (800–3200m), and the lowlands (<800m) (Seiler, 2013).  Colonial 
Bolivian society first evolved in the highlands around mineral exploitation, whereas the 
lowlands remained relatively inaccessible to Spanish colonial control (Klein, 2011).  Only 
after the National Revolution of 1952 did both the state and international development 
agencies channel capital to promote the development of large-scale cash crop agriculture in 
the lowlands; this in turn fostered migration processes aimed at peasants in the highlands 
(Gill, 1987).  The highlands and valleys (usually referred to as the Andes) and the lowlands 
followed different paths of agrarian change.  Whereas the Andes are characterized by small-
farmer agriculture, in the lowlands, small farmers and agribusiness co-exist. 
Once at the research sites, I followed the advice given by Marcus and Fischer (1986:94): 
‘Rather than being situated in one, or perhaps two, communities for the entire period of 
research, the fieldworkers must be mobile, covering a network of sites that encompasses a 
process, which is in fact the object of study.’  I carried out interviews and participant 
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observation of project activities.  I formally interviewed 188 people.  A complete list of 
interviews is presented in Appendix 1.1.  Most interviews lasted between 30 minutes and two 
hours.  I did not use a fully structured list of questions, but a list of themes that I wanted to 
cover, because I wanted to be open to new themes that could come from these interviews.  
These interviews can be described as semi-structured with some flexibility (Silverman, 2008).  
I also talked in informal settings with a variety of people.  These conversations were recorded 
as memos in a field notebook.  The interviews and memos were transcribed and coded using 
software for qualitative research (NVivo programme).  
Fieldwork followed different strategies depending on the degree of collaboration of the 
organizations involved in each case study.  In the case of EMAPA, I attended regional fairs, 
technicians’ field visits, and project activities.  Access to documentary material was restricted 
as EMAPA officials were careful about providing sensitive information.  On one occasion, an 
officer told me that he preferred to omit confidential data because this could be used by 
political opponents.  In the other cases, information obtained through interviews could always 
be cross-checked with a large amount of documentary material, including project reports, 
activity summaries, and so forth.  I also attended staff meetings, accompanied the technicians 
in their daily activities, and had the opportunity to spend time in the organization offices to 
observe the internal dynamics. 
The third phase of follow-up and feedback included more visits to each of the case studies, 
where I did some interviews and a presentation on the main research findings to the local 
organizations.  Additionally, I held two feedback and reflection workshops with project 
participants, one in the municipality of Yapacani with the rice-producer beneficiaries of 
EMAPA, and the other in the municipality of Padilla with APAJIMPA and with the support 
of Fundación Valles.  The themes of these workshops included a reconstruction of the 
timeline of external interventions, the changes carried out in the project interventions, and a 
reflection among participants on what should be done to improve the results.  
I also spent time in the Bolivian Information and Documentation Centre (CEDIB) in 
Cochabamba and the library of the graduate programme on development studies (CIDES) in 
La Paz to review newspaper articles, reports, and research published by national and 
international development organizations, the government, and universities.  This literature 
review allowed me to contrast my data collection with other findings, to look at 
inconsistencies, and to learn the interests and lines of thought of the interviewed people and 
their institutions. 
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S t r u c t u r e  a n d  A r g u m e n t  o f  t h e  T h e s i s  
 
This thesis is structured around six chapters.  Following this introduction, Chapter 2 
explores the growing conflicts between the NGOs and the MAS government as an illustration 
of the politically charged environment of current Bolivian neocollectivism.  This chapter 
differentiates between two types of NGOs: political and technical.  Whereas conflict exists in 
the political sphere between more politics-oriented NGOs and the MAS government, 
technical NGOs have found ways to adapt to the MAS government’s policies by 
strengthening their technical capacities.  The chapter concludes that there is complementarity 
between the NGOs’ technical approach and the MAS government’s political approach.  
Neocollectivism, as a politically driven view on participation, built a vision for social justice 
(the what), and NGOs’ technical approach to participation and agrarian development 
highlights the enabling factors that allow social change (the how).  Chapters 3 analyses the 
EMAPA case, the most important rural development project to shift from neoliberalism to 
neocollectivism.  This chapter shows how politicized rural development projects, like 
neocollectivist adaptations of neoliberalism in Morales’ Bolivia, cannot escape the strictures 
of nature and technological efficiency.  Chapter 4 focuses on the PROINPA case.  It examines 
specific development projects where participatory methodologies where shaped to accomplish 
neoliberal objectives, especially projects’ managerial efficiency.  It also shows, however, that 
PROINPA was not a passive actor in all these processes of implementing neoliberalism.  Its 
project interventions were the result of different processes of contestation from within and 
from among groups of actors at local level, where technical success was also important.  
Chapter 5 takes the PAR case to analyse the articulation of neocollectivism with 
neoliberalism.  It shows how the MAS government has not been able to shape the mode of 
governance of its development interventions to its political project.  Instead, it has appealed to 
the neoliberal notion of governmentality as a way to operationalize these interventions and 
push neocollectivism forward.  I conclude this thesis by knitting together the threads of my 
story: participation, politics, and technology.  
This research shows that the changes in the political sphere, and consequently in the role of 
the state and society in development, influence the conditions in which participatory 
technologies occur.  These conditions might enable or constrain the scope of participation in 
development projects.  For example, by influencing the intentions or mechanisms that are 
created to change power relations, the way of mobilizing resources for development and the 
relationship between the state and the actors within civil society may change.  Furthermore, 
participatory technologies are still needed to prepare the enabling environment (the skills and 
capacities people need to face agricultural problems) necessary to operationalize specific 
projects affecting people’s material conditions.  Societies cannot escape either the technical 
projects or the technical strategies required to select participants and to obtain their views to 
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monitor and evaluate the projects.  Technical projects are everywhere, and many of them are 
(in fact) demands from below, seen as necessary to improve farmers’ productive systems, 
establish fair market conditions, control crop disease, develop varieties, and so forth. In my 
view, the purpose of separating the political from the technical is not necessarily to analyse 
them in isolation, but to make visible different aspects embedded in the development 
interventions and to take them both into account.  Thus, this thesis illustrates how the political 
neocollectivist project cannot escape the technocratic dimensions of government, as for 
example will be seen in participatory technologies intended to assure more effectiveness, 
accountability, and participant mobilization in development projects.  
The establishment of a close relationship between participatory technologies and political 
ideas is by no means something new.  Postero (2007) has shown how in Bolivia during 
neoliberalism, especially under the Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada government, democratic 
liberal ideals of citizenship inspired different laws to enhance participation to generate 
important social changes in society.  The neoliberal political project in Bolivia ushered in the 
concept of ‘multicultural citizenship’ as a point of departure to create different participatory 
mechanisms or technologies aimed at incorporating peasants or indigenous people within the 
scope of state control.  Contestation against these participation mechanisms, in turn, served as 
channels to allow the re-organization of society as a preamble to social ferment and the search 
for alternatives. 
Why is this important for agrarian development in Bolivia and for development practice 
more generally? In Chapter 2, I show how the MAS government has tried to politicize 
development in order to generate structural changes.  This politicization has included both 
redistributive and recognition measures to overcome the structural causes of poverty in 
Bolivia.  In the introduction to the present chapter, the words of Aniceto echo this re-
politicization attempt.  He highlights the fact that it is the people that should do development, 
because ‘we know what should be done.’  The neocollectivism promoted by the MAS 
government has become a kind of Political Machine, almost an attempted antithesis of the 
Anti-politics Machine as conceived by Ferguson (1990).  My conversation with Aniceto and 
Melean presented above, and the later empirical chapters of this thesis, show that, in its 
concern about what should be done, the MAS government has paid too little attention to how 
it should be done, if operationalization of policy is to be efficient and have the expected 
results in development interventions. 
Besides helping the MAS government decision makers, the results of this research might 
also serve to support those who have been part of the anti-politics machine.  During my 
research, I have had the opportunity to work with colleagues, agricultural engineers, and 
social scientists, who like to think that they are outside of politics, especially in Latin 
America, where politics is strongly associated with corruption, clientelism, and strong social 
protests, including violent conflict and disorders.  Engineers as well as facilitators and 
Chapter 1: General Introduction 
20 
 
designers of methodologies and participatory spaces prefer to see themselves as technology 
developers, and, although they acknowledge and strive to see the political as important, 
politics tends to be seen as an item that escapes the scope of projects.  Just as Ferguson stated 
(1990), I also argue that de-politicization, in the sense of ‘technocratizing’ problems that are 
political, is inherent in development interventions.  This does not mean, however, that they 
cannot be accompanied by a process of politicization that shapes these interventions.  By 
showing how participatory development and political participation are different but 
interrelated spheres of development, this thesis argues that the de-politicization of planning 
interventions is inevitable.  The challenge, then, is how to create bridges between politics and 
technological interventions, when both (on their separate tracks) are aimed at the construction 
of more just societies. 
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Abstract 
This chapter examines the growing conflict between NGOs and the MAS government in 
post-neoliberal Bolivia.  This government proposes to re-politicize agrarian development by 
favouring a prominent role for the state and sees NGOs as a threat to social transformation.  
Our analysis engages both with critiques of development intervention that consider technical 
interventions as de-politicizing and with contrasting viewpoints that argue that politicization 
of development often leads to a neglect of the technological aspects of planning, intervention, 
and progress.  By using data on three of the most important national NGOs, we analyse how 
the political and technological fields are being defined and redefined, and how these play a 
role in the interaction between the three NGOs and the MAS government.  We show that the 
NGOs appear to have found the space to respond to public discursive confrontation and adapt 
their interventions to post-neoliberal politics.  While the MAS government is making efforts 
to bring the state back in, NGOs are trying to accommodate to a highly politicized 
environment by highlighting their own technical strengths and filling the current technological 
services void. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
The explosion of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the developing world is 
especially associated with neoliberalism as they were seen as the ideal vehicle with which to 
replace the state when the latter privatized many of its functions (Hulme and Edwards, 1997).  
Against the backdrop of the ‘post-neoliberal’ wave that swept over Latin America (Escobar, 
2010; Córdoba et al., 2014b) however, the debate on their role in development has intensified.  
The so-called New Left governments (Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia) started to question 
the hegemonic development paradigms influenced by neoliberalism (Escobar, 2010) and to 
propose post-neoliberal alternatives that change the relations between the state and civil 
society.  With the rise to power of Evo Morales and the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) 
party in 2006 (re-elected in 2010), the Bolivian case offers an ideal opportunity to examine 
the conflicts that emerge between a ‘progressive government’ and NGOs.  NGOs in Bolivia 
face a critical backlash.  Whereas neoliberalism attempted to de-politicize development by 
delegating the state’s work to NGOs (Kohl, 2003), the central aim of Morales’ political 
project is to achieve radical changes through a more prominent role of the state in 
development to reverse centuries of colonialism and social injustice (Córdoba et al., 2014b).  
In this context, Bolivian NGOs are now perceived as an obstacle to social transformation. 
The first MAS government (2006–2010) increasingly questioned ideas and practices of 
NGOs.  The National Development Plan of 2006 states in the introduction that NGO projects 
have been instrumental to the neoliberal model.  The plan criticizes NGO practices as 
‘Western civilizational guidelines, whose formal language hides the devices of domination 
and social control that endorse the practice of colonial power and knowledge’ (Ministerio de 
Planificación del Desarrollo, 2007:5).  The MAS government’s development view, instead, is 
rooted in the concept of ‘Living Well’1 as opposed to the concept of ‘Living Better’ (Vivir 
Mejor), which is seen as being supported by individual rather than collective access to, and 
accumulation of, material goods (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2007).  The 
Living Better concept is implicitly attributed to NGOs working within the neoliberal model.  
The second MAS government (2010) sharpened this criticism further and targeted NGOs 
more explicitly.  The two most visible heads of the government, President Evo Morales, a 
cocalero (coca grower) leader and the first indigenous president on the continent, and his 
vice-president, Alvaro García-Linera, have questioned the legitimacy and capacity of NGOs 
to represent the real needs of the poor. Morales has repeatedly declared: ‘NGOs use the poor 
                                                          
 
1 Living Well, Vivir Bien in Spanish, is inspired by the Andean concept of reciprocity and equity where people do not want to 
live better than anyone else but to live well all together (collectively). 
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to live well’, and accuses them of ‘inventing things to receive funding,’ making reference to 
their role as mediator between the state or international cooperation and the poor (Vaca, 
2009).  Vice President Linera has gone even further and accuses them of working for foreign 
interests (García-Linera, 2012a). 
NGOs felt threatened and attacked by the MAS government.  In May 2013, the MAS 
government expelled the US Agency for International Development (USAID), accusing it of 
‘interference in public policy’ and of conspiring against the ‘indigenous’ government of Evo 
Morales.  This was followed by the expulsion of the Danish NGO IBIS on similar charges in 
December 2013.  The following quote from a recognized consultant of national and 
international NGOs plainly illustrates these worries: ‘The NGOs are in absolute crisis, we 
know.  President Morales is happy to be destroying NGOs.  Today we have a state that did 
nothing and suddenly wants it all’ (Interview, 7 October 2010).  The statistics reflect a crisis 
among NGOs. In the neoliberal period between 1981 and 2005, the number of NGOs 
increased from 181 to approximately 1,600 (Jica, 2007:23).  The number of estimated 
registered NGOs had decreased to about 465 in 2010 (von Freyberg, 2011).  This decrease 
may not be entirely an effect of MAS policies, but these certainly contributed to a less 
favourable environment for NGOs. 
This chapter examines the confrontation between the MAS government and NGOs.  To 
explore this confrontation, we present the practices of three important NGOs in agrarian 
development: Fundación Valles, the Foundation for the Promotion and Research of Andean 
Products (PROINPA), and the Centre for the Promotion of Farmer Production (CEPAC).  
Whereas during neoliberalism development related to a technical problem (Rodríguez-
Carmona, 2008), during the MAS government it has been extremely re-politicized by 
presenting it as a state responsibility and the result of power relations.  In particular, we 
analyse how political and the technological fields are being defined and how they play a role 
in the interaction between NGOs and the MAS government.  We show that, although there is 
a confrontation in the political sphere between the MAS government and more politically 
oriented NGOs, NGOs have found strategies in the technical sphere to align their 
interventions to the current context.  They are trying to adapt to the new situation by offering 
technological and training services to social organizations allied to the MAS government or to 
respond to the MAS government’s demands for technological services at national level. 
The material presented here is based on fieldwork in April and October 2010, September–
December 2011, and July–August 2012.  It consisted of around 54 open and in-depth 
interviews, participant observation, attending workshops and events, and reviewing written 
sources, including NGOs’ project documents and regional and national newspapers.  The 
interviews were held with state officials, representatives of the government, NGOs, agrarian 
unions, and farmer organizations. 
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The argument is presented as follows: the next section distinguishes between technical and 
political NGOs and describes their principal characteristics.  The third section introduces the 
MAS government’s political project for agrarian development.  Then, the fourth section 
explores the clash between NGOs and the MAS government, and the fifth section presents 
three case studies of NGO interventions to illustrate tensions and negotiations on the ground.  
Finally, we conclude by highlighting the need to unravel the technical and political content of 
NGOs’ confrontations with, and adaptation to, the MAS government context. 
 
D i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  N G O s  i n  A g r a r i a n  D e v e l o p m e n t  
 
NGOs represent a wide variety of non-governmental non-profit membership and support 
organizations.  According to the emphasis of their interventions, we may distinguish 
analytically between political and technical NGOs.  Political NGOs provide political 
education and awareness-raising of constraining social relations and aim to create spaces for 
political participation based on social justice concerns.  Technical NGOs foster projects that 
aim to deliver technologies that solve production problems and to incorporate the poor in 
production networks.  Political NGOs in Bolivia began to strengthen in the early 1970s and 
were mostly led by activists from the Catholic Church, the predominant leftist political 
parties, the universities, or independent professional groups.  These NGOs were part of the 
resistance movement against the dictatorship regimes of the 1960s and 1970s (Kruse, 
1994:124; Bebbington and Thiele, 1993) and were often anti-capitalist and founded on the 
basis of a commitment to alternative development (Bebbington, 1997).  Their work was 
inspired by liberation theology and Paulo Freire’s ideas on participation as a means of raising 
the poor’s awareness of asymmetric power relations (Kay, 2004).  Their methods and 
practices for intervention focused primarily on strengthening grassroots organizations and 
social movements, but also aimed to achieve structural change at national level (Kay, 2004).  
They grouped into networks such as the National Union of Institutions for Social Work 
(UNITAS).
2
  
The emergence of technical NGOs relates strongly to the shift to neoliberalism.  As of 
1985, the state implemented neoliberal policies and, one year later, the central government 
developed a Social Emergency Fund (Fondo Social de Emergencia, FSE) to mitigate the 
social costs and effects of these measures (Kohl and Farthing, 2006).  The FSE, created with 
                                                          
 
2 Examples of such NGOs are the Centre of Legal Studies and Social Research (CEJIS), the Centre for Research and 
Promotion of Farmers (CIPCA), Loyola Cultural Action (ACLO), and more recently the Communication Centre for Andean 
Development (CENDA). 
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support from the World Bank, helped to give birth to technical NGOs that were meant to 
increase the reach of FSE programmes and to attract international aid funding (Kay, 2004; 
Kohl, 2003).  The number of these NGOs grew rapidly to accommodate the available money 
as approximately one-third of all FSE funds were channelled through them (Van Niekerk, 
1992).  In the 1990s, President Sanchez de Lozada enabled a new wave of neoliberal reforms 
guided by the principles of privatization and decentralization.  Amongst the most important 
reforms for our discussion were the Law of Popular Participation and the Administrative 
Decentralization Law, which together established a new system for local participation in 
decision making on public investment (Ayo, 2004; Postero, 2007).  Technical NGOs 
expanded their presence at municipal level and introduced participatory development methods 
in capacity building; training; project design; adaptation of, and experimentation with, new 
technologies; and monitoring and evaluation (Bebbington, 1997).  The underlying idea was 
that these methods enabled the participation of target populations and would contribute to 
technology development, sustainable livelihoods, and incorporation of small farmers into the 
market (Salazar et al., 2004; Santacoloma et al., 2005; Córdoba et al., 2014a). 
This distinction between technical and political NGOs is an analytical one.  It does not 
mean that technical NGOs do not have politics; these domains are intertwined (Jansen and 
Vellema, 2011).  In gradations, every NGO is both technical and political, but how much and 
in what sense has to be defined empirically.  Before we do that however, we first describe the 
different views within the MAS government on agricultural development and the conflicts 
between the two NGO groups and the MAS government.  
 
T h e  M A S  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  t h e  R i s e  o f  N e o c o l l e c t i v i s m  i n  
B o l i v i a  
 
The twenty-first century began in Bolivia with an intense social upheaval against 
neoliberal reforms.  Peasant and indigenous social movements, together with urban grassroots 
organizations, spurred a series of events against the neoliberal project that began with the 
‘Water War’ in 2000 in Cochabamba, where protesters expressed their disapproval of the 
privatization of the municipal water supply.  The Water War was followed by the ‘Gas War’ 
in 2003 and 2005, as different social movements protested against the privatization of the 
country’s natural gas, resulting in the resignation and flight of President Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada in October 2003.  The organization of the MAS party is closely linked to these 
historical moments.  The movement originated in the powerful Cocalero movement in the 
Chapare region and was successful in uniting progressively peasant, indigenous, and urban 
movements in what was called the Pacto de Unidad (Unity Pact) towards democratic 
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elections in 2005 (Komadina and Geffroy, 2007).  In 2006, the MAS party, led by Evo 
Morales, took over state control and a new constitution was approved in 2009.  In 2010, 
Morales was re-elected as president. In its second term, the MAS government aims to reshape 
fundamentally the development agenda for poverty reduction in rural areas.  
The MAS government, as a confederation of social movements, combined three tendencies 
with different demands and agendas (Postero, 2010b; Komadina and Geffroy, 2007; Molina, 
2006): the tendency of indigenous and sustainable development, whose central demand is the 
decolonization of the state; the left anti-imperialist tendency, which favours a strong state 
capable of defending the nation against transnational companies and neoliberalism; and the 
popular tendency, which gives the popular-sector social movements, especially agrarian 
unions (sindicatos) and urban neighbourhood associations (juntas vecinales), a key role 
(Postero, 2010b).  
Each of these three tendencies has a different proposal for the rural sector.  The first 
tendency, indigenous and sustainable development, combines the vision of Living Well with 
the ‘rights of Mother Earth’ to develop environmentally friendly technologies and to retrieve 
indigenous knowledge of agricultural production.  Within this tendency, we can classify the 
Confederation of Indigenous People of Bolivia (CIDOB) and the National Council of Ayllus 
and Marcas of Bolivia (CONAMAQ).  
The second, leftist, tendency, especially defended by Vice President García-Linera, has 
proposed an economic model called ‘Andean-Amazonian Capitalism’ (Lora, 2005).  This 
entails constructing a strong state regulating the exploitation of natural resources by extracting 
its surplus and transferring it to the rural areas for the industrialization and modernization of 
agriculture (Gómez, 2007).  One element of this model is the nationalization of hydrocarbon 
and natural resource industries and the creation of state companies in the rural sector, most 
notably the Support Company for Food Production (EMAPA).  EMAPA represents a 
redistributive policy, subsidizing small and medium producers and offering an alternative to 
vertically integrated systems of commercialization dominated by larger producers.  It 
intervenes through the sale of agricultural inputs (seeds, agrochemicals, and diesel) at 
preferential prices to farmer organizations, technical assistance, and the purchase of farmers’ 
output, paying 15 per cent above the established market price (Córdoba and Jansen, 2013). 
The third, the popular tendency, primarily represented by Evo Morales, defends a 
campesino (peasant) vision of rural development based on the principles of ‘food 
sovereignty.’  It rejects the concept of food security that focuses on food supply and instead 
advocates a form of food sovereignty in which the state plays a major role in promoting the 
production, preservation, and/or acquisition of food, and develops alternatives for the 
globalization and corporatization of food systems (Cartagena, 2012).  The state should 
support social organizations that assemble around campesino interests by directly transferring 
resources to them.  Two different types of social organizations support this tendency.  On one 
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side, we find politically oriented organizations such as the Sole Union Confederation of 
Bolivian Peasant Workers (CSUTCB), the most powerful peasant organization in the country, 
uniting the majority of agrarian unions, especially in the highlands; the Union Confederation 
of Intercultural Communities in Bolivia (CSCIB), comprising a large proportion of the unions 
in the lowlands; the National Federation of Peasant Women Bartolina Sisa (FNMCB-BS); and 
the Cocalero Movement represented in the seven union confederations of the Tropics of 
Cochabamba.  On the other side, we find economic support organizations.  Economic 
smallholder organizations (OECAs) are grouped in the Coordinating Committee for the 
Integration of Economic Organizations of Bolivia (CIOEC) and the Association of Ecological 
Producers of Bolivia (AOPEB).  Community-based peasant unions originated after the 
National Revolution of 1952 to facilitate the land titling process and since then have 
represented these communities.  The CIOEC has a more recent history linked to the support of 
NGOs since the 1980s (Bebbington, 1996).  The CIOEC seeks to address production 
problems, especially agricultural, and its members have been trained, especially in production 
aspects and resource management, to improve their competitiveness in the market.  
In the MAS government’s public discourse (what is said), the party’s organization is linked 
to a historical moment of articulation attempting to reconcile these tendencies under a 
common slogan: ‘the dismantling of colonialism and neoliberalism and participation in local 
democratic spaces’ (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2007:21).  This discourse 
advocates a notion of social justice that balances redistribution, recognition, and 
representation claims of indigenous and poor people and seeks to reformulate the meanings of 
social justice towards social transformation.  To achieve this, the MAS government proposes 
a radical and politically charged approach to participation in rural development that we label 
as ‘neocollectivism.’  It comprises different models of collective action for social justice vis-
à-vis neoliberal politics: leftist demands, favouring a strong state as resource distributor; 
popular demands for political representation and direct dialogue with grassroots 
organizations, especially agrarian unions, as representatives of the communitarian circle to 
drive production projects; and indigenous collective identities.  
 
Neocollectivism and internal tensions  
 
Tensions among the three tendencies within neocollectivism have not been long in coming.  
Social organizations in the popular tendency that supported the MAS government during its 
first term in office, like the CIOEC (the network of economic organizations), have declared 
themselves ‘distanced from the government’ during its second term.  They primarily complain 
about the lack of dialogue and that politicians do not recognize the experiences of economic 
smallholder organizations, the OECAs (CIOEC, 2008).  The leftist trend has been critical of 
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what it perceives to be a conflict of interest.  Nina, the national director of the CIOEC, 
disapproves of the prominent role of the state in agricultural production and 
commercialization as follows:   
 
With these policies, the state will be in charge of everything, they are state 
socialist policies.  I don’t know what it can be called… if the small producers 
want to reach the market, the state stops us; it doesn’t allow us.  We are 
worried.  For example, we sell dairy products for the school-feeding 
programme.  Now, the government has created dairy plants to deliver these 
same products, it is taking the market from us, the small producers.  This trend 
creates a struggle between the state and small producers (Interview, 4 October 
2010).  
 
The CIOEC considers the involved state companies as a threat to small farmers’ market 
opportunities.  
There are also disagreements within the popular tendency.  These concern the selection of 
organizations that should receive state support.  The CSUTCB has publicly pressured the 
government to support the social movements directly, as representatives of the communities, 
with productive projects.  The CIOEC, on the contrary, has advocated for the recognition of 
the diversity of groups within a community.  Interviewed leaders argue that social 
movements, especially agrarian unions, have a more political and organizational role, but very 
little experience in production.  Because of this, their projects have little technical viability or 
only involve products with little added value (rice, wheat, maize, potatoes, and so forth).  The 
following quotation from Suazo, the president of the CIOEC in the department of Santa Cruz, 
exemplifies this discontent:  
 
We, as the CIOEC, have presented projects, but they aren’t approved quickly 
because the government is embracing the agrarian unions with a Marxist base.  
For them there is money, for them there is Evo Cumple [‘Evo fulfils,’ a 
government programme].  But for us, [nothing], because we want to transform, 
for example to sell processed products, so the government doesn’t like this 
vision, it wants us to sell our unprocessed produce and other people can 
transform it and earn (Interview, 30 September 2010).  
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Suazo and his colleagues in the CIOEC believed that the absence of an arrangement 
between them and the government was due to a lack of power to influence decision makers, in 
contrast to the agrarian unions, which were represented in the Ministry of Rural Development 
with two of their leaders: Julia Ramos and Nemesia Achacollo (previous and current 
ministers).  In the years after this interview, the CIOEC continued to advocate for a law that 
recognizes not only communitarian economic initiatives but also economics-oriented peasant 
organizations and family farming, and Law 338 on Peasant Economic Organizations and 
Community Economic Organizations was approved in January 2013.  Confusion exists, 
however, on how this new law will be operationalized and coordinated in practice. 
The leaders of the agrarian unions, on the other hand, defended the government’s choice of 
targeting them for support.  It complements their claims to access to political representation.  
This is an opportunity that they never had before.  Some of the resources that were channelled 
through local governments are now allocated directly to social movements.  They argue that 
this streamlines the implementation of production projects and avoids government 
bureaucracy (Rojas, 2012).  
Tensions have also emerged between, on the one hand, leftist and popular tendencies, and, 
on the other, indigenous movements who direct their claims towards challenging identity-
based forms of social injustice.  These indigenous movements feel their territories threatened 
by the exploitation of natural resources and infrastructure projects driven by the state’s 
industrialization and modernization intentions.  This is the case for CIDOB and CONAMAQ, 
the country’s two most important indigenous social movements.  The tensions reached a peak 
around the Isiboro Securé National Park (TIPNIS) conflict.
 
  The government decided to build 
a new – approximately 300 km – road that would split this territory in two, despite resistance 
from indigenous groups that live there.  The government argued that this road was necessary 
for the integration and development of the country, opening new markets, and boosting 
production in rural communities.  Indigenous movements, however, rejected the construction 
of this road since they regarded it as a government strategy to divide their territory and 
organizations, parcel out the land, and allow the in-migration of colonists, especially coca 
growers from the Chapare region, who are key supporters of the MAS government.  As a 
protest, members of indigenous movements marched more than 1,400 kilometres from the 
city of Trinidad in Beni to La Paz (the seat of the government).  They accused the MAS 
government of being authoritarian and pointed out the contradictions of a government that 
calls itself indigenous, while closing the lines of dialogue and participation in decision 
making with them as part of its constituency (Opinión, 2011).  Meanwhile, agrarian unions 
staged their own counter-march to support the construction of the road on behalf of the 
country’s development.  Finally, in 2013, the MAS government revoked its intention to build 
this road. 
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The TIPNIS case represents perhaps the clearest example of the conflicts that emerge when 
an attempt is being made to unite three different tendencies in a single approach to social 
justice.  In practice, participation within the MAS government is mostly a bottom-up process, 
relying on mobilization of social movements to accept or reject political decisions.  In seeking 
ways to cohabit with neoliberalism and change it, the tendencies within neocollectivism are 
not fully subordinated to Morales’ authority; on the contrary, they try to impose their claims 
over other tendencies. Insofar as their social justice claims can be contradictory, as when 
indigenous rights clash with the agrarian unions’ demands for economic redistribution or with 
the leftists’ extractivism, the government is forced to prioritize some claims over others.  
According to Salman (2011:38), the positions of these social movements vis-à-vis the MAS 
government depend on ‘specific issues, specific facts and tactic uncertainties.’  Vice-president 
García-Linera interpreted these conflicts not as an anomaly but as the nuclear component of 
politics or, in his own words, as ‘creative tensions’ inherent in each revolutionary process, 
alluding to similar situations in Mao Tse-Tung’s China (García-Linera, 2011a).  With this 
context of neocollectivist internal tensions and views on participation as the background, the 
next two sections explore how NGOs align or negotiate with the different tendencies within 
MAS that cause various concrete clashes, tensions, and complementarities between 
neocollectivism and NGOs.  
 
T h e  M A S  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  N G O s :  A  P u b l i c  C o n f r o n t a t i o n  
  
The MAS government’s criticism of NGOs, outlined in the introduction, built initially on 
already existing critiques of NGOs, and one would expect that, in line with these critiques, the 
MAS government would predominantly criticize the technical NGOs for being vehicles of 
neoliberal ideas.  In the late 1990s, the NGO sector faced a crisis of legitimacy in which their 
role as mediators between the state and civil society was being discussed extensively 
(Bebbington and Farrington, 1993; Hulme and Edwards, 1997; Atack, 1999).  Some 
questioned the participatory spaces and the ability of NGOs to translate the real needs of the 
poor (Arellano-Lopez and Petras, 1994).  Others considered their interventions to be 
dominated by external interests in order to fulfil and enact neoliberal discourses (Gill, 1997), 
in particular through their focus on capacity building and technology, which the neoliberalist 
discourse considers imperative for sustainable economic growth (Postero, 2007; Andersson 
and Haarstad, 2009).  This legitimacy crisis was also felt in Bolivia and led to suspicion and 
distrust of technical NGOs in different rural communities (Rivera-Cusicanqui, 1990).  NGOs 
themselves organized events to reflect on and criticize their role during neoliberalism.  For 
example, in an event in 2001, organized by the Association of Promotion and Education 
Institutions (AIPE) – a network of NGOs – participants concluded that the crisis had 
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manifested itself on three levels: a) an identity crisis about their role in society; b) a crisis of 
legitimacy and accountability towards the people with whom they worked (who strongly 
criticized their interventions); and c) a crisis of sustainability due to dependence on external 
financing (AIPE, 2001).  Indeed, in its early years, the MAS government (2006–2008) 
criticized technical NGOs for being vehicles of neoliberal policies. 
Many political NGOs were allies of the MAS government in this first period.  Political 
NGOs were important supporters of social movements in the process of social mobilization 
and contestation against neoliberalism in the early 2000s (Rodríguez-Carmona, 2008; Do 
Alto, 2011).  NGOs like CIPCA, CEJIS, and CENDA, among others, participated actively and 
offered support to the discussions that established a national constituent assembly and 
culminated in the new constitution enacted in 2009 (Rodríguez-Carmona, 2009; Do Alto, 
2011).  These NGOs forged an alliance between indigenous groups and the MAS government 
that developed a politically engaged discourse of indigeneity and an indigenous vision within 
the government (Página Siete, 2011).  In 2006, many political NGO staff became employees 
of the MAS government (La Razón, 2011).  This was, for example, the case with the 
ministers, Vladimir Sanchez and Carlos Romero, and Chancellor Choquehuanca, some of the 
MAS government’s most important representatives. 
As of 2008 however, the relationship between these political NGOs and the government 
began to deteriorate.  Their presence in the government was criticized by social movements 
and grassroots organizations, who considered it a form of co-optation by middle class and 
NGO technical leaders, at the expense of peasant, indigenous, and popular sector participation 
(Do Alto, 2011).  This confrontation became clear in 2011 when a group of intellectuals, 
many linked to political NGOs and once part of the process of change, wrote a manifesto 
criticizing what they considered the inconsistencies and contradictions within the MAS 
government (Almaraz et al., 2011).  In response to this manifesto, Vice President García-
Linera responded with a book called The NGOism, the Infantile Disease of the Right Wing, 
where he criticized the urban, professional, and middle-class origin of its authors and 
defended the government’s results during its first five years (García-Linera, 2011b).  
Meanwhile, networks of political NGOs like CEJIS and UNITAS publically criticized the 
MAS government’s actions and especially its decision to build a road (as previously 
discussed) through TIPNIS indigenous territory.  They formed alliances with indigenous 
movements and considered the proposed building of the road as a breach of the new political 
constitution as it did not follow technical and legal procedures (such as an environmental 
impact study), and did not consult with the indigenous population.  
These discords triggered a media confrontation with personal attacks and harsh language 
between NGOs and the government.  Evo Morales accused some NGOs of being ‘the fifth 
column of espionage’ and of defending the interests of ‘imperialism’ (Los Tiempos, 2010).  
García-Linera accused them of being enemies of the so-called ‘process of change’ and of 
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serving the covert colonialist ideas of international cooperation, especially because of their 
support of the TIPNIS march (García-Linera, 2012a).  The MAS government called for a 
national debate on the role of NGOs and used congress to promote parliamentary research 
into their activities.  It also supported the enactment of future legislation to regulate their 
operation, funding, and access to legal status (Molina, 2011), pressing them to adapt their 
activities to the National Development Plan and the new constitution (Layme, 2013).  In a 
newspaper interview, Juan Ramón Quintana, Minister of the Presidency, called on the NGOs 
to comply with ‘their task,’ which was, according to him, providing technical services and 
training and not interfering in decisions of indigenous organizations or in internal tensions 
within the MAS government.  He pointed out that, if they wanted to be political advocates, 
they should become political parties and not use the ‘NGO mask’ for political opposition to 
the MAS government (Corz, 2013).  For their part, NGOs publically rejected the MAS 
government’s request to abandon their political activities, which they considered a right.  
They also argued that the same political activism had strengthened social movements to seize 
power through the MAS and the Unity Pact.  UNITAS, a network of political NGOs, pointed 
out:  
 
Since when is political action constrained in our country? Without the (non-
partisan) political agenda, the structural changes and social transformations 
historically demanded by workers, indigenous people, peasants, women, and 
other social sectors in Bolivia would not have been possible (UNITAS, 2013). 
 
Besides this public confrontation in the media between NGOs and the MAS government, 
we identify three crucial factors (derived from our interview data and document analysis) that 
impacted upon the conflict between NGOs and neocollectivism.  First, the recovery of the 
state’s role in development as part of neocollectivism has shifted state action from 
intermediation to direct implementation of development projects.  In 2011, state investment 
reached a historical high of US $2,400 million: 67 per cent came from internal resources, and 
donations from international cooperation were below 22 per cent for the first time since 1995 
(Banco Mundial, 2011:41).  Furthermore, the MAS government has progressively displaced 
Bolivian NGOs as central channels of resources from international cooperation (Bazoberry 
and Ruiz, 2010; Devisscher, 2013, Córdoba and Jansen, 2013).  To improve the effectiveness 
of development cooperation, the government created the Group of Development Partners of 
Bolivia (GruS) in 2006 as a platform to align international cooperation with its National 
Development Plan (UNITAS, 2010).  NGOs have not been involved in the GruS, 
marginalizing them in the planning and distribution of these resources. 
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Second, the crisis of NGO legitimacy that became explicit in the 1990s has worsened 
during the MAS government.  The social organizations do not perceive themselves as ‘target 
groups’ or ‘beneficiaries’ or ‘clients’ of projects (as in the language of NGOs), but as 
‘protagonists’ of what they call ‘the process of change.’  Although leaders of social 
organizations value, in our interviews, the work of NGOs, both technical and political, they 
perceive them more as service providers than as managers of state resources. They demand 
that state resources be managed directly by communities.  One interviewed NGO technician 
expressed the progressive change in their relations with communities as follows:  
 
The producers have empowered themselves, especially with the MAS 
government that has given more power to farmers to monitor NGOs.  They 
even have the ability to ask you for accounts, to oversee the funds that you are 
managing through the financing of our projects.  Once they told me in a large 
meeting that the NGO technicians, us, that we live thanks to them, to the 
farmers, that we have money, we get money, thanks to them (Interview, 8 
December 2011). 
 
Third, the confrontation in the political field is a conflict between two visions of 
participation.  On the one hand, NGOs – especially the political ones – that fought to 
strengthen the voice of civil society during periods of dictatorship see their institutions as 
allies of social organizations and as an important actor in civil society.  They perceive 
themselves as part of the ‘public sphere,’ in Habermas’ words, as ‘opposed to the state’ 
(1995:7) with the goal of strengthening democracy and deliberation in society.  On the other 
hand, neocollectivism defends direct and radical participation (Córdoba and Jansen, 2013).  
According to Komadina (2008), this vision of radical participation calls for the construction 
of an adversary and the permanent appeal of confrontation and antagonism in which the 
construction of an ‘us’ versus a ‘they’ is vital.  The TIPNIS conflict best illustrates this.  
Whereas indigenous criticisms of the leftists’ tendency within the MAS government were 
seen as ‘creative tensions’ (still part of the ‘us’), when similar criticisms came from NGOs, 
they were seen as enemy attacks (the ‘they’), supplanting the voice of legitimate groups in 
society.  
We can conclude that the public confrontation between the MAS government and NGOs 
was mainly with the political NGOs.  This firstly shows the highly politicized environment in 
the post-neoliberal era where political NGOs are struggling to define their role and spaces for 
action.  Second, it is precisely their low political profile that keeps the technical NGOs out of 
the public confrontation.  This does not mean that they have not changed as a consequence of 
the political context.  The next section discusses the shifts in NGO activities within the 
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technical sphere, and the negotiations between NGOs and neocollectivism that have redefined 
what is political and what is technical. 
 
T h e  P o l i t i c a l  a n d  t h e  T e c h n i c a l  i n  N G O s ’  A d a p t a t i o n s  t o  
P o s t - n e o l i b e r a l  P o l i t i c s  
 
The previous section discussed the conflict between neocollectivism and NGOs, focusing 
on confrontation in the political context.  In this section, we describe how Fundación Valles, 
PROINPA, and CEPAC responded to the tensions and negotiations with neocollectivism in 
specific rural development interventions.  Fundación Valles and PROINPA emphasize 
technological innovation as the main component of their interventions, whereas CEPAC 
interventions in economic and technology development are embedded in a rights approach to 
transform political participation at local level.  As follows, we show how these NGOs 
balanced politics and technology in different ways to adapt to neocollectivism.  
 
Fundación Valles: tensions and negotiations in business models for small 
farmers  
 
Fundación Valles is a private foundation that worked, from 2001 to 2008, with the 
Bolivian System of Agricultural Technology (SIBTA) of the Bolivian Ministry of 
Agriculture.  It has been working closely with OECAs, which focus primarily on production 
objectives, on promoting market-oriented initiatives to increase farmers’ incomes.  It 
prioritizes a value-chain approach in which farmers seek collaboration with other actors along 
the agri-chain and adapt to consumer demands.  The key change sought is to enhance OECAs’ 
agricultural business and decision-making skills to increase competitiveness.  These 
organizations are seen as crucial for increasing effectiveness, economies of scale, and 
facilitating service delivery for agricultural production and marketing.  
In 2003, Fundación Valles began its support to the Association of Peanut and Chili 
Producers of Padilla (APAJIMPA), an OECA composed of around 240 farmers from different 
communities in Padilla.  This municipality in Chuquisaca department is basically populated 
by farmers of Quechua origin forced to migrate, temporarily or permanently, to other 
departments of Bolivia to escape the extreme levels of poverty: 84 per cent (Fernández et al., 
2005).  The intervention focused on how to encourage collective commercialization of chili 
and peanuts to bypass intermediaries and improve negotiation skills.  With funding from 
USAID, it supported the construction and equipping of a chili and peanut processing plant to 
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ensure better product quality, to meet the demands of domestic and export markets, and to 
create job opportunities in the area to counteract migration.  Post-harvest machinery, such as 
for peanut cracking, was adapted in a joint collaboration of farmers and industrial 
infrastructure companies.  Association members were trained in developing an 
entrepreneurship vision, administrative capacities, and an organization structure.  In 2009, 
APAJIMPA, through the efforts of Fundación Valles, established a business alliance with 
Agrinuts Company for peanut exportation.  Agrinuts delegated an engineer to support the 
association with quality improvement in order to comply with international standards crucial 
for export markets (i.e. good manufacturing practices).  APAJIMPA’s organizational structure 
and its commercial alliance with Agrinuts served as a model for other producer organizations 
and private companies to develop similar chili and peanut processing plants in the Chaco 
ecoregion in Bolivia.  Currently, APAJIMPA manages its own resources, has a board of 
producers elected by the association in a general meeting, and has administrative and 
production staff, generating 24 full-time jobs.  
In 2010, a new mayor from the MAS party was elected in Padilla, and tensions arose 
between the local government and Fundación Valles.  The national government was trying to 
reduce the influence of international donor agencies, resulting in 2010 in a prohibition of 
direct transfer of municipal funds (including those earmarked as the counterpart to NGO 
programmes) to NGOs’ accounts.  Local governmental contributions had to be delivered in 
kind, directly purchased by local government.  Following this prohibition, the mayor 
withdrew support for APAJIMPA from the municipal budget.  Some APAJIMPA leaders 
perceived this as the mayor’s rejection of the association and the work of NGOs.  At public 
events, the mayor criticized NGOs for being disconnected from local government aims.  
These tensions between local government and Fundación Valles’ intervention processes 
must be seen as partly the result of a national conflict between the MAS government and 
USAID.  This government regards NGOs like Fundación Valles, who have received support 
from USAID, with disdain and as promoters of neoliberal values.  Beyond the national 
political confrontation however, the issue plays out differently at local level in the end.  We 
observed how, despite the abovementioned incidental strong criticism, the municipality 
presented APAJIMPA and Fundación Valles’ intervention as a successful business model for 
small farmers and a cause of pride for the town.  Field visits were organized by the 
municipality to show APAJIMPA’s experience to other farmers’ organization and 
municipalities;  and, even at national level, Fundación Valles is starting to engage with 
several initiatives of the Ministry of Rural Development (for example in the Programme for 
the Support of the Productive and Agricultural Sector).  
When asked about the conflicts between NGOs and the MAS government, a representative 
of Fundación Valles argued:  
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There are two things to differentiate. If the government is involved, there 
always has to be politics.... But I think we [Fundación Valles] do not have a 
political position.  If so, we would try to impose things, impose models without 
legitimate request or demand from producers (Interview, 9 September 2011).  
 
The interviewed Fundación Valles representatives locate the political confrontations 
outside their technical intervention activities and prefer not to get involved.  They perceive 
themselves as ‘apolitical,’ avoiding confrontation and highlighting their expertise.  Despite 
the political criticism, new ways are being explored to collaborate, and apparently the 
distinction made between politics and technical support works for both sides.  It could even be 
seen as a strategy to adapt to neocollectivism. 
 
PROINPA: adapting to post -neoliberal policies with agri -ecological 
technology 
 
The PROINPA Foundation is a national NGO that evolved out of the state’s Potato 
Programme of the Institute of Agricultural Technology (IBTA) after 1989, filling much of the 
gap left when the state retreated from agricultural research and technology transfer in 1997 
(Gandarillas et al., 2007).  PROINPA began to rapidly adapt its intervention processes to the 
rural development agendas of the MAS government and its constituencies.  According to an 
interviewed PROINPA researcher, the adoption of a pragmatic position to ‘respond to the 
demands of the changing environment’ – in this case, a new political agenda – is one of their 
keys to success (Interview, 9 December 2011).  To adapt to the MAS government’s rural 
development view, it developed bio-inputs (bio-pesticides and bio-fertilizers) that are 
consistent with the agri-ecological view on farming.  PROINPA had already begun its 
research on bio-inputs in 2005 as a response to the growing demands from grassroots 
organizations for alternatives to chemical control and the availability of funding for research 
on agri-ecological technologies.  When the MAS government took power, agri-ecology 
became one of its priorities (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2007:131; Estado 
Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2011), making bio-inputs even more relevant to PROINPA’s agenda 
(Interview, 9 August 2012).  PROINPA used participatory methods for the testing and 
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subsequent adoption of bio-inputs.
3
  Interviewed PROINPA technicians envisioned these 
methods as an alternative to previous top-down research and technology transfer models, and 
an effective way to involve farmers in agricultural experimentation, to teach them different 
techniques, and to promote more sustainable farming systems.  In on-farm validations, 
researchers tested different blends of bio-inputs on crops like potato, quinoa, onion, bean, and 
peach.  The producers determined the dose, time, and frequency of application. 
PROINPA experimented with different models of technology transfer.  First, they 
undertook a strong process of capacity building based on participatory development principles 
whereby producers learned how to develop bio-inputs.  However, the vast majority of 
participants did not continue developing bio-inputs, either because it was time-consuming or 
because they did not have the materials.  Second, PROINPA worked with agrarian unions, 
creating a collective mechanism with a rotation of producers in charge of bio-inputs.  This 
decreased the amount of time each producer invested in this task.  Although this mechanism 
was enthusiastically approved by the unions, it did not work because very few producers 
wanted to distribute the bio-inputs from farm-to-farm without a return for their time.  Finally, 
PROINPA, together with the agrarian unions, created a market mechanism in which each 
union elected a bio-input promoter.  In 2010, PROINPA trained these promoters for a week 
and installed mini bio-input plants for mass production.  Bio-input promoters gave 
demonstrative lectures to different groups of producers to advertise products and received half 
of the profits from sales as an incentive to further develop these technologies.  Additionally, 
PROINPA produced radio spots on the benefits of various bio-products.  
In 2008, participatory methodologies were deployed for the bio-input validation process in 
Morochata municipality in Cochabamba, where PROINPA had established a close working 
relation with agrarian union members since the 1990s.  Bio-fertilizers were tested on potato 
crops, obtaining production increases up to 15 per cent (Interview, 28 October 2011).  In our 
fieldwork, we observed that bio-input technology has been enthusiastically adopted by 
agrarian unions in Morochata.  Benedicto, one of the bio-input promoters, pointed out that he 
has buyers coming from different parts of Morochata and even from other municipalities in 
Cochabamba.  He describes the technology as a success: ‘I sell 100 litres or more each week.  
Often what I produce is not enough for the people.  They come to buy a lot and it runs out 
quickly.  And I have to make more and more every time’ (Interview, 6 October 2011).  This 
adoption of bio-inputs by farmers cannot prevent unions remaining sceptical about 
PROINPA.  Interviewed agrarian union members perceived that PROINPA absorbs most of 
its resources in administrative costs and paying technicians to perform training and technical 
                                                          
 
3 Researchers isolated and tested different micro-organisms for different purposes (plant growth, fertilization, disease 
control). 
Chapter 2: Realigning the Political and the Technical 
39 
 
assistance; they maintain their salaries without concrete benefits for the material condition of 
producers.  However, these same leaders recognized the much-needed technical support 
offered and stated that, because of PROINPA’s intervention, unions have changed the agenda 
of their monthly meetings: they now discussed production issues like crop management 
strategies and seed improvement, and not only political issues.  
At national level, PROINPA communicated its participatory methodologies and the 
resulting technologies (i.e. bio-inputs) to government representatives in different activities 
(e.g. a national forum organized by PROINPA in 2010, see Bravo, 2010) and publications 
(Ortuño et al., 2010), but this could not prevent PROINPA from being involved in the 
tensions between the MAS government and NGOs.  Lack of funding and the increasing role 
of the state in agricultural research and development have generated considerable debate in 
PROINPA regarding two strategies for its future.  The first is to become a consultancy 
company offering technological services and market technologies, such as improved seeds 
and bio-inputs.  One result of this strategy is the creation of BIOTOP, a bio-input production 
company owned by PROINPA.  The second strategy is to access public resources through the 
municipal governments with which they have built close relationships.  This demonstrates this 
NGO’s pragmatic approach: being flexible with regard to the balance between laboratory-
based and on-farm research; engaging in participatory research depending on funding 
opportunities; being flexible with adapting to technology agendas, e.g. towards agri-ecology, 
depending on the political environment; and being flexible with regard to acting as a 
commercial, private market actor or as a service provider in the public domain.  
 
CEPAC: Providing services to social organizations to access government 
resources 
 
The third case is the NGO, CEPAC.  CEPAC, an NGO based in the city of Santa Cruz, 
began working in urban contexts with food security, literacy, and nutrition.  Later, because of 
its engagement with social movements in the municipality of Yapacani, north of the city, it 
switched to rural development interventions.  It became a key player in the government’s 
decentralization by supporting the implementation of the 1994 Law of Popular Participation 
in this municipality.  Yapacani’s ecological context is distinct from those of Padilla and 
Morochata; as it is located in the lowlands, where a wider range of crops can be cultivated.  It 
has strong agrarian union organizations composed of migrants from the highlands.  CEPAC 
worked on rural territorial development (diversification of agricultural production and 
livelihoods) and the strengthening of the municipal government’s technical capacities.  It uses 
various participatory methods to facilitate access to technical assistance and for the selection 
of new agricultural technologies.  CEPAC adopted an agri-chain approach in 2000 (partly 
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influenced by its donors, including ICCO, Cordaid, COH, and Caritas).  It started with agri-
chains that have market and productive potential in the area (i.e. fish farming, coffee, and 
timber) and worked with individual producers and farmer organizations with the required 
resources (for instant, access to water for fish farming, suitable land for coffee production, 
and access to forests for timber production).  Similar to Fundación Valles, CEPAC trains 
producers or local businessmen on how to deliver services and inputs for these chains, on 
information about prices and markets, on how to write business plans, and on gender equality 
(the evaluation process monitors not only income increases but also women’s participation).  
Unlike PROINPA and Fundación Valles, CEPAC engages more actively with social 
movements at local level, on the premise that farmers and their social organizations can assert 
their economic rights to the local and national government.  For that, social organizations that 
have historically focused on the redistribution of resources have to make a shift to 
modernizing agriculture through the introduction of better technologies and access to local 
spaces of power.  According to CEPAC, the latter component is essential to facilitate the 
politicization of poverty through the exercise of citizenship. Access to technology and 
capacities helps farmers and organizations to become their own protagonists for the 
generation of social justice.  CEPAC identified the funds from the MAS government for 
farmer-managed production projects as a strategic opportunity to provide training to social 
organizations with whom they have already worked for more than 15 years.  According to 
CEPAC’s director, they aim to fill the gaps not bridged by the government: 
 
The government’s proposal is a direct transfer of resources to organizations.  
We have seen a specific demand there.  We want the organizations we are 
working with to be able to get support from state resources. … We have 
become allies of these organizations because of our technical capacity to 
support them (Interview, 18 May 2010). 
 
Remarkably, the political content of the work is here translated into CEPAC’s technical 
capacity.  Despite the fact that social organizations in Yapacani have been successful in 
gaining political influence in local government, fieldwork research has found that they are 
encountering difficulties when proposing specific rural development projects.  These become 
mired in formal applications, project procedures, and mandatory bureaucratic paperwork (all 
designed to improve accountability to the state).  Without the organizational assistance in 
terms of project management skills provided by organizations such as CEPAC, it is difficult 
for poorer union members or farmers who are not yet well-organized to get access to project 
funding.  Interviewed representatives from agrarian unions appreciate this role in the 
formation of these capacities.  
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C o n t r a s t i n g  a d a p t a t i o n  s t r a t e g i e s  t o  n e o c o l l e c t i v i s m  b y  
N G O s  
 
Despite the public discursive confrontation between MAS and NGOs, the above case 
studies show that NGOs appear to have found manoeuvring room to face this confrontation, in 
particular by presenting themselves as technical service providers.  These NGOs have 
developed different adaptation strategies that have in common the strengthening of farmers’ 
technical capacity.  They use a type of farmer participation that neither conflicts with 
neocollectivist political aims nor takes a position in favour of one of the MAS tendencies.  In 
consequence, these NGOs envisage the use of participatory development to achieve better 
technical and production goals rather than political participation and contestation against 
government decisions.  Each one, however, places a different emphasis (see Table 1).  
PROINPA takes a pragmatic position to develop technologies that are adapted to 
neocollectivist interests in agri-ecology.  PROINPA’s methods have attracted the attention of 
public institutions as a way to incorporate farmers’ views in technology development.  
Fundación Valles operates with a concept of participation in which farmer associations 
(OECAs) develop business with other agri-chain actors.  Despite tensions between this NGO 
and the MAS government, it has gained a position at national level thanks to its expertise in 
fostering business alliances, thus addressing a gap in the MAS government policies (Urioste, 
2011).  Some NGOs like CEPAC, who have a closer relation with social organizations at local 
level, have adapted their participatory approaches and practices to the new conditions; they 
channel the demands of these organizations in areas such a technological transfer and training 
in which the government has a weak presence. 
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Table 2.1 Contrasting NGOs’ views on participation and rural development and their 
strategies to adapt to neocollectivism 
Characteristic NGOs  
PROINPA Fundación Valles CEPAC 
View on rural 
development 
Techno-scientific 
 Adoption of 
technologies with 
better fit to farming 
systems is solution to 
poverty 
 Develop capacities to 
monitor and evaluate 
planned intervention 
 
Market-centred 
(Technical) 
 The market as 
redistributor of 
resources 
 Foster incorporation 
into agri-chains 
 State should facilitate 
market relationships 
Political 
 Rights-based approach to 
rural development 
 Balance economic 
development with political 
participation 
View on 
participation 
 Participatory 
methods required for 
technological 
innovations 
 And for 
strengthening 
farmers’ skills 
 Collaborate with 
social/ political 
organizations 
(agrarian unions) 
 No intervention in 
political participation 
 
 Associations of 
farmers are crucial 
for improving 
efficiency and  
competitiveness 
(through economies 
of scale) and service 
delivery 
 Participation to link 
political and technological 
processes 
 Participation to exercise 
rights and citizenship 
 Participation to ensure 
public policy 
implementation 
 Participation to enable 
farmers’ participation in 
markets and technology 
development 
Adaptation to 
neocollectivism 
 Pragmatic adaptation 
of activities to 
political desires of 
the MAS government 
and its constituencies 
 No evidence of 
change; sticks to its 
technical and market-
centred profile 
 Public presentation as 
apolitical* 
 Positions itself as provider 
of technological services 
(training, technological 
innovations) to social 
organizations 
Note: 
* 
Although we could not collect any data about it, it may be hypothesized that strategies towards 
the MAS government have been discussed within Fundación Valles. 
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C o n c l u s i o n  
 
This chapter examines the conflict between NGOs and the MAS government in Bolivia.  
MAS’s agrarian politics, labelled here as neocollectivism, tries to conciliate different and 
sometimes contradictory collective demands into a single framework of social justice: leftists’ 
claims for redistribution of state resources; indigenous claims to agri-ecology based on the 
notions of Living Well and the rights of Mother Earth; and peasant claims that include a 
radical change in the food system towards food sovereignty.  The MAS government sees 
NGOs as a threat to its political project and a divisive factor at a time when tensions are 
experienced among these three tendencies.  This has generated a public discursive 
confrontation and national debate on NGOs’ role in society, leading to the expulsion of two 
international NGOs in 2013. 
Our study shows that NGOs appear to have found manoeuvring room to face this public 
discursive confrontation.  Each of the three studied NGOs has adopted different strategies.  
Technical NGOs like PROINPA have to start to play politics and search for ways to negotiate 
with neocollectivist interests on agri-ecology, whereas more political NGOs like CEPAC 
stress their technical aspects to serve as service providers and to avoid being seen as a 
political threat to social organizations.  In the same line, Fundación Valles stresses an 
apolitical image, at least publically, and sticks to its market-centred initiatives and expertise.  
This helps it to counter its historical association with USAID and distance itself from previous 
neoliberal regimes.  Finally, we conclude that NGOs’ emphasis on political and technical 
aspects are not only influenced by NGOs’ nature and aims, but also are particularly driven by 
the context.  During neoliberalism, political NGOs contested neoliberal politics and supported 
social movements; technical NGOs emphasized even more their technical capacities.  With a 
MAS government that strongly criticizes and attacks NGO activities and political meddling, 
these organizations need to realign their interventions by stressing their technical strengths to 
accommodate to the current circumstances.  While the MAS government is continuing to 
make efforts to bring the state back into development, NGOs are exploring new ways to adapt 
and to fill the gaps still left by the state or to create new spaces for action. 
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Abstract 
The Movement towards Socialism (MAS) party promised to break with neoliberal politics 
when it rose to power in Bolivia in 2006.  Using the concept of neocollectivism to 
characterize MAS agrarian politics, this chapter examines one of its key instruments for 
achieving rural development: the state enterprise EMAPA.  This state company, which 
supports small producers, envisions a new agrarian structure of production and 
commercialization, one which will break the power of the Santa Cruz-based agro-industrial 
elite.  Drawing on a discussion of the mechanisms of governance employed by this state 
entity, we argue that new complexities in state-civil society relations and a low state capacity 
have constrained its ability to shift power relationships between the state and the agro-
industrial elites.  Instead of reducing the dependency of small producers on agro-industrial 
capital, the Bolivian state has increased it, thereby undermining its goal of redistribution.  The 
chapter also analyses different moments of politicization and de-politicization in the 
intervention process arising from the demand for political change as well as for technically 
efficient and profitable agricultural production. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
Alternatives to neoliberal food regimes are often formulated in terms of local endogenous 
resistance or transnational and bottom-up food sovereignty networks (Borras et al., 2008; 
Martínez-Torres and Rosset, 2010; Giménez et al., 2011; Altieri et al., 2011).  Relatively little 
scholarly attention has been paid to recent state-led initiatives which redefine neoliberal 
agricultural modernization.  The agricultural and rural development policy of the MAS 
(Movement toward Socialism) government in Bolivia provides a central case for discussing 
the return of the state.  In 2006, after more than 20 years of neoliberalism and state 
withdrawal, the MAS government headed by Evo Morales officially rejected the dominant 
food regime spear-headed by large-scale industrial agriculture in the east of the country.  It 
prioritized peasant and communitarian economies, considering these to be the key actors for 
achieving food security and food sovereignty, redistributing wealth, combating poverty and 
historical patterns of social injustice in the countryside.  The new political vocabulary adopted 
emphasises state intervention instead of neoliberalism, small indigenous farmers rather than 
agro-enterprises, fair markets instead of free markets and the internal market instead of the 
external market (MDRAyMA, 2007; García-Linera, 2008b; MAS IPSP, 2010).   
This study analyses ‘neocollectivism’, the term which we adopt to characterize the 
response of the MAS to neoliberal politics
4
.  Neocollectivism combines different models of 
collective action for social justice vis-à-vis neoliberal politics: the use of state power in 
interaction with politicized social organizations (agrarian unions, associations, demands of 
political representation and direct dialogue with grassroots organizations, and collective 
identities (indigenistas).  Although it may bear some resemblance to the collectivist policies 
of the past (i.e. statism), it is argued here that present day Bolivian collectivism can only be 
understood within the new complexities of state-civil society relations, modernization 
ideologies and social-technical configurations enforced during the period of neoliberalism.   
To examine how the Bolivian state sought to implement collectivist agrarian policies as an 
alternative to the prevailing dominant food regime, we have selected the case of EMAPA 
(Empresa de Apoyo a la Producción de Alimentos or Company in Support of Food 
Production).  Established in 2007 as one of 18 new public companies financed from 
hydrocarbon and mineral revenues, EMAPA supports production, commercialization and 
stabilization of the agricultural market (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2007).  
EMAPA is a cornerstone in the strategy of the state called ‘food security with sovereignty’, 
                                                          
 
4 The term neocollectivism has been used in a slightly different way in China to indicate how collective and private 
ownership can be valued equally by the Chinese state (Wang 1996). 
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which aims to gain control over the food regime (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2011).  
This strategy combines the concept of ‘food security’ and ‘food sovereignty’ with the Andean 
concept of ‘Living Well’5.  EMAPA focuses most of its operations in Santa Cruz department, 
which accounts for 87 per cent of its budget.  EMAPA’s reasons to select Santa Cruz are 
twofold.  First, this department provides 70 per cent of the national agricultural production, 
being of vital importance for food security (Ormachea, 2009).  Second, it is the country’s 
agro-business heartland where commercial relations are marked by unequal power relations 
between small-farmers and agribusiness elites.  EMAPA provides seeds, agricultural inputs 
and technical assistance to small and medium producers with interest-free loans and purchases 
from small and medium producers rather than from the vertically integrated systems of 
commercialization dominated by the agribusiness sector.  With a budget of US$ 148 million 
in 2011 EMAPA is, by far, the most important government project underpinning the 
modernization of agricultural production (Ministerio de Desarrollo Productivo y Economia 
Rural, 2012)
6
.  Fieldwork was carried out in Santa Cruz during April and October of 2010 and 
September and November 2011 and included: a) archival research, b) 56 in-depth interviews 
with technicians; small, medium and large producers; EMAPA representatives and 
technicians; agrochemical companies; research centres; and producer organizations in the 
cities of Santa Cruz and La Paz and the municipalities of Yapacaní, San Pedro, Cuatro 
Cañadas, Santa Rosa del Sará, Mineros, and San Julian, c) participant observation in meetings 
and training sessions for producer associations and during visits to individual farms and d) a 
focus group with rice producers in the municipality of Yapacani in August 2012. 
The case study of EMAPA contributes to a wider analysis of states in the global South, 
especially the rise of the ‘New Left’ in Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela) and its room for manoeuvre to develop alternatives to neoliberal 
globalization (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012).  In the course of the 20th century, several Latin 
American countries have espoused strong state intervention and control of agricultural 
production and commercialisation to meet the domestic demand for food.  In some cases, 
marketing boards operate as a monopoly, purchasing all production and controlling exports 
(Araóz, 1983).  The National Rice Company (Empresa Nacional del Arroz – ENA) 
                                                          
 
5 The New Bolivian Constitution (approved in February 2009) in its article 16 recognized access to food as a fundamental 
right of the population.  The Suma Qamaña or Living Well is also recognized in the Bolivian constitution as an ethical and 
moral principle of society, assumed and promoted by the state (Bolivian constitution 2009 - Chapter 2, Article 8).  The 
Ministry of Development Planning defined the concept as follows: ‘[Living Well] is the access and enjoyment of material 
goods in harmony with nature and people.  It is the human dimension of emotional and spiritual fulfilment.  People do not 
live in isolation but in a family, social and natural environment.  One cannot live well if others live badly or if we destroy 
nature’ (Ministerio de Planificación del Desarrollo, 2009) 
6 The budget includes support for small farmer agriculture (credits and purchases) as well as infrastructure and 
commercialization. 
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established in 1972 is one such example (Ossio, 1977).  A dominant approach to analysing 
state intervention has conceptualized the state as an autonomous sphere with exclusive control 
over people and territory, such that its actions are often beyond the reach of societal actors 
(Stepan, 1978; Mann, 1984; Skocpol and Amenta, 1986).  Recent developments, however, 
cannot be understood within this framework.  Since the mid-1980s state intervention in rural 
development has declined as a marked process of liberalization took hold.  In addition, the 
dynamics of the MAS government and the implementation of neocollectivism can only be 
understood in relation to the wider social formation.  In this study we undertake a strategic-
relational analysis (Jessop, 2008) in which the capacity of the state to intervene does not 
simply depend on the nature of its apparatus but results from strategies and interactions with 
different actors and forces that lie beyond the state.  Thus, state intervention cannot be 
analysed in isolation but must take into account the state’s changing articulations with 
different forces in civil society since power relations within society influence the state and are 
in turn influenced by state power (Jessop, 2008; Cannon and Kirby, 2012).  In our analysis of 
EMAPA, we examine several interrelated aspects of state intervention  a) the mechanisms of 
governance employed by the state to meet its goals (strategies); b) the capacity of the MAS 
government to formulate and implement alternative views on agrarian production and its 
independence from actors who may hinder the fulfilment of its objectives; c) the interaction 
with civil society to carry out these alternatives and compete with dominant agro-business 
elites; and d) the shaping of technological agricultural trajectories by shifting state policies 
(Jansen, 2003; Toleubayev et al., 2010; Novo et al., 2011).  In our analysis, we attribute 
agency not only to individuals but also to collective actors. 
Although this chapter mainly addresses the actions of the Bolivian state in a public 
enterprise such as EMAPA, the next section first discusses how ‘neocollectivism’ has become 
embedded in political discourse in Bolivia.  As EMAPA aims to change the agrarian structure, 
the third section outlines two periods in the historical formation of the Santa Cruz agrarian 
structure.  The fourth section describes the practices of EMAPA by focusing on four 
mechanisms of governance.  The two final sections analyse the outcomes of neocollectivism 
in terms of contrasting images of agricultural modernization, state-civil society relations and 
state capacity.  To conclude, we argue that the MAS government has been unable to develop 
an independent alternative to that of the agro-industrial elites and the agribusiness model 
owing to the complex relationship between the state and civil society that influences state 
capacity and its technological vision.  On the contrary, EMAPA’s current intervention serves 
to strengthen rather than weaken dependency ties between supported producers and the agro-
industrial sector. 
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N e o c o l l e c t i v i s m  d e s p i t e  i t s  C r i t i c s  
 
Bolivian neocollectivism as a political alternative to neoliberalism was promoted in 
particular by the faction of MAS led by vice president García-Linera.  This intellectual and 
leftist activist was receptive to new forms of socialism which combined Quechua and Aymara 
visions
7
.  In January 2006, when the MAS government rose to power, García-Linera outlined 
his concept of ‘Amazonian Andean capitalism’ in Le Monde Diplomatique as follows: 
 
Amazonian Andean capitalism is the construction of a strong state that 
regulates the expansion of the industrial economy, extracts the surplus and 
transfers it to the community to promote forms of self-organization and the 
development of their own market in the indigenous communities (García-
Linera, 2006). 
 
According to García-Linera, Amazonian Andean capitalism is a temporary and transitory 
mode but one which is necessary to develop socialism or communism in Bolivia (García-
Linera, 2008a, 2008b; Lora, 2005).  The notion was further developed in the MAS 
government’s second term program (MAS–IPSP, 2010), which proposed an ‘industrial jump’ 
to industrialize agrarian production, the inclusion of Bolivia in the modern Western project 
and the reduction of poverty.  It implied that state companies should be attached to and 
directed by the state during a first phase and later transferred to social organizations with a 
collective interest (agrarian unions, communities, associations) in the form of communitarian 
companies (MAS IPSP, 2010).  García-Linera’s main argument for a state-led 
‘modernization’ project lies in the potential he sees it as holding to transform the economic 
hierarchy of the neoliberal period characterized by a high level of participation of foreign 
companies and by agribusiness development (García-Linera, 2012).  
A first group of critics of García-Linera’s line of thinking defends the neoliberal model 
claiming that experience worldwide indicates that productive transformation has rarely 
occurred with a significant state presence, whereas the ‘dynamic private’ sector unleashed 
during the neoliberalism period has proved effective for the economy and for the 
competitiveness of the country (Arias, 2011; Molina and Oporto, 2011).  This criticism omits 
the negative impact of neoliberal politics on food security and food sovereignty (Pérez, 2008). 
                                                          
 
7 Quechua and Aymara people, located in the Andean highlands and valleys, are the two most important indigenous groups 
in Bolivia.   
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A second group of critics consists of indigenous movements and researchers, many of 
them from within the MAS government itself.  As an alternative to García-Lineras’ model, 
they contemplate a more sustainable and ‘de-colonized’ rural development as reflected in the 
concept of ‘Living Well’.  Researchers from this viewpoint criticize the priority given to an 
extractive and industrialized agriculture, the commoditization of agriculture and the export of 
raw materials.  They consider these processes to contradict the principles of ‘Living Well’ and 
to be similar to the ‘extractivism’ promoted by the capitalist state in the 1970s (Gudynas, 
2010; Albó, 2011; Pacheco, 2011; Soliz, 2011).  The two most important indigenous 
movements, the Confederation of Indigenous People of Bolivia (CIDOB) and the Council of 
Ayllus and Markas of the Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), see the proposed neocollectivism as an 
imposition on indigenous practices and as a restriction on indigenous participation and 
autonomy. 
Finally, a third group of critics consists of left-wing intellectuals who point out the limited 
impact of the proposed land reform which hardly affects landowners nor facilitates 
peasantization.  They argue that state policies which support agrarian capitalism in Santa Cruz 
department reduce the significance of peasant production and cannot be considered as a real 
alternative for rural transformation (Orellana, 2006; Ormachea, 2008, 2009). 
Despite these critics, the MAS government has proceeded to implement neocollectivism, 
transferring the economic surplus of strategic sectors (hydrocarbons, mining, electricity and 
environment) to financing social policies (for conditional cash transfers) and to sectors which 
generate income and employment (manufacturing, farming, tourism, etc.) thereby reducing 
poverty (Córdoba and Jansen, 2014).  Between 2006 and 2010 the MAS government 
nationalized 12 companies which had been privatized during the neoliberal period and created 
18 new state companies defined as ‘strategic’ for the country (including companies for 
processing coca, citruses, dairy, palmettos, almonds, basic foods, agricultural fertilizers, 
seeds, paper and cardboard).  It has started to develop new projects in iron and steel, 
metallurgical and sugar production.  Within the same period, state participation in the 
economy grew from 16 per cent to 34 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (García-Linera, 
2012b). 
 
T h e  F o r m a t i o n  o f  A g r a r i a n  C l a s s e s  i n  S a n t a  C r u z  
 
MAS neocollectivism confronted a long process of agrarian class formation.  We 
distinguish two different formative periods. 
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The capitalist state (1953-1985) and national agribusiness e lites  
 
Peasants and indigenous people of the Andes (highlands and valleys) played a leading role 
in the ‘Agrarian Revolution’ of 1952, expelling large landowners and occupying and dividing 
their haciendas (Ormachea, 2008).  After the revolution, the government directed by the 
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR, Nationalist Revolutionary Movement) 
implemented a series of reforms to accelerate capitalist development.  Firstly, the MNR 
encouraged individual ownership of land, as opposed to Indian and collective forms of land 
tenure (ayllus), and the establishment of agrarian unions (sindicatos) as the legitimate 
representatives of the heterogeneous rural population before the state.  Rivera (1990) argues 
that the unions were a top-down MNR project to ‘civilize’ the Indians and redefine them as 
‘campesinos’ to promote ‘mestizaje’ in the country.  Over time, the unions established a ‘pact’ 
with the state to channel their demands directly (García-Linera et al. 2005).  Secondly, in line 
with the wider continental trend, MNR adopted an import substitution strategy with a strong 
state presence in the economy and industrial development, and an emphasis on the expansion 
of the internal market (Ormachea 2008; Prado et al. 2007; Valdivia 2010).  MNR liberal 
reforms, seen as an essential part of a comprehensive agro-industrial project, targeted the 
eastern part of the country (lowlands), especially the department of Santa Cruz, assuming that 
the region possessed useless land (tierras baldias) and unproductive estates.  The state 
encouraged and strengthened agro-industry through public investment (with US support) in 
machinery, infrastructure and credit, in particular for sugar cane and cotton cultivation (Ossio, 
1977).
8
  
MNR policies played a fundamental role in creating two new agrarian classes in the 
lowlands (Urioste and Kay, 2005; Gustafson, 2006; Soruco 2008; Valdivia, 2010).  First, 
former hacendados were turned into capitalist entrepreneurs, mainly Cruceños and Paceños 
(from Santa Cruz and La Paz cities respectively) with strong links to political power.  These 
new entrepreneurial farmers engaged in rather extensive agriculture in this period: mainly 
sugar cane, cotton, livestock and forest exploitation.  This so-called Cruceño elite obtained 
large extensions of land and state support for agricultural production.  However, the Cruceño 
elite were in fact more urban and agro-industrial than rural and agricultural.  They not only 
exercised power in the departmental government, but also through gremial organizations such 
as the Agricultural Chamber of Commerce of Eastern Bolivia (CAO) and the Chamber of 
Industry and Trade of Santa Cruz (CAINCO). 
                                                          
 
8 Classical problems such as very low levels of return on public investments, along with indiscriminate land donations as 
political favours, especially during the government of President Banzer, have been reported (Soruco, 2008). 
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Second, the ‘March to the East’ politics encouraged peasants and indigenous people from 
the Andes (Quechua and Aymara ethnic groups) to migrate to the lowlands and become 
farmers,  thereby extending the agricultural frontier, or to become part of a cheap labour force 
for the rising agro-industry (Ormachea, 2008).
9
  These colonists or ‘small farmers’, referred to 
as ‘Kollas’ (pejorative), received relatively little state support, infrastructure and land (less 
than 50 has per farmer).
10
  The National Colonization Institute (INC) distributed individual 
plots of between 30 and 50 has to colonists in the two largest state-sponsored frontier 
settlements of Andean migrants: Yapacani in the North of Santa Cruz, and San Julian to the 
East (Fifer, 1982).  This planned colonization was followed by a spontaneous colonization 
process, comprising eventually at least 80 per cent of new agricultural settlements since the 
revolution of 1952 (Fifer, 1982).  Both government and ‘spontaneous’ forms of colonization 
were largely based on individual land tenure, cultivating rice and corn for the national market.  
Copying the peasant organizational structure of the Andes, ‘small farmers’ organized 
themselves into class-based ‘agrarian unions’ (sindicatos agrarios) to address the lack of state 
support and to facilitate colonization and land titling.  At the national level these unions were 
grouped into two major confederations: the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores de 
Bolivia (the Sole Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers, or CSUTCB) and the 
Confederación Sindical de Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia (the Union Confederation 
of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia, or CSCIB).  At the local level, these unions 
organized the territory and demanded public services in the new colonization zones
11
. 
 
Neoliberalism (1985-2005) and multinational capital  
 
In the mid-1980s, the capitalist state gave way to neoliberalism, reconfiguring the territory 
and agricultural production and changing the landscape of the lowlands.  The axis of change 
was the soy boom, made possible by the combination of a favourable global market for soy, 
neoliberal reforms —deregulation of markets, and privatization of nearly all large state 
companies— and development intervention.  The Eastern Lowlands Project promoted and 
financed by the World Bank (World Bank 1997), invested in silos, processing facilities, roads 
and technical assistance, as well as land-use planning (Killeen et al. 2008).  It provided the 
                                                          
 
9 The Interamerican Development Bank (9.1 million dollars ) and USAID (2.3 million dollars) financed the “March to the 
East”, whereas the Bolivian government provided land valued at 10 million dollars (Suárez et al., 2010) 
10 “Small farmer” often refers to the origin of the farmer (a migrant from the highlands) than to farm size. According to 
ANAPO, a small farmer in Santa Cruz has up to 50 has, a medium farmer between 51 and 300 has and a large farmer more 
than 300 has. 
11 The agrarian unions are grouped into ‘centrals’ at the provincial level and into ‘federations’ at the departmental level.  
Chapter 3: The return of the state in Bolivia 
54 
 
infrastructure for a monoculture, export-oriented agribusiness.  In addition, the formation of 
the Andean Community of Nations (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia) as a free trade 
zone promoted tax-free exports to Colombia, the major market (Fabricant, 2010).  At the 
beginning of the 21st century, soy is Bolivia’s most important export crop, with one million 
hectares in Santa Cruz (52 per cent of the department’s cultivable land); more than 90 per cent 
of which is produced in the colonization zones known as ‘Integrated North’ and ‘Expansion 
Zone’ (Urioste, 2010). 
The soy sector consists of different types of producers but is dominated by a few capital 
groups.  There are approximately 14,000 producers, of which 3 per cent are large producers 
(more than 1000 ha) who control approximately 56 per cent of the land sown with soy.  Small 
and medium producers represent 97 per cent of all soy producers and control 45 per cent of 
the sown area (Suárez et al., 2010).  Large companies and investment funds controlled and 
administered the production and commercialization.  In part  they emerged from the Cruceño 
elite discussed above, but Brazilian, Colombian and Argentinian producers have become 
increasingly important (the first arriving in the mid-1990s, the latter more recently).
12
  Foreign 
capital is even more important in the wider commodity chain: a few multinationals dominate 
industrialization, exportation and financing of soy production, whereas the Cruceño elite is 
only a small partner (Medeiros, 2008; Urioste, 2010).
13
  According to Urioste (2010, 2011), 
foreign control of land has not led to clashes as the new foreigners integrate well with the 
culturally heterogeneous Cruceño elite, who identify more with a cosmopolitan culture than 
with Andean indigenismo.  In their view it is the Andean peasants who are the ‘immigrants’ 
rather than the Brazilian soy producers. 
Multinational capital works with small as well as large producers.  Financing production is 
a key mechanism of subsumption of smallholders (Jansen, 1998)
14
.  Agribusiness companies 
offer loans for buying inputs and renting agricultural machinery, under the contractual 
requirement that they will receive the production (Pérez, 2007).  For example, the 
multinational ADM SAO S.A., one of the largest soybean, corn and wheat processors in the 
world, allocates around US$20 million annually as loans to smallholders to buy agricultural 
inputs and diesel.  Contracts stipulated that ADM takes possession of the land if production is 
not carried out well and that the company sets the price and standard of beans harvested 
                                                          
 
12 According to Medeiros (2008), the number of large producers (who cultivate more than 1000 has) does not exceed 300, 
the majority of whom are Brazilian, with a powerful nucleus of no more than 100 producers with farms between 3,500 and 
8,000 has. 
13 Core companies are American (ADM-SAO S.A. and Cargill Bolivia), Colombian (Gravetal Bolivia), Peruvian (Industrias 
Aceiteras S.A.) and Bolivian (Industria Oleoginosas, Intergrain, El Productor, CAICO, CAISY and Granos del Oriente). 
14 60 per cent of loans for production are financed by export and oil companies, 21 per cent by agricultural firms and only 3 
per cent by formal banks (Suárez et al., 2011). 
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(usually leading to high discounts owing to dampness or impurities).  Such binding contracts 
lessened small producers’ ability to negotiate the best price or more favourable buying 
conditions (Catacora, 2007; Pérez, 2007; Medeiros, 2008). 
This subsumption process not only created the dependency of small producers on 
transnational capital for credits and markets but also set the standard for production 
technology.  Soy is only profitable when mechanically cultivated on large plots.  Producers 
must mechanize, use agrochemical packages to control pests, diseases and weeds, and sow 
high quality seeds in order to obtain a return on investments.  Inputs as well as corresponding 
agricultural extension services are controlled by companies closely linked to transnational 
capital (Kaimowitz et al., 2001, Urioste et al., 2001; Hecht, 2005, Mackey, 2011).  Public 
sector agricultural research and transfer is scarce and has failed to adapt to this reality.  The 
soy sector is an example of technological monoculture (Richards, 2004) as the actors involved 
imagine a single technology optimum for all soy farmers (both small and large).  For example, 
ANAPO, the organization that unites large soy producers, has publicly declared that the 
implementation of agricultural policies in Bolivia should focus on producers who incorporate 
this type of technology in their harvests (ANAPO, 2010).
15
 
 
N e o c o l l e c t i v i s m :  T h e  c a s e  o f  E M A P A  
 
The MAS government aimed to reverse the growing differentiation between smallholders 
and large-scale farming, a result of the capitalist state period, and the growing dependency on 
multinational capital during neoliberalism.  In August 2007, the government created EMAPA 
with the goal of facilitating access of small producers to capital, technology and markets with 
a fair price.  EMAPA had to modify the economic structures in the lowlands and reduce the 
power of agribusiness, which in turn would transform political power within the state. 
The selection of sites for EMAPA intervention is politically driven.  The political elites in 
Santa Cruz have been the strongest opponents of the Morales government.  EMAPA 
concentrated on the department of Santa Cruz, and in particular on those territories called 
colonization zones where power relations between the agro-industry and ‘small farmers’ were 
very unequal (the municipalities of Yapacaní, Mineros, San Pedro, and Santa Rosa del Sara in 
the integrated north and San Julián and Cuatro Cañadas in the expansion zone).  Of the 
                                                          
 
15 Soy modernization has been criticized for causing environmental destruction (more than a million hectares have been 
deforested for soy during the last 15 years).  Easy and cheap access to land, low property taxes, and uncertainty in property 
rights (that favour a non-sustainable short-term vision), provided favourable conditions for continuous deforestation (Urioste 
et al., 2001; Killeen et al., 2008). 
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266,903 hectares supported by EMAPA up until 2011, 232,482 (87 per cent) are located in 
Santa Cruz.  Figure 3.1 shows the degree of overlap between those municipalities where MAS 
won the local elections (in grey) and those municipalities where EMAPA has intervened (the 
dotted areas).  According to our interpretation of the results of the last municipal elections 
(April 2009), EMAPA selects municipalities with a high concentration of people who identify 
themselves with the MAS political plan and who elected a MAS candidate as mayor.  In these 
zones, the EMAPA government supported the production of four crops: soy, wheat, corn, and 
rice
16
.  Each small farmer can request a loan for sowing up to three crops per agricultural 
cycle and a maximum of 80 has; 3,856 producers were supported in 2009 (figures supplied by 
EMAPA-Santa Cruz). 
 
 
Figure 3.1 EMAPA and MAS presence in Santa Cruz 
Data from the National Electoral Court of Bolivia (www.cne.org.bo) and EMAPA regional office in 
Santa Cruz de la Sierra. 
 
To analyse how EMAPA has operated we distinguish four mechanisms of governance.  The 
first one concerns the distinction made between two categories: associations of producers 
(groups of individual farmers) and agrarian unions (generally the political constituencies of 
MAS at the local level).  Unions (sindicatos) are a collective form of local governance that 
channel demands directly to the state and provide new spaces of political participation to 
peasant communities.  EMAPA engages first with agrarian unions who are in charge of 
putting the neocollectivist ideas to work.  EMAPA requires union members to organize in 
                                                          
 
16 EMAPA supports two agricultural cycles a year: a summer cycle from October to December and a winter cycle from April 
to June.  Soy and corn are cultivated in both cycles; rice only during the summer and wheat only during the winter. 
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legally constituted economic associations.  These maintain a strong relationship with the 
unions, although not all union members are part of the associations.  Associations have 
between 15 and 270 members (sometimes including members from two or more unions), 
grouping together only those producers who are able to practise commercial and mechanized 
agriculture.  Smallholders refer to the unions as the political branch of the communities and to 
the associations as the economic branch.  The following statement by a leader of the peasant 
association CAUPAIN (Head Office of the Agricultural Producers United Associations of the 
North) illustrates how political strategy is interwoven with technical support measures:  
 
CAUPAIN was born from the government, from the socialism that exists right 
now.  They were the producers whom the government launched.  […]  An 
invitation arrived from the government for producers to form groups and 
associations to receive support, especially for storage and commercialization of 
grains.  It was a program with Venezuela, if I’m not mistaken.  The 
government would buy the grain at a fair price.  The program was called TCP 
ALBA.
17
  In the past, companies paid us what they wanted and we just about 
covered the costs of production.  A need was seen for more financing for and 
political strengthening of small producers.  [This] was more of a political 
question (Interview, 11 August 2010). 
 
This quote accentuates the political character underlying the moves to improve agricultural 
production.  EMAPA preferred to work with newly-created associations rather than with older 
or more experienced groups like cooperatives and peasant economic organisations (OECAs).  
During the fieldwork, we recorded complaints from members of cooperatives and OECAs that 
EMAPA had formed these new associations along political lines, excluding those groups 
which did not openly support the MAS or have authorization from the unions. 
MAS strategy has been to create alternative local powers in the economic sphere and to 
weaken already existing productive organizations.  For example, the National Federation of 
Rice-Growing Cooperatives (FENCA)
18
 and the Rice Producer Association (ASPAR)
19
, both 
of which are made up of ‘small producers’, are affiliated to CAO and CAINCO, organizations 
which are politically represented and economically controlled by the Cruceño elite.  Ortiz, an 
                                                          
 
17 In 2006, the MAS government formed producer associations to commercialize basic foodstuffs with the support of the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America - Trade Agreement of the People (TCP-ALBA; ALBA consists of 
Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, San Vincent and Grenadines and Venezuela) based on 
fair prices and food provisioning via the state.  EMAPA expanded these earlier interventions. 
18 FENCA, created in 1964, brings together 63 cooperatives and 3500 families of small and medium rice producers. 
19 ASPAR, created in 1984, covers the rice producers in Santa Cruz. 
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agricultural researcher who is knowledgeable about FENCA, commented in an interview (16 
December 2011) that a proposal which EMAPA had submitted to the government to work 
with producer cooperatives affiliated to FENCA had been disapproved.  The president of 
FENCA confirmed the government’s negative response to this proposed collaboration:  ‘Even 
though we (FENCA) tried, we could not have a relationship with EMAPA for political 
reasons.  We are affiliated with CAO; all FENCA and ASPAR groups are affiliated with 
CAO, that’s why we weren’t able to work with the government through EMAPA’ (Interview, 
23 August 2011). 
This form of exclusion was driven by the MAS national political strategy which, in this 
case, overruled EMAPA’s proposals.  EMAPA had the task of supporting those associations 
which belonged to the Agricultural Chamber of Small Producers of the East (CAPPO).  
CAPPO was set up as an alternative to CAO and CAINCO— the chambers of commerce that 
had historically represented the agro-industrial Cruceño elite.  Through CAPPO, which 
defends smallholder interests, associations have gained improvements in basic productive 
infrastructure such as roads and the construction of silos for the storage of basic grains.  
A complex pattern of politicization and de-politicization has emerged.  On the one hand, 
unions continue ‘the pact’ to channel their claims directly through the state.  On the other 
hand, the relationship between EMAPA and the associations is pictured as a ‘business’, a 
relationship which needs to be de-politicized if EMAPA is to carry out the technical 
requirements involved in modernizing agriculture and to ensure government access to basic 
grains for its urban food distribution programmes.  The formation of associations allowed 
EMAPA to benefit from economies of scale (delivering inputs, infrastructure and services to 
organized groups rather than individual producers).  One EMAPA official interviewed 
thought that unions ‘are very politicized’ and ‘are moved more by political than productive 
interests’.  Interestingly, those union leaders interviewed shared this view and added that since 
not all producers in a community receive EMAPA’s support, the selection of potential 
beneficiaries can cause conflict amongst members and distract organizations from their 
political claims.  In sum, not unlike the Lesotho case described by Ferguson (1990), the MAS 
government turned development into a technical problem by supporting EMAPA’s focus on 
associations rather than unions.  EMAPA’s exclusion of subsistence producers (19 per cent of 
rice producers in Santa Cruz) and farmers without land can be seen as one result of this de-
politicization.  On the other hand, as described earlier, the selection of sites where EMAPA 
intervenes as well as the organization of associations into alternative chambers of commerce 
were politicized acts of intervention. 
A second mechanism of governance has been the diffusion of a collective vision to 
promote social cohesion among the associations.  This collective vision sought counter the 
atomization of agricultural production engrained in the unions and to facilitate the creation of 
community enterprises in the near future (García-Linera, 2012b).  A main instrument for 
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achieving this consists of what EMAPA calls the ‘social guarantee’ (garantia social).  
Producers cannot obtain access to EMAPA’s resources without the support of an association 
that acts as guarantor.  Should a producer default, the whole association is burdened with the 
debt and is entitled to rent or auction the debtor’s land (interview with Ordoñez, EMAPA 
employee, 7 October 2010).  The social guarantee was introduced to give associations ‘an 
incentive’ to form a collective vision which enables the group to exercise social control over 
its members. Where associations meet their commitments with EMAPA, they can more easily 
negotiate additional resources for new productive infrastructure.  In vice-president García-
Linera’s view, associations, when formed into communitarian enterprises, will eventually be 
able to manage these productive infrastructures which strengthen local production (García-
Linera, 2012).  If, on the other hand, an association should default through one of its members 
not paying, it is ‘punished’ and excluded from EMAPA support in the following agricultural 
cycle.  This at least is the case in theory, as some associations have been able to reschedule 
their debts with EMAPA and thus continue to receive support.   
A third mechanism of governance works to make producers dependent on EMAPA by 
means of offering a ‘fair price’ (i.e. higher price than market value) for their production.  By 
offering a higher price, the government seeks several goals.  First, higher prices improve the 
livelihoods of small producers.  Second, it forces the agribusiness sector to revise its prices 
and improve the terms of their commercialization contracts with small-farmers.  García-
Linera (2009) regards EMAPA as a strategy to break with the mechanisms of patronage and 
subordination in Santa Cruz and sees the sale of produce to EMAPA by smallholders as 
evidence of a successful new alliance between state and producer.  Producers are attracted by 
receiving 15 per cent more than the market price.  For example, in 2009, producers sold rice 
to EMAPA at US$ 57 per bag, while the agro-industry paid only US$ 37.  Higher prices are 
also an incentive for producers to sell their production to EMAPA rather than to agribusiness 
markets in order to repay any outstanding debts with EMAPA.  Fourth, the produce captured 
by offering higher prices goes on sale in EMAPA’s own stores in popular neighbourhoods in 
cities, rural communities and towns to contribute to national food security with sovereignty
20
. 
Finally, the fourth and most important mechanism of governance concerns the way in 
which EMAPA organizes the supply of inputs and technical assistance to ‘small producers’.  
By supplying diesel, the MAS government makes sure that producers mechanize their lands 
and use the appropriate seeds and agrochemicals.  Moreover, the technical services aim to 
direct and monitor the different stages of the productive process and the correct use of inputs.  
EMAPA extends state support for agricultural activities to places where it was previously 
                                                          
 
20 In 2010 EMAPA supplied 462 sales centres in the whole country; 22 were state property and 440 were private property. 
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non-existent.  Offering credits with zero per cent interest puts EMAPA in a stronger position 
with respect to agroindustry and other suppliers of similar services. 
 
E M A P A  S h a p i n g  I m a g e s  o f  A g r a r i a n  M o d e r n i z a t i o n  
 
An assessment of the prospects of neocollectivism requires a discussion of the capacity of 
EMAPA to transform the local agrarian structure and construct an alternative modernization 
process.  This section discusses the view of modernization central to EMAPA’s programme 
and then reflects on the reception of collective approaches versus individualist approaches and 
the creation of new technological dependencies. 
 
Adopting the dominant image of agrarian modernization  
 
On several occasions, Evo Morales has blamed capitalism for fomenting an 
industrialization process which destroys nature (Los Tiempos, 2010).  In October 2012, the 
MAS government enacted the ‘Law of Mother Earth and Integral Development’ inspired by 
the indigenous values of ‘Living Well’.  This law aims to promote an ‘integral development’ 
model that balances the exploitation of natural resources with the rights of mother earth (El 
Deber, 2012).  In principle, this model conflicts with that of Cruceño agrarian capitalism and 
its image of agricultural modernization based on ‘Green Revolution’ principles: new crop 
varieties, agrochemicals and machinery.  This vision is well captured in the documentary 
‘Histories of successful migrants in the Agro-Cruceño’ produced by the Bolivian Institute of 
Foreign Commerce in 2010 and supported by CAO and CAINCO, two organizational 
structures of the Cruceño elite.  This documentary depicts the  Santa Cruz department as a 
land of opportunities, drawing on the testimonies of 33 indigenous migrants from the 
highlands who overcame poverty and went on to become important agricultural producers in 
Santa Cruz.  A typical account is that of Jacinto Arellano, who arrived from Oruro (in the 
western part of the country): 
 
Poverty was all that he brought in his pockets, even though his heart was full 
of hope.  The ‘promised land’, as Santa Cruz is called even now, was what fed 
his hope for better days.  Determination and hard work did the rest.  Almost 
four decades after his arrival on Cruceño soil, Jacinto is now just one 
agricultural producer among many in Santa Cruz, with thousands of hectares, a 
good fleet of vehicles and his own agricultural machinery (author’s emphasis). 
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The documentary tells a story of agricultural modernization based on large tracts of lands, 
mechanization and high chemical inputs, reproducing the illusion that natural resources, 
especially land, are infinite and available in sufficient quantity for everyone.  Those producers 
who did not succeed either lacked determination or did not work hard enough. 
Paradoxically EMAPA’s propaganda has systematically adopted and reinforced the 
Cruceño model of intensive agriculture as the way forward.  An example is the photo of 
President Evo Morales which appears in EMAPA’s promotional literature (Figure 3.2).  
Morales is shown wearing a blue poncho, representing the indigenous Aymaras of the 
Altiplano, driving a tractor (a symbol of success) with, in the background, a field of intensive 
rice cultivation, the principal crop of small producers in the lowlands.  Morales used this 
image when visiting rural communities in Cochabamba and Santa Cruz during his 2009 re-
election campaign.  When asked about its significance, Morales responded: ‘This big tractor 
sends out a message that the national government will guarantee food security and 
sovereignty, that we produce our own food’ (Macher 2009). 
The view of mechanization as the way to achieve food security with sovereignty was 
underlined in the program of the MAS government’s second term.  The Plan highlighted how 
during its first term in office, MAS had allocated 1,661 tractors, 20 combine harvesters and 40 
grain drillers to producer organizations and communities as an important step towards the 
industrialization of agrarian production (MAS IPSP 2010).  
 
 
Figure 3.2 President Evo Morales in EMAPA’s promotional literature 
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Our field data reveal how small farmers themselves have adopted and believe in this model 
as the standard for success (Richards, 2004) and see EMAPA as the means to achieve it.  For 
instance, Huaylla, a producer from San Pedro, stated: 
 
Now our vision is to form a small business so as to sustain ourselves as a small 
unit of producers, God willing, [within] 4 or 5 years from now, because Evo 
will not be in government for his whole life.  Maybe he will stay 5 or 10 more 
years, but after that the right might topple him.  This would affect us because 
we don’t want to produce basic grains [of low quality], but high quality, 
selected grains for export (Interview, 12 August 2010). 
 
Carballo, in Santa Rosa del Sara, echoed Huaylla’s wishes: ‘We, as a family, have other 
objectives, trying to grow agriculturally, and even trying to save and industrialize in order to 
be able to export’ (Interview, 25 April 2010).  Such farmer narratives reflect the desire to 
industrialize and improve quality and quantity in order to export as way of achieving higher 
profits from agricultural production.  Producers see governmental support as an opportunity to 
shift production and gain access to export markets. 
Both EMAPA and small producers seemingly share the view that the only way to compete 
with the agro-industrial power of the Cruceño elite and the multinational companies is by 
adopting their model of agricultural modernization.  This involves directly increasing 
productivity through technical assistance and inputs (pesticides, fertilizers, seeds) as well as 
converting existing forests into land for the production of basic grains and oilseeds.  As yet, 
EMAPA has not been concerned with advocating sustainable technological alternatives based 
on the concepts of food sovereignty and ‘Living Well’, claims of indigenous and peasant 
movements.  Furthermore, EMAPA’s objectives of meeting domestic food demands first and 
achieving food security conflict with the export orientation of both small-producers and the 
Cruceño elite.  The MAS government has confronted the aspirations of the Cruceño elite by 
restricting the export of some products (among them soy). 
 
Technological dependency 
 
Based on the Cruceño model of agrarian modernization, EMAPA has spent a large part of 
its budget intervening (mainly through credit and technical services) in places where the state 
had not been present before.  However, it has only been able to set up a relatively small 
organization.  In 2011, EMAPA-Santa Cruz had only nine outreach workers providing 
technical assistance, covering on average 11,000 has while the recommendation is for one 
outreach worker to cover 3,000 has.  In addition these technicians undertake administrative 
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tasks, verify planting areas, carry out geo-referencing of land and provide support for the 
formation of producer associations.  Apart from its limited capacity to provide technical 
assistance, the state has no special technology to offer.  As a result of neoliberal policies, the 
national system of agricultural research was dismantled.  For example, seed certification 
services were co-opted by the agro-industry sector and many technical services were put in 
the hands of NGOs or market actors.  Hence, notwithstanding its aim of developing a political 
and economic alternative, EMAPA is almost entirely dependent for the supply of technology 
on the despised agro-industry controlled by Cruceño and international capital. 
EMAPA has tried to control the provision of technology by entering into contracts.  It 
selected 25 agro-chemical companies to supply agro-chemical inputs; in 2009, 10 of these 
companies signed a ‘supply of agricultural inputs contract’.21  The producer associations are 
responsible for choosing which of these companies they want to work with.  The contract 
specifies the inputs, the price, and the kind of technical assistance.  This technical assistance 
consists of a monthly or bimonthly visit to the field (the frequency depends on the size of the 
association) and three training sessions per agricultural cycle.  A technician, accompanied by 
a representative from the particular association, visits an average of 20 producers a day.  Most 
visits involve a quick visit to the crop site with recommendations for chemical controls to be 
carried out.  The technician takes photographs to monitor progress and to provide a record of 
the visit.  In turn, legal representatives of the associations monitor how the agrochemical 
companies do their job.  Representatives of these companies indicated that thanks to 
EMAPA’s intervention they have been able to expand their markets to small farmers.  The 
transaction costs of reaching these farmers used to be too high but their organization into 
associations means that they can now reach this new customer group. 
A major contentious issue arising out of the contracts has been the embedded technological 
package.  Before each campaign, EMAPA technicians, representatives of the producer 
associations and of the agro-chemical companies define the input package, based on the 
availability of products stocked by these companies.  EMAPA simplifies the agricultural 
package offered by grouping them into three types, according to region of intervention (the 
north, the northeast and east zone).  In rice, for example, the standard package only targets a 
mechanized system of non-irrigated land.  This system, however, has been characterized as 
inadequate owing to poor soil tillage practices, inadequate pest control and indiscriminate use 
of pesticides (Ortiz et al., 2007).  These agricultural packages are an example of 
‘simplification’ in the sense of Scott (1998) as they reduce the complex reality of farming 
systems to a single standard.  Producers indicated that they would like to have the option of 
                                                          
 
21 These companies were: Guaraní Agriculture Defensive, Mega Agro, Agro-impulse, Artist Life Science, Agro-Bolivia, 
Agroinco, Agropartners, AGRIPAC, FABIMAC, and AI Group. 
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returning unneeded inputs.  The agro-chemical companies would like to be able to make 
different recommendations when new problems arise (disease, pests, and climatic events). 
The agro-chemical companies find the contracts with EMAPA excessively rigid as they 
cannot adapt sales to needs nor sell more than specified.  Some producers interviewed 
commented that agro-chemical companies make technical recommendations with the sole 
purpose of getting the producer to apply agro-chemicals and consume the whole standard 
package on offer.  Five technicians, from four different companies, agreed in interviews that 
this practice did occur (though not in their companies).  The EMAPA employees interviewed 
are conscious of overdosing and inconsistencies in the productive package:  ‘What we have 
seen is that some companies try to get the farmer to overdose.  There are [crop protection] 
products that are very expensive: an increase in dosage from 100 to 200 ml [of a product in an 
application] changes the production costs’ (interview, 15 May 2010).  According to EMAPA, 
making contracts more flexible by allowing inputs to be adjusted to the needs of individual 
producers, would be practically impossible.  Each change or return of product would require 
approval by the central office in the city of La Paz, plus verification by an EMAPA 
technician:  EMAPA serves approximately 3800 producers in Santa Cruz.  The EMAPA 
manager in Santa Cruz explained that EMAPA simplifies farming systems into three 
intervention zones because of the lack of administrative capacity and financial resources. 
Since the capacity of EMAPA is limited, it can only work with very simplified 
technological packages and is, in fact, completely dependent on the input industry for 
specifying the technologies to be used.  Producer associations are likewise placed in an 
unequal relationship with agro-chemical companies; not just because of differences in capital 
but also because producers may lack knowledge of the proposed agrochemicals and have little 
means of challenging these companies’ technical recommendations.  Thus, many producers 
feel they are forced to sell or exchange these inputs to pay their debts with EMAPA.  This 
shows that technology not only has the power to emancipate as stressed by Ribot and Peluso 
(2003) but also to deepen dependency ties.  The lack of an alternative proposal to the 
dominant model of agricultural modernization together with inappropriate technical advice, 
low quality inputs and expensive, oversimplified agriculture packages weaken the position of 
small producers in relation to other actors in the agro-food chain.  EMAPA’s attempts to 
break dependency ties on agro-industry and weaken its power may backfire.  In this case, it is 
control over input delivery and technology rather than capital or land which is crucial.   
 
Collective versus individual v isions 
 
Neocollectivism faces the challenge of surmounting the contradiction between a 
commitment to collective strategies in which associations may potentially become 
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communitarian enterprises, and individual aspirations.  Mamani, a leader of an association 
expresses a typical justification for upholding a collective vision:  ‘A stronger association has 
greater decision-making power to confront EMAPA and the aceiteras [oil companies], 
individually this is very difficult (interview, 13 August 2010).  Interestingly the collectivist 
vision presented by Mamani is seen as strengthening their hand not only with the dominant 
agro-industry but with EMAPA/the state itself.  While we have not researched this 
quantitatively, field data suggest that those who defend a collective vision are often leaders 
with strong links to the MAS party and small producers who do not have access to credit from 
agro-industry as they lack the necessary collateral; for these producers EMAPA is the only 
source of support.  According to this viewpoint, the association acting as a collective force is 
the only way to improve market options.  On the other hand, those association members with 
more land and resources and strong ties to agro-industry may harbour individual ambitions to 
become profitable by the Cruceño agrarian capitalism model, possibly drawing on resources 
provided by EMAPA to do so. 
One bone of contention is the ‘social guarantee’.  This was a recurring theme in the 
meetings we attended as most associations are indebted to EMAPA. (In 2011 of the 45 
associations supported by EMAPA only one is free from financial obligations).  In these 
meetings, representatives of associations often highlighted the disadvantages of being 
‘excluded’ from EMAPA and from other government support, such as road construction, 
storage facilities and processing plants.  Although most people agreed to pay the debts fearing 
that otherwise the government would legally enforce the ‘social guarantee’ and seize their 
land, some voices argued that ‘the money is ours’, ‘this money is from Evo’ or ‘in the end I 
think we are going to write off these loans, as the government has done before’.  Associations 
participating in EMAPA have been strong supporters of President Evo Morales and the MAS 
party.  The politicization of the debt issue by linking it to the larger political project of MAS 
may hinder EMAPA’s ability to collect outstanding loans. 
Besides the political, collectivist resistance to debt repayment, EMAPA also faces 
individual acts of evasion.  Interviewees acknowledged that it was better to sell part of their 
production to agro-industry in order to avoid EMAPA debt (since this must be paid in kind 
rather than cash).  Some argued that they preferred to sell to agro-industry because the buying 
process is much faster (no long queues to deliver the product).  Others wanted to invest in 
machinery or farm improvements or just solve a farm crisis.  For example, rice producer 
Huaylla admitted that he had sold part of his production on the ‘black market’ (agro-industry) 
because he needed the money to recover from a bad harvest; he now owes EMAPA 42,000 
Bolivians (approx. US$6,100). 
The social guarantee and debt issue indicate that EMAPA’s attempt to separate the 
functional (de-politicized) associations from the unions who form political constituencies of 
MAS is not yet complete.  In 2010, after strong pressure from those producer associations 
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directly related to the MAS network, EMAPA rescheduled debts and set a new deadline of 
2012 for debt cancellation.  It remains unclear whether EMAPA will be able to develop the 
mechanisms to enforce payment of debts.  
 
S t a t e - C i v i l  S o c i e t y  R e l a t i o n s  a n d  E M A P A ’ s  C a p a c i t y  t o  
I n t e r v e n e  i n  R u r a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  
 
An important challenge for neocollectivism is to develop an alternative to bureaucratic and 
inefficient state services which have been the subject of neoliberal criticism.  This has not 
been an easy task, mainly because the state has lacked the capacity, implementation failures 
on the part of EMAPA, and tensions with different civil society actors, including agro 
business elites. 
EMAPA’s intervention is characterized by a centralized and inefficient decision-making 
process as well as a lack of capacity in infrastructure and technical advice.  EMAPA’s service 
delivery is often held up because of the time taken to reach a decision.  For example, in 2009 
some producers received seed too late for the planting season.  The head of the unit of inputs 
of EMAPA in Santa Cruz timidly gave the following reason for slowness in input delivery:  
 
Applications and folders from each association must pass across at least 30 
desks to obtain approval, expenditure, and purchase. 
 
A technician added: 
 
EMAPA is too centralized.  Santa Cruz manages 80 per cent of what EMAPA 
does.  The centre should be here, but it is not, it is in La Paz.  All the decision 
makers are in La Paz.  We have to send all the papers to La Paz and some get 
lost on the way (interview, 03 December 2010). 
 
EMAPA has also not been able to set up completely the infrastructure needed for storage 
and processing.  During the rice harvest of 2009, long lines of trucks waited for more than 
three weeks to unload their rice in front of EMAPA’s facilities.  Desperate producers 
expressed concern about damage to their production arising from the loss of moisture in the 
grain.  They remained because they needed to pay off their debt to EMAPA even though they 
would have preferred to sell to private companies.  Producers also commented on instances of 
corruption by EMAPA technicians who sought bribes in return for speeding up the reception 
of their harvest.  This situation forced EMAPA to rent silos and processing plants from the 
traditional agro-industry. 
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The associations, like the unions, have contested these failures.  On more than one 
occasion, they have blocked the principal highway linking Santa Cruz with Cochabamba and 
La Paz to show their discontent and to pressure for changes in EMAPA’s intervention.  
Among other changes, these protests have led to the resignation of the minister of rural 
development and to a revision of EMAPA’s purchase prices (Villarroel, 2008). 
The complex process of politicization and depoliticization proposed by the MAS 
government to facilitate the implementation of neocollectivism has caused discontent among 
the associations.  According to them, EMAPA officials come to these meetings with a pre-
prepared technical plan without any intention of adopting suggestions from the associations.  
During a meeting between EMAPA and an association in the town of San Pedro, a peasant 
leader energetically showed his displeasure as follows:  
 
They invite us to participate, but they present plans without any attempt at joint 
planning.  We read the plans but they do not take our views into consideration 
at all.  It should not be like this if we are real partners.  Planning should be 
agreed on, without military instruction, with participation.  The minister should 
be invited to attend these planning meetings (fieldwork notes, October 2011). 
 
The reference to the minister in this quote is particularly interesting.  At this meeting, the 
minister, owing to her rural background and union history, was seen as the person who really 
knew the farmers’ problems.  Technicians meanwhile are seen as adopting a rigid (military) 
position and depoliticizing the participatory process.  Despite threatening to end their 
relationship with EMAPA, most small producers are not demanding a withdrawal of the state.  
On the contrary, farmers’ demands are for greater participation of the state in the regulation of 
food prices, an improvement of agricultural services or the expansion of EMAPA’s support to 
producers not yet covered by the programme (Energy Press, 2012) 
The most critical backlash from civil society came in early 2011 when the MAS 
government withdrew the fuel subsidy in a measure known as the ‘gasolinazo’ (big fuel).  
Food prices shot up and cities suffered from food shortages and speculation.  Mass 
mobilization across the country pressured the MAS government to withdraw this measure.  In 
the aftermath of these mobilizations, EMAPA changed its role from that of supporter of food 
production to that of importer and intermediary so as to ensure the supply and distribution of 
food.  These new functions which exceeded EMAPA’s capacity to carry them out might even 
have deepened the food crisis.  Merchants organized in gremios (guilds) and urban supporters 
of the MAS government protested in the streets demanding EMAPA’s closure.  These actions 
generated intense debate on the role of EMAPA in food security and sovereignty and on its 
economic viability (Arias, 2011; García-Linera, 2012b).   
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The ‘gasolinazo’ demonstrated how the complex relationship between state and civil 
society actors, including the agro-industrial elites, contested and shaped neocollectivism.  The 
agro-industrial elite saw the crisis as an opportunity to cut back state intervention in 
agricultural production.  CAO and CAINCO warned of a new food crisis if export restrictions, 
state interference in price controls and in oil production continued (El Dia, 2011).  The MAS 
government was forced to enter into a ‘new productive alliance’ with agro-industrial elites to 
bring down domestic food prices.  By entering into this alliance, the government abandoned 
its confrontational posture towards this sector and promised financial support and legal 
security for their land.  This change in MAS’ radical discourse will not necessarily lead to the 
demise of neocollectivism nor erode the influence of neoliberalism in agrarian modernization 
(Cannon and Kirby, 2012).  It can be better seen as part of a ‘state in transformation’ (Jessop, 
2008) in which the state’s room for manoeuvre depends on continuous interaction with its 
local constituencies and on a variety of forces in society, especially those strengthened during 
the era of neoliberalism.  The outcome will also depend on the capacity of the MAS 
government to present an alternative model of agrarian modernization, which does not rely on 
technological dependence on agro-industrial elites.  
 
C o n c l u s i o n s  
 
This chapter has examined the most important attempt by the MAS government in Bolivia 
to shift from a neoliberal to a neocollectivist agrarian development.  To do this, EMAPA had 
to become the cornerstone of an alternative agrarian structure which would undermine the 
power of the Santa Cruz-based agro-industrial capital.  This new state company had to forge a 
productive alliance between the state and small producers organized in associations, and 
integrate production into larger state networks to increase food security with sovereignty. 
We conclude that the results of this state intervention have been marginal and that it has 
reproduced dependency relationships with agro-industrial capital.  The implementation of 
neocollectivism in Bolivia has been shaped by the new complexities in state-civil society 
relations that emerged during neoliberalism.  First, the dominant position of agro industry and 
its control of technology (seeds, agrochemicals, technical knowledge) and markets constrain 
state capacity, forcing the state to rely on resources and services controlled by agro-industrial 
capital.  Second, the MAS government has been unable to develop alternatives to the 
technological monoculture and the industrialized form of production imagined and driven by 
agro-industrial capital.  Paradoxically, it has facilitated rather than hindered the integration of 
small producers into this internationalizing agro-industrial complex.  The agricultural 
companies set the standards for which inputs to use and which practices, services and 
technological packages to adopt.  It undermines the MAS government intention of recovering 
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state’s sovereignty of the food regime.  Third, the government’s aim to create associations 
with a collective vision has led to tensions within these associations.  The politics of a 
collective vision to confront the power of agribusiness regularly clashes with the vision of 
individual entrepreneurship favoured in a capitalist economy in which growing numbers of 
small producers develop strong ties with the agro-industry for credit and services, using 
EMAPA as a transitional stage for access to resources. 
We selected EMAPA as an interesting case of rural transformation targeting changes in the 
class structure and pattern of class domination which prevailed in Santa Cruz, a centre of 
dynamic agro-industrial capitalism.  The part played by the state in developing alternatives to 
neoliberal capitalism deserves more scholarly attention, whether perceived as complementary 
to or as an alternative to the multiple calls for endogenous, local level initiatives for food 
sovereignty.  The state’s limited room for manoeuvre to advance neocollectivism appears to 
result from the complexities in the relations between a ‘state in transformation’ and civil 
society.  Nevertheless, the MAS government has extended the state’s presence and welfare 
programmes to places and people where it previously did not exist.  One major unresolved 
problem, however, concerns the relationship between technology and politics.  The MAS 
government has encouraged moments of politicization whereby agricultural production is 
politicized and the goal is set to change the particular agrarian structure of Santa Cruz.  At the 
same time, intervention in agricultural production has its de-politicizing moments as EMAPA 
also seeks to increase economic and technical efficiency (although not always with success), 
for example by separating the associations from the unions.  This case study shows that the 
balance between politicization and de-politicization, and the interaction between shifts in 
political power and technical progress are not yet fully understood or well handled. 
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Abstract 
This chapter analyses how neoliberal restructuring encouraged the use of participatory 
methods in agricultural research in Bolivia and how, at a later stage, participatory 
development initiatives had to be adapted to prevent conflicts with the post-neoliberal views 
of farmer organisations.  This chapter contributes to the debate on the normalization of 
participatory methods in agrarian development.  Engaging with Foucault’s work on 
governmentality and neoliberalism our analysis goes beyond interpretations of participation 
which conceptualize it exclusively as a technology of power to discipline subjects.  Drawing 
on a distinction between a liberal and a neoliberal moment in the restructuring of agricultural 
research, we study the case of PROINPA (Foundation for the Promotion and Research of 
Andean Products) a national NGO that was once part of the state system for agricultural 
research but was then privatized.  Although PROINPA employed participation mainly to 
enhance managerial effectiveness, it also facilitated moments of participation from below.  
We argue that participation designed by this type of NGO is not just ‘technical’ as PROINPA 
professionals would like to perceive it, nor is it simply ‘political’ as critical views on 
participation hold.  Instead it is malleable in the sense that each actor is involved in finding a 
new balance between technical, economic and political considerations. 
  
Chapter 4: The Malleability of Participation 
73 
 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
Neoliberal restructuring and the popular protests it gives rise to can have a marked impact 
on agricultural research and farmers’ participation therein.  Recent history in Bolivia provides 
an instructive case.  Inspired by popular protest against water privatization (Water War) in 
Cochabamba (Assies, 2003), the coca farmer blockades in Chapare region (Albó, 2003), and 
the ‘Gas War’ (Perrault, 2007), peasants under the leadership of Felipe Quispe and the 
Pachakuti Movement invaded several agricultural research stations (Patacamaya station in 
August 2002, Kallutaca and Huayrocondo stations in September and October of 2003, and 
Belén station in 2004; El Diario, 2003, 2004, 2005).  Gene banks of important crops and 
animals (including Andean camelids llamas and alpacas) were attacked and documents and 
passport databases were lost, making it impossible to continue with any on-station research 
(Coca, 2010; Quispe, 2005).  The resulting material damage came on top of already declining 
state support for research stations and led to a de facto dismantling and decay of 
infrastructure, machinery and laboratories.  These events left a strong imprint on agricultural 
researchers.  As one interviewed researcher who lamented the destruction of her technically 
successful experimental station stated: 
 
After the invasion [my research station] remained a shell.  It makes you think 
that you can do a lot of research, much development, but if you do not address 
the pertinent social issues there won’t be anything.  You have first to look at 
the social issue before [deciding whether] other systems of research or 
development will bear fruit. (..) This research station was invaded by people 
from the community, because the producers did not see any fruit from the 
research processes. (..) [This] strengthens the idea that you have to address the 
needs and demands of farmers, and that they really participate and take 
decisions about the research. (Interview, 5 October 2010). 
 
The last sentence of this quote refers to the on-going restructuring of the relationship between 
applied research and society as a consequence of neoliberal policies, which favoured a 
particular form of participation by farmers in agricultural research.  What is at stake here is a 
complex interaction between notions of participation, research design and popular politics.  
This chapter discusses how neoliberal restructuring of agricultural research in Bolivia 
embraced an increased use of participatory methods by research organizations which had once 
been part of the public system of agricultural research but were now privatized.  Our analysis 
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hinges not so much on the heated events of invasions but on the normalization of participatory 
methods in agricultural technology innovation and the implications for thinking about 
technological improvement and politics.
22
  The chapter builds on a case study of PROINPA, 
once part of the state but later transformed into a national NGO.  PROINPA is a forerunner in 
agricultural research in the Bolivian Andes and has developed significant initiatives in the 
field of participatory plant breeding. 
Participatory development, once the leitmotif of the more progressive part of the 
development community (Galjart, 1981; Vío-Grossi et al., 1981), has become increasingly 
mainstream and subject to reflexive critique (Hickey and Mohan, 2005).  What is now 
regarded as ‘participatory development orthodoxy’ has been criticized for too readily 
assuming that motivations and behaviour in participatory processes are authentic.  On the 
contrary the language of empowerment may mask an underlying concern for managerial 
effectiveness, and the emphasis on micro-level interventions may obscure broader macro-
level inequalities and injustices (Cooke and Kothari, 2001: 14).  These critics also argue that 
participatory development obscures politics by keeping participatory practice within the frame 
imposed by project interventions (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  Along these same lines, 
Cornwall (2006: 50) refers to participation as ‘[an] infinitely malleable term’ since it can be 
used as a vehicle for different kinds of purposes and can be framed to suit almost any 
situation.  Below we will assess if this also applies to the experience of PROINPA during the 
neoliberal period in Bolivia.  We also aim to contribute to the debate on participation.  Much 
of the criticism of participatory development draws upon ideas from Foucault (e.g. Kothari, 
2001; Williams, 2004) and particularly on his early work on disciplining and 
power/knowledge (e.g. Foucault, 1977).  According to the critics ‘participatory development 
can encourage a reassertion of control and power by dominant individuals and groups’ 
(Kothari, 2001: 142). However, using Foucault’s later work on governmentality and 
neoliberalism one can develop another reading of participatory development than that of the 
rather unified Machiavellian anti-politics machine of development in which participation only 
disciplines.  Conceptualizing participation as a productive way of governing people rather 
than as being simply repressive and negative, we will explore how PROINPA has created new 
forms of linking technological innovation to small farmers and how it has sought ways to 
‘improve populations’ (Li, 2007a). 
The discussion on governmentality is useful here in three ways.  First, to understand the 
role of participatory development in neoliberalism we examine not so much how power is 
constituted in and by the state through ‘particular and identifiable individuals’ as in sovereign 
                                                          
 
22 Invasions as such had their historical roots in disputes over land tenure, land taken from communities by the state, but were 
triggered by the national anti-neoliberal protests.  The land question falls outside the remit of this chapter. 
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and disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977), but how power circulates through a range of 
institutions rather than being concentrated in one.  This means that elements of the 
agricultural research system (such as PROINPA) can be seen as sites where micro-
technologies of power are constituted.  Governing people through science management at 
micro-levels (Phillips and Ilcan, 2003) is not a way of forcing people but is a versatile, 
complementary and conflictive equilibrium between techniques of coercion and those of 
constructing and modifying the self (Lemke, 2001: 5).  Below we will focus in particular on 
how a new researcher is constructed in the course of participatory development.  Second, 
complementing studies that focus on the analysis of micro-technologies of intervention and 
everyday relations of power (Dean, 1999; Miller and Rose, 1990), we draw upon recent work 
that reads Foucault as a genealogist of statecraft and examine relationships between micro-
technologies and the exercise of macro-power (Jessop, 2006; Lemke, 2007; Tyfield 2012), in 
our case the restructuring of agricultural research in the era of neoliberalism.  Third, this task 
requires a clear notion of neoliberalism.  For Foucault neoliberalism is a form of government 
in which power works not by force as in more authoritarian regimes but through the use of 
freedom to create responsible citizen-subjects (Foucault, 1991; Ferguson, 2010).  We 
distinguish below a liberal and a neoliberal moment in the recent restructuring of agricultural 
research (Lemke, 2001) in which the former is mainly concerned with rolling back the state, 
while the latter is concerned with redefining the boundaries between the state and civil society 
and between the state and the economy.  Neoliberalism is not so much about getting rid of the 
state (or publicly funded agricultural research) but about making the market the organizing 
and regulatory principle underlying both the state and other domains of decision making 
(ranging from professional agricultural research to the family and the Andean ‘community’) 
(Flew, 2012; Lemke, 2001). 
The chapter is organized as follows.  The next two sections describe the liberal and 
neoliberal moments in the recent restructuring of agricultural research in Bolivia (from state-
led to more decentralized and demand-driven agricultural research).  Section four reviews the 
PROINPA case, not simply as an organization implementing a neoliberal plan but as a form 
of self-organization within a context of national and international ideas on participation and 
economic (funding) influences.  The final sections discuss the balance between the technical 
and the political in contrasting views of participatory agricultural research.  
Data collection in Bolivia (between August and October 2010 and August and December 
2011) consisted of (a) content analysis of literature and policy documents, including 
PROINPA project documents; (b) semi-structured interviews with different types of actor in 
the agricultural research system in the cities of La Paz, Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and Sucre; 
and (c) semi-structured interviews and participant observation in Morochata, one of 
PROINPA’s intervention sites.  In total fifty-two interviews were analysed. 
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B u i l d i n g  T e c h n o s t a t i s t  A g r i c u l t u r a l  R e s e a r c h  a n d  t h e  
L i b e r a l i z a t i o n  R e s p o n s e   
 
The agricultural research system pursued in Bolivia in the second half of the twentieth 
century followed a technostatist approach to science policy (Tyfield, 2012).  Accordingly 
science was seen as an expert system functionally separate from the market and as such to be 
organized by the state as part of its modernization strategy.  As in many other parts of Latin 
America, external aid played an important steering role.  Prior to the 1950s, agricultural 
research centres in Bolivia were practically non-existent.  The report of the U.S. Bohan 
Mission recommended agricultural modernization to end the country’s economic dependence 
on non-renewable natural resources and to transform Bolivia's indigenous agriculture.  It led 
to a US$26 million loan from the Export-Import Bank of the United States, crucial for setting 
up experimental stations in the Andes (Gandarillas, 2001; Godoy et al., 1993).  
This ‘pipeline’ model of knowledge considered agricultural research to be the exclusive 
domain of scientists.  It focused on importing technologies from advanced countries and 
adopting them after testing for suitability in different local agro-ecosystems.  Use of improved 
varieties and agrochemical inputs as advocated by the Green Revolution approach were 
important elements.  Central to this modernization model was the building of expertise, in 
particular through the Bolivian Institute of Agricultural Technology (IBTA) created in 1975 
by the Ministry of Rural and Agricultural Affairs (MACA) (Gandarillas, 2001; Gandarillas, et 
al., 2007)
23
.  IBTA researchers were trained abroad with a view to enhancing their capacity to 
carry out research (World Bank, 1999)
24
.  On account of its efforts to train new agricultural 
engineers, IBTA became seen as a relatively solid entity that enjoyed prestige among 
researchers. 
The technostatist approach to agricultural research became subject to reform as part of the 
liberalization drive that started at the end of eighteen years of dictatorship (1964-1982).  In a 
period of political instability, profound economic crisis and hyperinflation, structural 
adjustment policies as advocated by the International Monetary Fund were adopted in 1985 
(Kohl et al., 2006; García-Linera, 2008).  The so-called New Economic Policy aimed to 
stabilize prices and develop a market economy.  It announced a wave of privatization of 
                                                          
 
23 FAO, the International Service for National Agricultural Research (IICA), Interamerican Development Bank (IDB), 
World Bank, Swiss Cooperation, and USAID, among others, funded laboratories and basic equipment for the experimental 
centres and financed the establishment of the country’s gene banks, especially for potato, quinoa, forage, cereals, and Andean 
grains (Coca, 2010; Gandarillas, 2001).  International cooperation aimed at creating and sustaining a research system that 
would resist battering from the dictatorship periods and institutional crises. 
24 Three PhDs and twenty-four MSc were trained in European and American universities (World Bank, 1999) 
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public companies and imposed severe budget cuts in agricultural research.  State funding of 
agricultural research dropped from U$ 12 million in 1980 (Bebbington and Thiele, 1993:70) 
to an average of just U$ 4.5 million between 1985-1990 (Crespo-Valdivia, 2000:29).  The 
justification for this was provided by an ISNAR/IICA evaluation supported by the World 
Bank (ISNAR, 1989; Quijandría, 1989). This evaluation argued that IBTA lacked the 
administrative autonomy to deal with recurrent changes in government and the political 
instability resulting from a long period of dictatorship.  Each change in government was 
preceded by changes in the composition of national and regional management boards and 
even of technical staff along party and clientelist lines.  ISNAR/IICA (World Bank, 1991) 
points to a high turnover of professional staff who lacked professional breadth and depth.  The 
institution did not have the personnel to carry out scientific work; only 8 per cent of 
researchers had a postgraduate degree (2 per cent had a PhD - one of whom was the director, 
and 6 per cent had an MSc degree), 20 per cent were fully trained agronomists while 72 per 
cent were technicians (World Bank, 1991).  Crucial in the reform process was a US$21 
million loan from the World Bank in 1991.  This imposed a reduction in both the thematic and 
geographic coverage of IBTA’s research so that in place of researching almost all highland 
crops, the emphasis shifted to five national programmes: potato, quinoa, cereals (wheat and 
barley), leguminous plants (beans and peas) and camelids.  External funding from 
international cooperation was restricted to potato and quinoa, both subsistence crops for 
which the Andes is a centre of origin and biodiversity (Quijandría, 1989).  Research on rice, 
corn and soybeans was delegated to the Centre of Tropical Agricultural Research (CIAT-
SCZ),
25
 supported by the Santa Cruz provincial government, and the privately funded Centre 
for Phytogenetic Research of Paurumani in the department of Cochabamba.  The remaining 
research areas either disappeared or only survived when attached to a specific state 
development project.  Restructuring policies abandoned fundamental research projects and 
only continued to support adaptive or applied research.  Thus out of eleven experimental 
stations, IBTA kept only three, considering that these represented a ‘sufficient’ agro-
ecological coverage.  Other stations were handed over to universities or departmental 
governments (Coca, 2010).
26
 
Restructuring policies aimed to make IBTA independent from the Ministry of Agriculture 
in the recruitment of technical personnel and to raise wage levels to attract well-trained 
professionals at the start of their careers.  The reality, however, was quite different.  Although 
                                                          
 
25 This chapter uses the acronym CIAT-SCZ to distinguish it from CIAT (International Centre for Tropical Agriculture – a 
CGIAR centre).  
26 IBTA selected the following stations: Patacamaya (quinoa), San Benito (cereals, legumes, and the fruit transfer 
programme) and Toralapa (potato). 
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IBTA reduced its personnel by 40 per cent, jobs, especially at managerial level, continued to 
be the preserve of political sympathizers.  And although more than thirty professionals 
received postgraduate training, there were serious complaints about research conditions.  In a 
letter to the Minister of Finance, one researcher protested against the cut in IBTA’s budget as 
follows:  
The real concern is the consequence of trying to continue at current levels of 
compensation [from the state].  For example, at current salary levels, we would 
have to reduce salaries by 35 per cent on average or alternatively reduce the 
payroll (positions).  For operational costs, the required reduction would be 
around 90 per cent. If it were necessary to take these actions, the current staff 
would not be able to produce appropriate technology, negatively affecting 
institutional prestige, as well as our efforts at agricultural extension and 
decentralization (Posner, 1994). 
This letter and researchers’ reports on the consequences of budget cuts made no difference.  
The adjustment policies did little more than create a lack of interest and unwillingness by the 
state to support agricultural research, implying continued job instability, low salaries, and 
growing rather than diminishing political interference in the selection of personnel. 
 
N e o l i b e r a l  S t a t e  R e s t r u c t u r i n g s  a n d  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  
A g r i c u l t u r a l  R e s e a r c h  i n  B o l i v i a  
 
While reducing the role of the state in agricultural research can be seen as part of 
liberalization and privatization, the neoliberal moment also involved restructuring the 
relationship between technical expertise and the end-user.  The World Bank intervention was 
not only directed at the ‘retreat of the state’ in agricultural research but also aimed to improve 
IBTA’s technical capacities, increase its autonomy vis-à-vis the central government and 
create new forms of articulation and communication with its end users.  Extension services 
were cancelled and consequently IBTA’s regional extension offices were closed down.  The 
introduction of the notion of ‘pre-assistance’ (World Bank, 1991) –or no direct assistance to 
farmers– was instrumental in writing off the model in which technology is transferred from 
the experimental stations to the regional extension offices and thence to end users.  It meant 
the establishment of new lines of communication with end users of technologies (farmers and 
rural entrepreneurs) via NGOs and agribusiness, or ‘intermediate users’.  In the late 1980s, 
technically-oriented NGOs also received funding from the Fondo Social de Emergencia 
(Social Emergency Fund) for small projects which aimed to mitigate the social costs and 
effects of neoliberal economic policies (Kohl et al., 2006) or what Li (2007b:21) calls 
‘managing the fallout from capitalism’s advance’.  IBTA researchers started to instruct 
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trainers within the NGOs.  This helped NGOs to develop operational relations with IBTA, 
although the process of becoming intermediaries between IBTA and the farmers was not 
always effective (Bebbington and Thiele, 1993).  Financial resources were unequally 
distributed – while NGOs carried out extension and rural development on a total budget of 
about 10 million US$ per year (Godoy et al., 1993:7), government support to IBTA did not 
amount to even half of this (Bebbington and Thiele, 1993:120). 
IBTA ceased functioning in 1998 as a result of the administrative decentralization law of 
1995 and after the government determined that the institution had not demonstrated sufficient 
impact on producers.  In fact, it meant a complete withdrawal by the state from serious 
involvement in agricultural research until 2001 when IBTA was replaced by the Bolivian 
System of Agricultural Technology (SIBTA), a partnership between the ministries of 
Economic Development, Rural Affairs, and Foreign Trade and Investment.  SIBTA dispensed 
with the remaining experimental stations and transferred them to the departmental 
governments (which had neither the budget nor experience to run them).  SIBTA identified a 
gap between researchers and producers due to the verticality of the research process and the 
maladaptation of research to the demands of producers and the market (Gobierno de Bolivia, 
2000; Hartwich et al., 2007).  It proposed implementing a neoliberal rationale in the 
agricultural research system, preventing external values and politicization from influencing 
the efficiency and technical character of research.  Management of agricultural research and 
extension shifted from the state to semi-autonomous regional foundations created in the four 
eco-regions of the country: highlands, valleys, tropics, and Chaco.  These private foundations 
with ‘public interest’ could administer and manage public, private and international 
cooperation resources (Gobierno de Bolivia, 2000). 
SIBTA’s contribution to restructuring the relationship between technical expertise and 
end-users contained three important elements: invoking the language of innovation systems 
and participatory development, trusting service providers (mostly NGOs) as the key agents of 
change, and implementing market mechanisms for the allocation of funds.  First, the language 
of innovation systems worked to include private actors (agribusiness firms and consultancy 
firms) in the research/extension–farmer link, thereby reducing the role of the state to one 
among many actors in the system.  Innovation systems respond to changing contexts and 
require interaction between multiple actors and sources of knowledge without having a single 
central conductor (World Bank, 2012).  The concept of innovation emerged from evolutionary 
economics but was adapted by the application of systems theory in agriculture (Jansen et al., 
2004; for a critique see Jansen, 2009).  Crucial notions in this approach are stakeholder 
participation, coordination and trust, with the ‘end-user’ of the pipeline model being redefined 
as a ‘stakeholder’.  In development discourse, innovation systems applications draw heavily 
upon earlier notions of farmer participation (Chambers et al. 1989), farming systems research 
(Brouwer and Jansen, 1989), and social learning and iterative, adaptive thinking (Ashby, 
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2003; Leeuwis, 2000).  Second, participatory action involved a conceptualization of NGOs as 
being best placed to carry out research and extension activities due to their attributed 
independence from the political manoeuvring inside state agencies, their flexibility to choose 
their working areas, their efficiency, technical profile, transparency, and accountability 
(Gandarillas, 2006).  Third, market rationality in terms of competition, tendering, cost-benefit 
analysis, short term projects and measurable outputs became central to three new mechanisms 
for funding research and extension projects.  The most important one in our study was the 
Applied Technology Innovation Project (PITA), which selected and funded technological 
innovation proposals from producer organizations.  The PITA procedure looked primarily at 
technical feasibility and the potential of integrating producers and their products into the 
market (chain approach)
27
. 
PITAs were based on a competitive market mechanism (bidding) to facilitate farmers’ 
participation. Between 2002 and 2007 SIBTA supported 263 PITAs.  To access PITA project 
funds, producer associations supported by NGOs had to present projects that typically 
elaborated concrete demands, competitiveness in national and export markets, project 
ownership by farmers’ associations, and adequate counterpart (15 per cent of the project 
budget).  SIBTA selected for funding thirty productive chains or products, which showed 
potential for the export market.  However, potato and corn, fundamental to national food 
security, were not included within PITAs (in the Andean region only quinoa and camelids 
were included) (Lema, et al., 2006; Ranaboldo, 2002).  SIBTA established bureaucratic 
bidding rules that regulated the participation of farmer associations and their relations with 
service providers.  Farmer associations played an active role as they were responsible for 
identifying demands and contributing to research.  PITA’s beneficiaries, who were mainly 
poor farmers, often contributed in kind or via third-party donors (Hartwich, et al., 2007).  
Service providers were in charge of organizing research and technological services as well as 
designing the participatory spaces in which technological demands had to be defined.  In this 
way, service providers in partnership with the public sector were crucial in shaping farmers 
and associations into neoliberal subjects (Lemke, 2001).  Training and capacity-building 
became crucial for ensuring that these subjects had the necessary entrepreneurial and market 
skills to pursue their proposed innovations.  As we will see below, SIBTA’s neoliberal model 
was not simply handed down from above but adapted, engaged with and even contested by 
different actors.  
                                                          
 
27 The other two mechanisms were the National Strategic Innovation Project (PIEN) and the National System of Genetic 
Resources for Agriculture and Food (SINARGEAA) (Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2009).  SINARGEAA consisted of six 
germplasm banks: High Andean Grains Roots and Tubers, in custody of the PROINPA Foundation; Cereals and legumes, in 
custody of the Patiño Foundation; Valley Fruit, in custody of the Prefecture of Tarija; Camelids, in custody of the Technical 
University of Oruro; and Forestry, in custody of the University of San Simón (UMSS) in Cochabamba (FAO, 2009). 
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F r o m  S t a t e  t o  N G O :  P R O I N P A  a n d  p o t a t o  r e s e a r c h  a n d  
e x t e n s i o n  
 
The national and international significance of the potato, its wide geographical distribution, 
bio-diversity and economic contribution, gave it special prominence in the neoliberal 
restructuring process.
28
  During the restructuring, public potato research at Toralapa station 
was reorganized as PROINPA (the Potato Research Program) managed by IBTA but with 
strong technical and financial support from the International Potato Centre (CIP) and the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC).  To maintain job stability, SDC-
funded projects topped up the low salaries of PROINPA’s researchers.  PROINPA 
collaborated closely with the National Potato Seed Project (PROSEMPA), a Dutch-funded 
potato seed development project, which was in charge of extension services (Gandarillas et 
al., 2007).
29
  During the 1990s, PROINPA was organized into departments (eg nematology, 
physiology, pathology, etc.) to carry out applied research in selected impact zones.  Its social 
science department helped to identify the main constraints on potato cropping among 
potential technology users.  Furthermore, PROINPA worked on restructuring the Potato 
National Gene Bank (located in Toralapa) (Gabriel et al. 2006).  With IBTA’s closure in 
1997, potato research was in danger of disappearing.  To avoid losing skilled human resources 
and technological innovation in this key crop, a external evaluation mission of the programme 
led by the Swiss Cooperation in 1998 recommended turning PROINPA into a private, non-
profit foundation with public, donor, and self-generated resources (Gandarillas et al., 2007). 
The ensuing transformation made PROINPA the largest national NGO dedicated to 
agricultural research and development in Bolivia.  In 1998, PROINPA kept its acronym but 
became the ‘Foundation for the Promotion and Research of Andean Products’ (Garandillas et 
al., 2007).  When SIBTA started in 2001, PROINPA became one of its principal suppliers of 
research and development services.  It competed and won various PITA projects due to its 
accumulated experience and in-house technology developed during the IBTA period.  It stood 
well above other newly established, less experienced NGOs.  Most of the principal PROINPA 
researchers whose careers had begun in the early 1990s and who had attained post-graduate 
level stayed.  SIBTA projects, along with other projects sponsored by international 
cooperation
30
, allowed PROINPA to expand its activities to other Andean crops and 
                                                          
 
28 With more than 4000 native varieties (landraces) Bolivia, together with Peru, is a potato biodiversity hot spot of global 
importance.  Potato is crucial for national food security and 30–40 per cent of farmers grow potatoes (Meinzen-Dick and 
Deveaux, 2009). 
29 This and the next paragraph draw heavily from Garandillas et al. (2007). 
30 International partners were CIP, IPGRI (International Plant Genetic Resources Institute), CIAT (International Center for 
Tropical Agriculture) and European and US universities. 
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geographic areas, increasing its personnel from sixty to around 180 staff.  In addition, as part 
of SINARGEAA, PROINPA received from the state the potato and Andean grains gene banks 
in Toralapa (Cochabamba) and Quipaquipani (La Paz) experimental stations and the funding 
for their maintenance (Gandarillas et al., 2007)
31
.  PROINPA is currently present in thirty-six 
municipalities (especially concentrated in the Andean region).  In 2011, it had 157 workers of 
whom 46 per cent were researchers, 33 per cent consultants, usually hired to support research 
and extension projects, and 21 per cent administrative staff.  
After becoming an NGO, PROINPA reduced its applied research projects and focused 
more on so-called ‘research for development’ (in contrast to top-down research and 
extension).  This implied identifying local problems and using this feedback to design 
research agendas.  PROINPA’s success became less dependent on the quality of its research 
and contribution to national research priorities and more on its ability to adapt or ‘tune’ 
research proposals to funding sources.  PROINPA shifted from simply applying technologies 
(most of which had been designed or adopted during the IBTA period) to more development-
oriented projects that responded to central demands from farmers and the market. 
 
Technologies of the self: Shaping a new researcher  
 
The shift in PROINPA from being a state programme, whose researchers were civil 
servants, to an NGO, whose activities lacked a fixed mandate but responded to  international 
and national funding opportunities, was not simply externally imposed but actively initiated 
from within.  This shift was a form of self-regulation or a ‘technology of the self’ in Lemke’s 
words (2001:12).  Institutional change became paramount for PROINPA; an internal group 
made the label of ‘change’ central and shaped a new PROINPA researcher (Oros et al., 2002).  
A photo of the ‘change group’ printed in Oros et al. (2002) shows five relatively young 
researchers. Interacting with CIP and the New Paradigm programme of ISNAR, PROINPA 
incorporated the innovation system language in a series of strategic workshops focusing on 
institutional change.  
The following quote expresses this neoliberal form of governing as introduced from above: 
 
The greater freedom on the part of the Foundation [PROINPA] as an 
autonomous organisation to set its own agenda, and the reliance on competitive 
funding, triggered institutional innovation.  Foundation staff commented in 
                                                          
 
31 PROINPA had three experimental stations: in Toralapa, El Paso in Cochabamba, and The Quipaquipani Center for 
Research and Training Facilities in the department of La Paz. 
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planning meetings that generating research results, publishing scientific papers 
and relying on intermediary organisations of technology transfer were not 
enough.  Strategic planning led the Foundation management to the conclusion 
that it was imperative do build credibility with farmers and a broad range of 
stakeholders (Gandarillas et al. 2007:267). 
 
The language of freedom, autonomy, strategic planning, competitive funding and 
institutional innovation and staff who themselves seek closer contact with ‘clients’ expresses 
very well the contemporary shift in research governance.  As part of the change process, 
researchers now had to propose and manage new projects to maintain their research activities 
and finance their own salaries.  A researcher from PROINPA describes this change of 
governance in the following words:  
 
Demand is considered the origin of the research process.  This was a fairly 
complicated topic within PROINPA because we went from being employees 
who always received a monthly payment to not having a guaranteed source of 
monthly income the following day.  We had to really change our ‘chip’ [mind 
set] and say ‘well, now I have to find it [salary] myself.’  For you to find it 
yourself you have to understand the demands, the work in your environment, 
and give it what it needs from you. (Interview, 9 December 2011). 
 
The change in the ‘chip’ suggested in this quote expresses the transition process from a 
basic research model supported by the state which was seen as ‘vertical’ and ‘discipline-
bound’ to a trans-disciplinary research model open to the demands of producers, proposals, 
and donors.  PROINPA exchanged the laboratory for the peasant community as the new space 
for action.  To win projects, investigators had to go out to different communities, identify 
partners willing to participate in the research process, and jointly determine their specific 
demands.  To facilitate this process, PROINPA researchers had to acquire new training in the 
social sciences and rural development.  Entomologists and phytopathologists had to ‘open’ 
their minds to new disciplines so as to be more ‘sensitive’ to farmer demands.  
 
Creating demand 
 
While implementing several projects, PROINPA researchers found that meeting producer 
and association demands was not as simple as PITA and SIBTA had portrayed (Bentley et al., 
2004; Gandarillas et al., 2007).  First, while SIBTA assumed that producers were organized in 
associations and were market-oriented, PROINPA researchers found that the vast majority of 
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producers were organized in agrarian unions, which focused more on political and community 
rights than productive rights.  Organizing associations that focused on productive themes 
involved an extra effort for PROINPA.  Second, generating new technology did not fall 
within SIBTA’s time and budget allocation.  PITA projects, for example, had a maximum 
duration of 18 months, making research on perennial crops impossible.  PROINPA decided to 
work basically with already-existing technology and introduced the notions of ‘implicit 
demand’ and ‘explicit demand’ in which it assumed that there is a demand for available 
technology (implicit demand) but that producers generally are unable to make their demand 
explicit (Bentley et al., 2004).  Implicit demand was defined as ‘a need for research that 
people have not requested, but that they recognize if explained or shown in an appropriate 
form’ (Bentley et al., 2004).  In this sense, implicit demands do not simply respond to the 
researchers’ interests but are identified by the researcher through analysis and reflection of 
local problems and are reaffirmed in collaboration with the community or farmers.  To 
identify implicit demands, researchers organized workshops, and exhibitions, among other 
activities, with communities and producer organizations, demonstrating available technology 
to see if it was of interest to them.  Available technology was metaphorically called the slipper 
that would fit Cinderella.  
 
Malleable participation: Shifting the objectives of farmer participation in 
Morochata 
 
Participation, as a new technology of governing, does not have a fixed meaning.  In 
PROINPA the need for participation and the specific tasks this involved varied from potato 
technology innovation to market incorporation.  The language of participation gained 
prominence in PROINPA as part of the IBTA restructurings.  It first referred to participatory 
research in the sense of including farmers and farmers’ knowledge in research design and 
implementation (to various degrees and at various moments).  Interactions with CIAT and 
CIP were crucial.  As of the late 1980s, these centres worked on developing participatory 
methodologies in natural resource management in marginal agro-ecosystems in Latin 
America.  Farmers and scientists collaborated as colleagues in jointly generating knowledge 
and technology in response to farmer demands, whereby farmers had to diagnose their 
situation and experiment with and adapt possible solutions.  Similar to Green Revolution 
technology, scientists first developed new participatory methodologies and tested them on 
pilot sites in Central America and Colombia before transferring them in a user-friendly format 
to other countries for dissemination (Gottret, 2007).  Researchers from national research 
centres were trained to implement and validate these methodologies in their respective 
countries. 
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PROINPA adapted the participatory methodologies termed Local Agricultural Research 
Committees (CIAL) and Field Farmers School (FFS).  A CIAL consists of farmers to whom 
the community delegates research on the agricultural problem which most concerns them.  
CIAL members then relay possible research recommendations back to the community.  
PROINPA received support from CIAT, the Kellogg Foundation and FAO to work with 
agrarian unions.  The FFS is presented as a ‘people-centred approach’ which helps to develop 
farmers’ ‘analytic abilities, critical thinking, and creativity so that they would learn to make 
better decisions’ (Kenmore, 2002).  Unlike previous top-down research and extension, CIAL 
and FFS are seen as bottom-up strategies in which farmers acquire the necessary research and 
problem-solving skills.  Based on the logic of transforming farmers into active and capable 
investigators, PROINPA initiated Participatory Plant Breeding (PPB) in 1999 whereby 
farmers and scientists, in a ‘knowledge dialogue’ between indigenous knowledge and Western 
science, evaluate and select genotypes according to farmers’ needs, available resources and 
market demands (Almekinders et al., 2007; Gabriel et al., 2007). 
An important case for PROINPA to apply PPB was that of Morochata.  PROINPA had 
already been working with small farmers of Quechua origin in the municipality of Morochata 
since 1994, especially in the communities of Piusilla-San Isidro and Compañía Pampa.  
Morochata, located in the Bolivian inter-Andean valleys 70 kilometres from Cochabamba 
city, has a population of 34,134 (in 2001) living in communities at altitudes ranging from 
2750 to 4250 meters above sea level.  Agricultural production connects with the markets of 
Quillacollo and Cochabamba cities.  Morochata farmers are organized in agrarian unions, 
which are a complex amalgam that combines the structure of the Andean ayllu
32
 and the 
model of agrarian unions of the Cochabamba valleys formed during the Agrarian Reform after 
the 1952 revolution (CENDA, 2005; Van Cott, 2008).  PROINPA’s participatory research in 
Morochata focused on finding alternatives to the chemical control of late blight in potatoes 
(Phytophthora infestans) (Thiele et al., 1997; Torrez et al., 1997).  Morochata is known at 
national level for potato production, especially for the native Waycha variety, which is much 
appreciated for its quality and flavour.  However, this variety is highly susceptible to late 
blight, with reported crop losses of up to 100 per cent
33
.  In the FFS and CIAL, farmers 
learned, among other things, that late blight is a fungus with an invisible growth cycle.  
Farmers observed the fungus growth process through microscopes and learned to recognize 
the disease as ‘a living organism’ and identify the best time for chemical control. 
                                                          
 
32The community of Piusilla-San Isidro still preserves the aynoqas indigenous rotary agricultural system. 
33 Late blight, the most important potato disease in humid zones in Bolivia, affects approximately 20,000 ha (Torrez et al., 
1997). 
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One of the activities most highlighted by PROINPA in Morochata has been the work on 
participatory plant breeding, which during a five-year period (1998-2002) was financed 
through short-term projects.
34
  In monthly meetings with farmers, researchers explained the 
aims and activities of the PPB methodology and how to carry out research.  Farmers received 
training in breeding principles, flower morphology, botanic seed management, seedling 
management and crop selection.  Subsequent training sessions included hybridization 
techniques, management and selection of seedlings in household seedbeds and in the field to 
obtain new varieties.  Farmers identified and evaluated clones according to features such as 
plant height, number of stems, flowering, and tuber characteristics such as shape, culinary 
qualities, marketability, storability, resistance to late blight, and yield.  Farmers planned their 
monitoring and evaluation of genotypes in field activities and gave feedback to their 
communities through agrarian union assemblies.  
Participatory plant breeding in Morochata succeeded in generating enthusiastic 
participants, at least in the beginning, and in meeting the demand for new varieties, similar to 
the landrace Waycha, but resistant to late blight.  Participating farmers called themselves 
‘potato breeders’ and, paired with ‘experienced’ researchers, they carried out the breeding 
process.  In interviews some of these farmers enthusiastically related the breeding techniques 
they had mastered.  During five years of participatory research, farmers and researchers 
generated six new varieties, all of which are clear of virus and four of which have been 
registered in the formal seed system.  PPB participants were also trained in seed production, 
using protected seedbeds to multiply small amounts of high quality seed.
35
  They also shared 
the results with their communities, explaining the advantages of the new varieties.  
Participating farmers travelled to places as far as China and Japan to pass on the success story 
of participatory research.  PPB in Morochata also achieved positive gains in encouraging the 
equal participation of men and women in the PPB events.  Some women interviewed still 
remember this experience as a space that allowed them to gain the skills to interact publicly in 
community meetings.  PPB participatory spaces were considered different from decision-
making in male-dominated agrarian union assemblies.  Participating researchers also called 
PPB in Morochata a ‘unique experiment’ (Gabriel et al., 2004). 
Although the PPB experience in Morochata is an interesting example of what a ‘dialogue 
of knowledge’ between farmers and scientist can achieve, it could not escape the conditions 
and context of rural life.  After the initial enthusiasm, the number of PPB participants dropped 
                                                          
 
34 Donors included PREDUZA (Proyecto de Resistencia Duradera en la Zona Andina), PRGA, BMZ, IFAO, Fontangro, 
CIAT, and CIP. 
35 Protected seedbeds are boxes built of stone or adobes filled with fresh and clean soil and fertilized with organic manure. 
They protect against frost and hail storms.  
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from year to year since farmers felt that, apart from the training, there were few concrete 
results.  One researcher interviewed pointed out that initially farmers saw PROINPA as a 
source of material goods or concrete productive projects to overcome poverty.  ‘They were 
expecting to receive, as a gift, fertilizers, seeds and inputs’ (Interview, 25 September, 2011).  
Instead, participating in training sessions cost farmers’ time that could otherwise be dedicated 
to economic activities.  Furthermore, even though the new varieties responded to producer 
demands and farmers had received training to reproduce them, their spread was limited.  Our 
field data show that only one of the eigh farmers who participated actively in the PPB in 
Compañía Pampa reproduced seed potato of the new varieties; in Piusilla 3 of the original six 
new varieties were kept by at least three of the sixteen PPB participants
36
 (see also Puente-
Rodríguez, 2008).  The following interview excerpt illustrates the research leader’s struggle 
and frustration with the reproduction and dissemination of the new varieties: 
 
I didn’t think this would happen, that the farmers would lose the new seeds 
[obtained during the PPB], but it happened.  It also happens with the 
conventional programmes of plant breeding.  The great bottleneck is who takes 
the challenge of disseminating the varieties to make a massive diffusion.  In 
this sense, what we have tried to do is to construct a process, because we don’t 
have one.  We don’t have the capacity to do it: we have to join forces with 
someone, be it the municipality, institutions, NGOs; someone to spread the 
technology (Interview, 26 September, 2011).  
 
This PROINPA researcher’s comment suggests that both in conventional and participatory 
breeding, the likelihood of success in spreading new varieties depends on the goodwill not 
only of farmer but also of other actors.  Commercial seed multiplication by poor farmers is 
more difficult for potatoes than for, for example, grain or pulses, due to the quantities 
required, storage needs, and transportation costs (Torrez et al., 1997).  Replacing varieties is 
also slower in these crops since potato seed attracts viruses and other diseases, and its 
multiplication ratio is low (harvest ratio of 1:20) (Bentley and Vasques, 1998:1).  The 
procedures and costs of registering varieties in the formal Bolivian seed system and of the 
viral clearance required to maintain this register are high and unaffordable for poor farmers.  
Apart from the Empresa de Producción de Semilla de Papa (SEPA- Company of Potato Seed 
Production), a semi-private seed enterprise in charge of the sale and dissemination of 
commercial seeds, there are no public institutions that support the dissemination of new 
                                                          
 
36 A few farmers in Piusilla conserve and multiply the varieties Aurora, palta chola y puka waycha, while in Compañía 
Pampa we found a farmer producing puyjuni imilla y palta chola (fieldwork observations).  
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varieties to small-farmers.  PROINPA approached SEPA, but they were reluctant to multiply 
these varieties commercially due to uncertainty over their adoption and the economic risks 
involved.  PROINPA then proposed that the municipality of Morochata should allocate local 
government resources on multiplying these improved varieties, but without success. 
Notwithstanding the limited possibilities of turning the PPB experience into a far-reaching 
economic activity, PROINPA shifted further to working on development-oriented projects.  If 
PROINPA’s participatory research projects aimed to develop research skills among farmers, 
so they could find solutions to their own agronomic problems, its participatory development 
projects aimed to prepare farmers to cope in a neo-liberal environment.  Rather than 
organizing its work around crop specific knowledge, PROINPA deployed teams that focused 
on solving problems in so-called ‘impact zones’ (poverty, disorganization, food supply, etc.) 
and on implementing institutional and organizational innovations at the level of agro-food 
chains (Gandarillas et al., 2007).  The reasons for PROINPA’s shift in focus to development 
projects are twofold.  First, few farmers were able to invest time in research projects without 
receiving material support.  Second, PROINPA, as many other NGOs in Bolivia, was largely 
dependent on development aid funds and SIBTA.  It became more difficult to obtain funding 
for research alone (even if this included participatory research) as donors prioritized projects 
directed at poverty reduction. 
The new emphasis on poverty reduction projects meant a shift towards productive projects 
that aimed to integrate smallholders in larger agro-food chains, and the application of two 
additional types of participatory methodologies, the first oriented to enhancing social control 
over development projects and the second to creating access to markets for low income 
farmers.  
The first type included community-managed participatory monitoring and evaluation 
(PM&E).  It involved farmers in monitoring the progress of externally funded innovations in 
order to generate a sense of co-responsibility for the implementation and success of the 
intervention (Polar et al., 2007).  Farmer involvement was seen internationally as useful for 
monitoring the deployment of funds.  PM&E was also important for PROINPA in the context 
of national politics as it contributed to enhancing legitimacy at a time when PROINPA, like 
other NGOs, were being heavily criticized by social movements and seen as allies of the 
economic neoliberal model.  PROINPA justified the importance of PM&E as follows: 
 
In a ‘turbulent’ period [the civil unrest against neoliberal policies between 
2000 and 2005] in which social movements continually put pressure on 
government structures in search of greater equality, representation, and 
legitimacy, it is necessary to incorporate social control tools that allow 
technological innovation recipients [farmers] to freely express and transcend 
up to decision-making levels (Polar et al., 2007:1; emphasis by authors). 
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According to PROINPA, PM&E helps farmers to use ‘social control tools’ to channel their 
demands and express their disagreements with development planning, rather than engaging in 
violent pressure and protests, which were frequently employed by social movements in 
Bolivia.  However, in PROINPA’s projects, farmers’ views did not reach very far up the 
decision-making ladder.  The reason for this is because projects had already been designed by 
PROINPA as a prerequisite for funding, so the flexibility to change activities and resources 
was restricted.  Furthermore, projects were selected as the spaces in which farmers could 
participate and participation was framed in terms of them being co-responsible for the success 
of the projects.  This limited the potential to link participation to different or larger processes 
of social transformation.   
The Participatory Market Polls (PMP), a second type of participatory method, was also 
based on tools developed by CIAT and CIP.  This method aimed to empower farmers in the 
market and included a range of activities to analyse different market opportunities, and to 
develop innovations (Mamani et al., 2007, Oros, 2010).  In Morochata, PROINPA supported 
the creation of the Asociación de Productores Andinos (APRA: Association of Andean 
Farmers) and provided training to strengthen market-oriented organization with funds from 
Fontagro, the Papa Andina (Andean Potato) and Consorcio projects.  With APRA they 
established a marketing committee that identified new markets for potato products and 
promoted the consumption of native potatoes in bigger cities
37
.  Participatory market polls, 
implemented between 2005 and 2008, allowed APRA farmers to visit supermarkets and 
regional markets to determine the primary characteristics of native potatoes that potential 
buyers required (quantity, quality, frequency of sale, presentation of the product, etc.).  APRA 
began to participate in market fairs and to sell different native varieties of small potatoes 
called ‘gourmet potatoes’ or ‘Morochatitas’, to the main supermarkets of Cochabamba and La 
Paz.  As the quantities bought by supermarkets were low, weekly orders were rotated between 
the members of the association.  Gourmet potatoes offered an alternative income to 
association members but one which was not enough for the eighteen APRA members to make 
a living from. 
 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n :  M a k i n g  a g r i c u l t u r a l  r e s e a r c h  s o c i a l  w i t h o u t  
p o l i t i c s  
 
In the previous sections we described a subtle, small-scale process of turning the poor 
farmer into a new improved agent capable of operating successfully in a neoliberal 
                                                          
 
37 APRA had also collaborated in the reintroduction of native potato varieties. 
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environment: a free individual who can imagine new technologies and productive activities 
and who can mobilize resources.  The participation and innovation thrust gave agricultural 
research a social slant, moving it from the laboratory to the field, from thence to the farm 
household and, finally, to the regional economy.  Many documents point to the impact of this 
shift (for example, Fontagro, 2013).  However beyond the level of the individual, the impact 
on the wider political domain is more difficult to conceptualize and act upon for the 
interveners.  In this particular case, the wider political picture refers not only to advancing 
neo-liberalism but also to its opposing forces.  Here we discuss two interrelated issues: 
individual progress versus the group, and the implicit positioning in local and national 
politics. 
Preparing poor farmers for market integration may be successful in some cases but not all.  
A local case is that of Don José’38, one of the founding members of APRA who has worked in 
PROINPA interventions since their inception.  Don José decided to become independent of 
the association and to form his own company to market gourmet potatoes.  Using the 
knowledge he had acquired while contacting supermarkets for APRA, he expanded his 
business to other cities and other products (vegetables and other Andean roots: ulluco and 
arracacha).  His company, registered as Papas Gourmet®, sells products to the country’s 
largest supermarkets.  Thanks to the profits of his company, his sons can go to college and he 
could buy a house in the city of Quilacollo.  Don José’s individual entrepreneurship has 
brought him into conflict with APRA as some members accused him of being disloyal for 
taking away part of the potential market share of the association.  Don José’s success is 
difficult to replicate for other APRA members.  While Don José expanded his business, at 
least four members of APRA were forced to out-migrate temporarily due to their inability to 
secure a livelihood from agriculture.  Don Javier, an outstanding APRA leader who 
collaborated closely with PROINPA, first emigrated to Argentina and later to Spain where he 
was for the past six years.  In our interview, he told us that his main constraint was lack of 
land.  Temporary migration allowed him to save money and to buy more land in his 
community.  Stories of temporary and permanent out-migration are repeated by many of the 
producers interviewed.  Land has become a valuable resource in Morochata.  The community 
of Piusilla-San Isidro is a typical case of Andean ‘minifundio’ (smallholding)39 and migration.  
Although individual PROINPA researchers are very familiar with this kind of agrarian 
problem, the participatory methods do not, and probably cannot, address them and instead of 
producing a social benefit may result in individualized capital accumulation. 
                                                          
 
38 Pseudonyms are used for all individuals mentioned in the chapter. 
39 The unions, whose membership is related to land, divide members into two classes: those with land, who can have on 
average two hectares in different agro-ecological zones; and those without, called ‘leftovers’. 
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There are also frictions between PROINPA and political organizations based on large 
group formations such as the agrarian unions.  Unlike PROINPA, agrarian unions in 
Morochata do not see capacity-building and the promotion of the market and technical 
solutions as the prime engine to rural development, as providing an effective solution to 
people’s problems.  Agrarian unions have focused their demands on state support primarily on 
the basis of class (Ormachea 2008; Postero, 2007; Córdoba and Jansen, 2014).  During the 
1952 revolution, communities in Morochata struggled to expel large landowners and recover 
their land (CENDA, 2005).  During the neoliberal period, and using the tools provided by the 
law of popular participation of 1994, they petitioned the state around complementary demands 
such as autonomy, indigenous rights and local political control.  In the first years of this 
century, agrarian unions were key actors in the civil protests against neoliberal economic 
policies.  They expressed their frustration with liberal democracy and the neoliberal economic 
project for excluding indigenous populations and peasants from its universal promises of 
participation, consensus and representation in the decision making process (van Cott, 2008; 
Córdoba et al., 2014b).  In the 1990s, agrarian unions combined to form the Movement 
Towards Socialism (MAS) party, a political instrument that brought Evo Morales to the 
presidency in 2005.  These agrarian unions, as a social movement, pursue a form of radical 
democracy, in the sense given by Mouffe (2005), in which citizenship is seen as part of a 
political identity and not merely as a legal and entrepreneurial status related to markets as in 
neoliberal notions of citizenship (Dagnino, 2003:11).  The tensions between the agrarian 
unions’ post-neoliberal vision and PROINPA’s vision on rural development are highlighted in 
the following comment of a PROINPA researcher.  According to him, solutions for rural 
poverty come from ‘innovative’ leaders and not from ‘claimant’ leaders (from the agrarian 
unions).  When asked about the differences between these two types of leader he replied: 
 
An example: Don Villazón is the representative of the political party MAS in 
Cochabamba (…).  He developed claimant leadership qualities.  Don Villazón 
says in his speech: ‘we farmers need associations; we farmers are against 
GMOs [Genetically Modified Organisms]; we need plant breeding and better 
varieties; NGOs clear out [from our communities]’.  But these are political 
leaders because in the end they do nothing.  Being a claimant leader does not 
mean they cannot innovate, but they use innovation as a clear attempt to ask 
the state for things but not to do things.  (…) Who are the innovation leaders? 
A concrete example: you must have talked to Don José.  Don José is an 
innovation leader, I don’t mean that he doesn’t think politically, he does; but 
his efforts are innovative, they are a change in technology.  We refer to these 
as innovation leaders… (…) the [innovation] leader sees technological change 
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as an option, one of the primary options (Interview, 6 December 2011; 
emphasis by the authors). 
 
According to this researcher, farmers need to concentrate on innovation rather than 
politics, since technological innovation contributes better to poverty reduction.  Politics is 
defined as making demands on the state, while technological innovation is presented as being 
removed from politics, driven by the farmers’ own agency and ‘empowerment’ (as capacity, 
without power/politics).  Moreover, politics can and should be avoided by farmers in dealing 
with everyday issues.  From the interview data most researchers seem to understand the 
political as referring to street blockades, demonstrations and actions undertaken by social 
movements or as a product of political projects manipulated by politicians’ personal or party 
interests.  They consider that this kind of politics leads to chaos in society and should be 
avoided.  In contrast, PROINPA’s participation without politics is presented as an ideal type 
of ‘public sphere’ (Habermas, 1995) in which individuals communicate in a power-free, 
rational way and exchange opinions so as to  resolve problems and produce agricultural 
improvements through consensus. 
Despite the strong emphasis on separating politics from technology and innovation, in 
practice innovation developers had to collaborate at different levels with the political 
environment around them.  Over time, PROINPA and the MAS government have found ways 
of realigning participatory innovation and new political realities.  PROINPA modified its 
interventions to meet agrarian union demands.  It has done this by consulting unions over the 
relevance of their projects and engaging union leaders in their activities.  The introduction of 
participatory monitoring and evaluation methodologies discussed above was in part a 
response to the demand for accountability and research relevance from these farmer 
organizations.  PROINPA researchers who were interviewed also stated that they had had to 
adapt their interventions to fit new government priorities.  On the other hand, the MAS 
government, despite its earlier critique of NGO interventions, increasingly relied on 
PROINPA’s technical capacity, for example, to transfer the gene banks to state agencies40 
since, as INIAF’s national director pointed out, PROINPA is ‘a source of excellent 
researchers and we [INIAF] would like to work together with those resources’ (Interview, 
July 28 2012).  Hence, despite disagreements on technology and the role of politics in rural 
development, boundaries were crossed and participatory innovation was remodelled.  This 
                                                          
 
40 In 2008, the MAS government established the National Institute of Agricultural and Forestry Innovation (INIAF) 
proclaiming the return of the state in agricultural research (INIAF, 2010).  PROINPA co-operated with INIAF and transferred 
the two most important gene banks (potatoes and Andean roots, and Quinoa and highland Andean grains) to INIAF and 
trained INIAF’s staff to maintain these banks. 
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illustrates an important aspect of the malleability of participation: depending on the context it 
can acquire a more neutral, technologist outlook or a more political outlook. 
 
C o n c l u s i o n s  
 
In this chapter we analysed the emergence of participatory research and development 
methods by PROINPA, an NGO and former state agency.  PROINPA employed participatory 
methods mainly to enhance managerial effectiveness.  The methods were seen as effective in 
developing new technologies (for example, new crop varieties arising from farmer 
involvement in breeding) or integrating (some) farmers into the market.  This type of 
participation obscures macro-level inequalities and focuses on individual responses to market 
conditions.  As a micro-project, participatory research embraces modes of thinking and action 
that are congruent with a neoliberal restructuring of agricultural research and extension.  As 
the participatory approach unfolded, it modified the identity and practices of the researchers, 
turning them into development agents. Researchers only became successful when they linked 
their research and development intervention to global agendas (Jackson, 2005). 
Does this mean that participation in a micro-project is simply an outcome of macro-
economic/political restructuring and globalizing international cooperation? Was PROINPA 
merely an agent of neoliberalism? Our approach differs in that it emphasized PROINPA’s 
self-organization and the coupling of their notions of technical expertise to a changing 
environment and shifting opportunities.  PROINPA effectively managed three key issues.  
First, participation led not only to research objectives desired by globalizers and developers, 
but also generated these from below by local demands.  Farmers were not misled, they 
effectively ‘participated’.  Participation is neither a static nor a one-way process.  Secondly, 
PROINPA had to make room for two different types of politics.  Participation or 
empowerment as capacity building (of technical and economic expertise and skills) versus 
participation as a national project, or a political party project (in this case the MAS 
government) had to be, and were, reconciled.  Hence, despite the researchers’ formal anti-
political stance, they had to play politics.  Finally, PROINPA kept the technical moment 
intact.  Participation in research and development is not only about social relations and 
processes.  It cannot simply be assessed in terms of power/knowledge but involves 
reconnecting people and matter (crop varieties, inputs, soils): whether it makes sense to 
people, researchers and farmers alike, depends on technological success.  For this reason the 
MAS governments, despite blaming NGO interventions of the PROINPA type as neoliberal – 
and thereby negative - ended up  making use of engineering work as carried out by 
PROINPA. 
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These three key issues are the reason for adopting the notion of malleability of 
participation in this chapter and of expanding its meaning beyond Cornwall’s (2006) original 
use.  The term malleable does not just refer to bending participation to fit an actor’s objective 
or to the idea that everyone may perceive participation differently.  Our point is that in 
practice every form of participation seeks a new balance between reshaped subjects, technical 
and economic considerations, and political strategies and action (even though one element 
may be discursively prioritized).  As we have shown, this counts for both politicized and 
managerial or ‘technical’ views on participation.  
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Abstract 
During the Bolivian presidential election of 2005, the Movement Towards Socialism 
(MAS) campaigned against neoliberal politics, regarding the World Bank (the Bank) as one of 
its key promoters.  Instead the MAS advocated neocollectivism, a post-neoliberal agenda 
based on the active intervention of the state in the economy and the development of close ties 
between the state and social movements.  Paradoxically, the MAS when in power joined with 
the Bank in several development interventions to generate empowerment in rural areas.  
Taking the case of the Rural Alliances Project (PAR), considered to be the most successful 
intervention, we examine how neocollectivism and the Bank articulated around a seemingly 
common objective: the empowerment of poor farmers.  We study empowerment using a four-
mode analytical distinction of power, ranging from power as individual capacity (mode one) 
to power to carry out the transformation of social structures (mode four).  We demonstrate 
that, although on paper neocollectivism and the Bank represent two opposing modes of 
empowerment, in practice the PAR project articulated their respective intervention goals.  
While neocollectivism seeks to realise its political goals by establishing a direct relationship 
with social movements, elements of neoliberal governance which seek to regulate and execute 
this relationship are present in the PAR.  We conclude that there is an imbalance between 
political power shifts and technical progress that limits the potential for social transformation. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
In 2012, at Tiawanaku near La Paz, Bolivia, President Evo Morales and Hasan Tuluy, Vice 
President of the World Bank for Latin America and the Caribbean inaugurated the National 
Farmers Fair for the Rural Alliances Project (PAR).  The PAR programme, financed by the 
World Bank (hereafter the Bank) since 2007, aims to strengthen small farmers by providing 
them with financial resources and technical support.  The focus is on creating alliances 
between buyers and farmers and ensuring that farm production complies with market 
requirements.  Addressing nearly 3,000 attendees, including producers and social organization 
representatives from around the country, Morales said:  
 
We are not only strengthening ourselves socially through unions, but we have 
also strengthened ourselves with a political tool [the MAS party].  But if we 
have two tools – one that is the social organizations [social movements], the 
other electoral politics that is the political tool, it is now time to empower 
ourselves economically (La Razón, 2012). 
 
Morales praised the financial support given by the Bank, a portfolio of 14 investment 
programmes totalling US$450 million, and considered the Bank to be a strategic ally of the 
MAS government in the field of poverty reduction.  He added that the support received would 
foster the economic freedom of small farmers and stated: [if we were to promote] ‘social 
liberation and electoral or political liberation without the accompanying economic liberation, 
we would surely make a mistake’.  In his turn, the Bank representative, sporting a traditional 
red poncho, praised the economic development model of the MAS government which 
‘focused on social inclusion with the objective of eradicating extreme poverty’ and the 
outstanding results of the PAR programme. 
This was a surprising turn of events as President Evo Morales had up to then been a 
staunch critic of the Bank’s policies for Latin America.  For example, at the XXI Ibero-
American Summit of Heads of State in Paraguay he held the capitalist policies pursued by the 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) responsible for the subcontinent’s recent 
economic problems. Morales said:  
 
The Bank and the International Monetary Fund are responsible; some day they will 
have to compensate for the damages caused by implementing the policies of the 
Washington Consensus, policies such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement), the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas) which created 
problems in the region’s economy (Opinion, 2011).   
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The strategic partnership with the Bank is also surprising given the trajectory leading up to 
the election of Evo Morales as president of Bolivia in 2005.  His election marked the 
culmination of a period of popular protest, which peaked in 2000 with the so-called ‘Water 
War’ and in 2003 with the ‘Gas War’ (Kohl and Farthing, 2006).  As the leader of coca 
growers of the Chapare region and as a presidential candidate in 2002 and 2005, Morales 
campaigned against the neoliberal economic policies of the then incumbent presidents, 
accusing them of serving the Bank, the IMF and the imperialist interests of the US.  In 2006, 
once in power, he ignored the Washington Consensus by nationalizing the country’s 
hydrocarbon sector and ending its agreement with the IMF (Buxton, 2007).  His government 
designed a National Development Plan (NDP) with two main objectives:  to replace the 
primary export model and to end social inequality, poverty and exclusion (Molero-Simarro 
and Paz-Antolín, 2012 p. 531).  Morales declared a new national constitution in 2009, 
redefining the foundation of Bolivia as a pluri-national state.  The reforms included a 
transformation in state-civil society relations.  This new model upholds, at least in formal 
speech, an anti-neoliberal agenda, with an interventionist role of the state in the economy 
directly related to social movements (labelled elsewhere as ‘neocollectivism’: Córdoba and 
Jansen 2013). 
In contrast, the Bank was one of the main proponents of neoliberal policies in the continent 
based on the principles of the Washington Consensus (Harvey, 2005).  This process of 
neoliberalization was not only a set of economic strategies but also a political project ‘to re-
establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites’ 
(Harvey, 2005 p. 19).  The political project encapsulates a mode of governance or neoliberal 
governmentality in which rational entrepreneurial individuals seek to meet their needs and 
wants through the market (Lemke, 2001; Valdivia, 2005).  The first wave of neoliberal 
reforms in Bolivia started in 1985 with a structural adjustment to ‘roll back’ the state and to 
open up the economy.  In the mid-1990s, after evidence showed that the advantages of the 
market had not ‘trickled down’ to the poor but instead had made life even harder for them 
(Murillo, 2008, Pérez, 2008), a second wave of reforms was launched.  These advocated a 
more ‘efficient’ and decentralized state and an autonomous civil society (Murillo, 2008). 
We have outlined these two positions in a rather simplified way to highlight their 
differences.  In this chapter we examine how these two contrasting views on development 
articulate to empower the poor and create post-neoliberal alternatives.  Following Hart (2002 
p. 28-29), by articulation we refer to the way in which distinct ideologies composed of 
different subjects, projects, identities and aspirations are joined together through situated 
practices.  Some scholars have interpreted such interventions as evidence of contradictions 
between discourse and practice or as proof that Evo Morales, despite some reforms, wants to 
continue with a strong neoliberal agenda (Andersson and Haarstad, 2009; Kaup, 2010; 
Webber, 2011).  These interpretations have some shortcomings.  We argue that the PAR 
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project is not simply an extension of neoliberalism but a mixed model that intertwines 
interventionist politics, market economics and efficiency mechanism to facilitate government 
in favour of the poor.  This active state intervention encourages farmers’ participation in the 
national economy by providing technology services to poor farmers, without changing the 
rules of the game that regulate the market.  The PAR intervention shows the paradoxical and 
complex nature of the social transformation processes carried out by the ‘New Left’ in Latin 
America (Enriquez, 2013).  The case illustrates the major tensions, contradictions and risks 
involved in balancing the political empowerment of social organizations with their 
incorporation into market economic activities (Córdoba and Jansen, 2014-forthcoming).  
This chapter draws upon qualitative research (46 in-depth, semi-structured interviews and 
over 50 open, informal interviews, participant observation and documentary analysis) carried 
out in different periods during 2011 and 2012 in the department of Santa Cruz.  In January 
and February of 2011 the first field visits and in-depth interviews were conducted with PAR 
officials in Santa Cruz and La Paz (the seat of the government), as well as with technicians 
and beneficiaries.  From June to September of 2011 we participated in numerous activities of 
sixteen associations supported by PAR
41
, conducted open-ended interviews and accompanied 
PAR officials in the tasks of planning, monitoring, and evaluation.  We also studied the 
Iupaguasu indigenous organization in Lagunillas municipality.  Key actors interviewed 
included project beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, technicians and outreach workers from 
public and private organizations, representatives of NGOs, state officials and buyers.  
Additionally, we spent time in the PAR offices in Santa Cruz observing interactions between 
the PAR team, technicians who offer technical assistance and project beneficiaries.  In August 
of 2012 we conducted follow-up visits to the selected sites. 
This chapter is organized into the following sections.  Section two explores how the Bank 
and the MAS government frame empowerment while section three analyses the PAR 
programme in practice. Section four discusses how the neocollectivism of the MAS 
government articulates with the World Bank view on empowerment. 
 
N e o l i b e r a l  a n d  N e o c o l l e c t i v i s t  V i e w s  o n  E m p o w e r m e n t   
 
Empowerment has become a buzzword in transnational development circles, being hailed 
as a panacea, a means and an end of development, by both governments and powerful 
                                                          
 
41 These associations were: a) Comarapa: Aprosemco, Asogacom, Asofrumac, Torrebal b) Valle Grande: Aprovalle, 
Asociación de Ganaderos Rurales; c) Yapacaní: Asople, Competitividad de La Cadena Apícola Comunitaria; d) El Torno: 
Asapai, Junta Piraí, Nueva Asociación Surutú-Yungas, Asoprop, Asopega; La Guardia: Asapiguardia, Lechería ‘Naranjillos’, 
Apromat. 
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institutions like the World Bank (Cornwall et al., 2005).  The flexibility of the concept has 
allowed it to be mobilised both for and against hegemonic projects.  In response to the 
mainstream uses of the term in development practice, feminists stress power as a highly 
political notion and associate the process of empowerment with the interests of those who 
have little power (Kabeer, 1997; Young, 1993).  We will draw an analytical distinction 
between four modes of thinking about power, as summarized by Wolf (1999 p. 5), to analyse 
the divergent views on empowerment of the Bank and the MAS government as well as their 
articulation in the PAR intervention.   
In the first mode, empowerment is equated with capacity-building, in which power is seen 
as an attribute of individuals, such as the ability of farmers to produce or make informed 
decisions that allow them to interact with the market.  A second mode of empowerment refers 
to an increase in the capacity to impose one’s will on others.  In this case, the effects of the 
programme will be reflected in the ability of producers to improve their marketing and/or 
production conditions so that the requirements of buyers and service providers are met.  A 
third, stronger mode sees empowerment as the capacity of farmers to have their viewpoints 
included in the agenda and circumscribe the actions of others so as to improve tactically their 
position in the market and agricultural production and services.  Finally, a fourth mode refers 
to the development and use of power to change the structure of the setting in which 
production relations are established.  
How has empowerment been framed in the development texts of the Bank and the MAS 
government? In 2001, the Bank, in its World Development Report, adopted empowerment as 
a key priority of its development policy (Narayan, 2002; Mansuri and Rao, 2012).  Building 
upon Sen’s approach on freedom to choose (1999), empowerment was defined as: ‘the 
process of increasing the capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform 
those choices into desired actions and outcomes’ (World Bank, 2011).  Central to this view of 
empowerment is a non-relational view of power that focuses on strengthening individual and 
group capacities in four key areas: a) access to information, b) inclusion or participation in 
decision making, c) accountability of organisations to people, d) capacity to organize at the 
local level to resolve problems of common interest (World Bank, 2011).   
To enhance empowerment, the Bank introduced participatory development, partly in 
response to criticism of its top-down approach (Mansuri and Rao, 2012).  This shift to 
participatory development has been criticized as a move to depoliticize development 
(Ferguson, 1990), to instrumentalize participation (Cooke and Kothari, 2001) and to push the 
neoliberal agenda from below (Harris, 2002; Carrol, 2009 p. 459).  
In the Bank’s development model, implemented via PAR, empowerment means 
strengthening the productive and organizational capacities of farmers to improve production, 
to gain access to productive assets and to comply with ‘modern’ supply requirements (quality, 
safety, quantity, and timely delivery) such that they can compete in the market economy 
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(World Bank, 2005).  The state plays a facilitating, not controlling, role in line with the so-
called post-Washington consensus that considers ‘healthy’ states essential to the well-
functioning of markets (Joseph, 2012).  This means that states, while maintaining a market-
centred vision, must facilitate access (either directly or through third parties) to technical 
support, rural credit, infrastructure and commercial logistics services.  In this model, the 
market and not the state is the distributor of resources to the poor (Collion and Friedman, 
2010).  Alliances with agribusiness are presented as an effective way to enhance the 
entrepreneurial capacity of small farmers (World Bank, 2009; Collion and Friedman, 2010; 
Labaste and Weber, 2010).  Parties establish ‘win-win’ relations in which each benefits by 
developing solutions they could not achieve on their own.   
The PAR programme frames subjects as ‘participants’ in projects and markets rather than 
as citizens.  The PAR intervention facilitates the search for solutions by the poor themselves 
and promotes individual ‘self-governance’ crucial for neoliberal governance or 
‘governmentality’ (Lemke 2001; Foucault, 2010).  Neoliberal governance emphasizes 
technocratic administration in which the proper functioning of the market and ‘good 
governance’ of the state depend on and contribute to forming empowered ‘entrepreneurs of 
themselves’ (Lemke, 2001).  Farmers pass from being passive recipients of resources to 
becoming effective producers able to make decisions that improve their agricultural 
production and access to markets, as in mode one of power (Córdoba et al., 2014a-
forthcoming). 
While the Bank’s approach is primarily a non-relational framing of empowerment in terms 
of ‘self-governance’, the MAS government, links empowerment to historical notions of 
collective citizenship that question power relations and structures.  The MAS government was 
elected with the support of an archipelago of indigenous, social, peasant, and urban 
movements with diverse class and ethnic demands.  These movements have a long historical 
tradition of exercising collective citizenship through their political and territorial 
organizations such as agrarian unions, ayllus and Native Indigenous and Peasant territories 
(TIOC) (Postero, 2007; Farthing and Kohl, 2013).  At least two key historical moments have 
shaped this collective citizenship (Assies et al., 2005).  The first was the 1952 revolution that 
granted voting rights to Indian people and pushed for a land reform led by liberal notions of 
citizenship linked to individual land tenure (Rivera, 1993).  Indians were redefined as 
campesinos and the state-sponsored peasant unions became the main vehicle for interacting 
with the state and demanding civil, political, and social rights and participation (Wanderley, 
2009).  Peasant unions, later grouped at the national level into the Confederación Sindical 
Única de Trabajadores de Bolivia (the Sole Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant 
Workers or CSUTCB), supported various governments in the past and played an important 
role in the 1980s democratization process.  They have come to form a corporatist movement, 
with deep roots in class claims and strong powers to mobilize rural society at the local, 
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departmental and national level (Wanderley, 2009).  The second moment of strengthening 
collective citizenship occurred during the neoliberal restructuring of the 1990s when the MNR 
government led by Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada triggered a series of reforms such as the Law 
of Popular Participation (1994) and the National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) Law.  
These reforms, together with the mobilization of indigenous people from the lowlands, 
recognized indigenous organizations as interlocutors with the state within what has been 
called ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ (Kymlicka, 1995; Hale, 2002; Postero, 2007)42.  This 
development changed the terms of citizenship by focusing rural demands on cultural 
recognition and difference, and on the right to communal ownership rather than on class 
demands.  
The current (third) moment of citizenship, which we label neocollectivism, began with the 
social upheavals since 2000 and the rise to power of the MAS.  Neocollectivism refutes the 
separation of the state and politics from civil society and economy and is based on strong state 
intervention.  The Productive Revolution Law, approved in 2011, proposes a change of food 
system to include ideas of ‘food sovereignty’, ‘Living Well’43 and the rights of the ‘Mother 
Earth’.  This post-neoliberal framework for implementing rural neocollectivist policies 
emphasizes that social movements should present their economic demands not to the market, 
but directly to the state and press for the transfer of public resources.  Their social 
organizations, with a community character, are responsible for managing these resources, 
generating development processes and developing technical capacities (Estado Plurinacional 
de Bolivia, 2011).  The main difference with previous regimes of collective citizenship in 
Bolivia is the focus on balancing social movements’ class-based and cultural recognition 
demands with a quest for economic empowerment; highlighting that productive aspects and 
organizations are dependent on the political organizations of rural communities.  Although the 
MAS government does not deny the role of the market in a capitalist economy (Fabricant, 
2012), it argues that the market alone cannot ensure ‘Living Well’ and that is why the 
protagonist role of the state is justified to achieve collective well-being through redistributive 
policies (Córdoba and Jansen, 2013).   
In terms of the four modes of power outlined above, the Bank and the MAS government 
have contrasting views on empowerment.  While the former primarily subscribes to the first 
mode of empowerment, the latter addresses the fourth mode in its political discourse.  The 
Bank highlights individual capacities and de-emphasizes the collective, while the 
                                                          
 
42 Governments across Latin America supported recognition and cultural rights but were reluctant to accept their class-based 
claims.  Hale (2002) refers to it as the indio permitido, or the authorized Indian in neoliberalism. 
43 The ‘Living Well’ term refers to a conceptualization of the economy as subordinate to the need to live in harmony with 
the surrounding environment and gives priority to the development of just and reciprocal human relations (Fabricant, 2012). 
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neocollectivist view highlights the reverse.  In the Bank’s view, empowerment does not 
question unequal power relations or the economic system.  Disempowerment is not 
understood as a consequence of unequal political-economic and social structures, but as the 
lack of capacity of the poor to articulate itself to the market, the lack of human and social 
resources, and of capital that would allow them to make better decisions.  In contrast, the 
MAS government perceives empowerment strategies of the social movement–state nexus as a 
means to change structurally the dominant market-oriented and economic-growth based food 
system and as a contribution to the strengthening of a collective citizenship.  But how do these 
two contrasting frames of empowerment, come together in practice? And do the other modes 
of power also play a role?  In the next section, we explore these articulations in the PAR 
programme and the extent to which the Bank and the MAS government adhered to their 
respective views on empowerment.  
 
T h e  P A R  P r o g r a m m e  a n d  i t s  E m p o w e r m e n t  S t r a t e g i e s   
 
The PAR model in Bolivia  
 
The PAR is one of the MAS’s principal strategies for economic empowerment. It aims to 
balance and complement the strong focus on the political empowerment of social movements.  
Much of the technical institutional organization and implementation of the PAR are, however, 
set by the Bank.  The programme was designed by a small community in the Latin American 
and Caribbean section of the Bank, including the Bank’s senior representative in Bolivia, 
interested in how to incorporate poor producers into the market.  Implementation started in 
2002 in Colombia (Córdoba, 2012) and extended to 10 countries in Latin America with 
variations according to national policies and contexts (Collion and Friedman, n.d.).  In 
Colombia, the model strengthened commercial agreements between farmers and buyers, 
focusing on agro-chain constraints, while in Bolivia it concentrated on the productive level, 
improving farming systems so that farmers are able to respond to concrete market demands.  
Since its inception the model did not include the poorest of the poor.  Prospective 
beneficiaries must already be engaged in markets and have the potential to generate income 
(surplus) and jobs (World Bank, 2005).   
Once the MAS government assumed office, the Ministry of Rural and Land Development 
(MDRyT) took over the PAR programme proposal initiated by its predecessor.  The first 
US$28.4 million Bank credit for the PAR was approved on 26 May, 2005 and implemented in 
2007 (MDRyT; 2009).  In the first phase PAR launched four calls for proposals including a 
pilot in 2004.  In 2007, the programme covered 65 municipalities from the Tropics, the 
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Valley, and the Salt-flat sub-regions.  In 2009 coverage of the programme expanded to 110 
municipalities, and the intervention area doubled including the Chaco, North and Lake 
Titicaca regions.  Currently, the programme supports around 700 productive alliances 
reaching approximately fifteen thousand producers in all departments of the country, except 
Pando (See Figure 5.1).  In 2013, a second phase started with a US$50 million loan from the 
Bank. Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of the project around the country. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Number of PAR Projects by Municipalities 2011 
*Data supplied by the PAR office – La Paz – August 2011 
 
The PAR model was adapted during the MAS government.  First, PAR changed the name 
of beneficiaries from ‘small producers’ to ‘indigenous people’, thereby recognizing the 
context of indigenous villages.  This name change did not imply a reformulation of the 
content of the programme as PAR offered the same support mechanisms and management 
formats to all participating producers regardless of their ethnicity.  Second, the programme 
expanded its intervention areas during the first six years of implementation.  The MAS 
government argued that the programme should be more inclusive, alleviate poverty and 
support the poor.  While the Bank emphasized the productive technical area, the MAS 
attempted to expand the programme to include poorer municipalities and not only those sites 
with greater economic potential.  Third, PAR increasingly focused on business opportunities 
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in the domestic market whereas the initial PAR proposal had emphasized the support of 
export initiatives.  
The PAR, although linked to the Ministry of Rural and Land Development (MDRyT), 
operates as an autonomous programme.  Once the Bolivian government receives funding from 
the Bank, the programme manages these as a decentralized entity with operational autonomy 
from the MDRyT.  The fact that PAR is completely funded by the Bank makes its 
administration and operational management responsive to the Bank’s general guidelines 
rather than to the Bolivian state.  The PAR representatives interviewed found that this brought 
greater financial independence and management flexibility as well as independence in 
choosing beneficiaries and intervention sites on the basis of technical rather than political 
criteria.  However, this also isolates them from other state institutions.  PAR’s central offices 
in La Paz are located in a small house in a residential neighbourhood at some distance from 
the MDRyT.  The recruitment of programme managers and technical staff is based on merit.  
For example, members of the technical team of the PAR were selected by an external private 
company that evaluated the candidates according to merit and not political affiliation.  The 
current PAR general manager has been in the job since 2004, allowing greater stability than 
occurs in other government jobs where rotation is high.  This is in line with ‘building a 
capable bureaucracy’ (Joseph, 2012 p. 220) that contributes to a healthy state.  As such the 
PAR technicians occupy an unusual position, working in accordance with both the technical 
dictates of the Bank and the needs of the MAS government and its constituency.  
 
Depoliticizing social movements: Individual entrepreneurship vs collective 
citizenship 
 
Central to the PAR programme for ‘economic empowerment’ is the depoliticization of 
social movements by organizing them into market-oriented associations.  The Productive 
Revolution Law of 2011 aimed to support Community Economic Organizations (OECOM), 
which are strongly linked to social movements.  The Law gives OECOMs the power to 
manage and approve rural projects and channel financial resources for communitarian 
economic initiatives, a demand expressed by the Sole Union Confederation of Bolivian 
Peasant Workers.  Rather than waiting for the slow process of endogenous development to 
take place through the strengthening of communitarian economies (i.e. OECOM) as 
advocated initially by neocollectivism, the Bank proposed market-centred associations 
comprising  market-oriented producers interested in improving farm income, productivity, 
marketing and local processing activities and participating in value chains (Collion and 
Friedman, nd).  For one Bank representative interviewed, the involvement of social 
movements would distort the purpose of the programme which, according to him, is 
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productive not political.  The main challenge for PAR, he highlighted, is precisely the creation 
of depoliticized economic organizations.  He said: 
 
We [the Bank] have insisted, and eventually the Bolivian government supported this 
view, that the economic transfers from the PAR go directly to the producers, with an 
economic purpose (…) The Unions can co-opt and hinder productive resource 
management (Interview, August 1, 2011). 
 
He also stressed that using social movements as intermediaries could divert part of the 
resources to purposes other than those intended.  This view on supporting economic 
organizations in the PAR programme, instead of more communitarian organizations such as 
OECOM, was finally accepted by the MAS government.  
The prioritization of market-oriented associations over communitarian enterprises created 
tensions within the communities studied.  In the presence of PAR representatives, community 
leaders voiced their concerns about divisions in the union structure arising from the top-down 
imposition of new associations, which have a different modus operandi from that of life in the 
communities.  As the associations organize individual farmers by agricultural product, it is 
difficult to link them collectively to the community as a whole.  One union leader held that 
PAR sought to do the same as the NGOs, ‘create associations with the intention of dividing 
the unions’.  The distinction between collective and productive organizations is perceived as a 
divide and rule strategy.   
External interventions, however, can be developed and appropriated in different ways by 
different actors (Nuijten, 2002).  Our observations suggest that in places where individual 
land tenure is dominant, forms of coordination and negotiation with social movements have 
been generated in practice.  In Yapacani, a town of predominantly Andean migrants (Quechua 
and Aymara origin) and where the unions are the dominant form of organization, emerging 
associations have maintained strong ties to the unions.  In August 2012, we attended a 
workshop conducted by a local NGO to train women from the Union Federation on how to 
organize themselves into productive associations.  Yolanda
44
, a representative of the 
federation, told us that those attending had created three women’s associations so as to access 
the PAR resources.  One group of women proposed a project of poultry for eggs, another 
involved pigs, and a third, with more economic resources, opted for genetically-improved 
livestock and pasture.  Each group worked separately on these productive projects and 
organized their association around market opportunities, while simultaneously continuing to 
form part of a single active political union.  She added: 
                                                          
 
44 Pseudonyms are used for all individuals mentioned. 
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The members of the Union Federation get together and inform us that there is a call 
from the government to access resources.  The leader goes and gets the PAR forms 
and calls a meeting.  In the meeting it is announced what the possibilities are and we 
decide what we want to do, if we want to raise chickens, pigs, cattle, etc. (…) not all 
want the same thing’ (..) With the Union Federation we work on gender issues.  The 
Ministry of Justice supports us. We have been actively involved in the formulation of 
five national laws.  In the union, women raise gender issues and the need to 
participate in power spaces; from the unions emerge local government 
representatives, councillors and ministers.  In the town we have a new secretary of 
gender: for women to learn how to empower ourselves in power positions.  
Productive projects are also important to position women within the family, to gain 
independence and contribute financially (Interview, August 17, 2012). 
 
While the unions highlight the significance of collective citizenship and political 
empowerment for social transformation, the associations focus on managing state-resources to 
improve individual production.  This is one example of what Albó labels ‘individualism 
within the group’ (quoted in Lazar, 2008 p. 179), and what some scholars (Zoomers, 2006) 
point to as part of the Andinidad (the Andean way of doing things).  Here individual land 
tenure, individual agricultural production and strong market orientation do not necessarily 
conflict with collective political projects and aspirations.  
The case of lowland indigenous people who are trying to strengthen their collective land-
ownership and values, however, is different.  An illustrative example is the Iupaguasu 
captaincy (a form of indigenous organization), which is a member of the Guarani People’s 
Assembly in Lagunillas.  This community, like other Guarani communities, has historically 
experienced strong oppression.  People were held as semi-slaves, and worked under the yoke 
of large landowners.  The struggle of the Guarani to recover their lands and territory started in 
the late 1970s (Gianotten, 2006), with the support of NGOs.  Today, the community of 
Iupaguasu owns 38,229 hectares entitled as Community Territories of Origin (TCO - Tierras 
Comunitarias de Origen) under the National Agrarian Reform Law of 1996.  When we studied 
this community in 2011 they were proposing a productive project to PAR and other 
government programmes.  The project aimed to create a strategic alliance between the 
community and AGRINUTS, a company based in Santa Cruz dedicated to the production and 
export of Bolivian peanuts.  The Guarani community owned land suitable for intensive peanut 
cultivation and AGRINUTS needed to increase its production area to meet export orders. 
CEPAC, a local NGO, facilitated the partnership between AGRINUTS and the Iupagausu 
community.  CEPAC was concerned because the Guarani did not cultivate their land 
themselves but rented it out to others, even to those who were once their landlords.  The 
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alliance with AGRINUTS could potentially terminate these leases.  AGRINUTS would 
contribute capital and the Guarani land and labour.  The profits would be shared equally.  
Guarani leaders saw it as an opportunity to empower themselves productively and alleviate 
poverty.  However, the land recovery process was not easy.  Tenants refused to return the land 
and the captaincy had to hire a lawyer to dissolve the contracts.  Although the community 
wanted to receive support from PAR, they had doubts about being divided into associations.  
As a member, the captaincy receives support from the Guarani People’s Assembly but 
associations may not receive such support as they are economic initiatives in which only some 
participate.  
Additionally, the MAS neocollectivist project presents new threats for the Guarani of 
Iupaguasu.  The Law of Popular Participation (LPP) of 1994 helped them to increase their 
representation at the local political level and the agrarian reform law of 1996 awarded them 
collective land rights (Wanderley, 2009).  Their collective territories were entitled 
Community Territories of Origin (TCO) in 2001 but with the new constitution of 2009 (art. 30 
and 394) they became Native Indigenous and Peasant territories (TIOC).  Today they consider 
this change in the constitution to be detrimental since it includes peasant communities, based 
on individual land tenure, who may want to seize and divide their lands. According to an 
Iupaguasu leader: 
 
Now all laws are changing, now we are TIOC.  Also, the migrants [peasants from the 
highlands] are going to be able to enter our territories, then we will never have real 
land access and they are going to take it from us (Interview, July 29, 2010). 
 
Currently, the Guarani from Iupaguasu find themselves caught between their struggles for 
recognition of indigenous territories and rights, the need to fight poverty as a community and 
the pressure from neocollectivism to become productive and incorporate into markets.   
The emphasis of the PAR on economic-oriented forms of organizations based on 
individual land tenure has placed the MAS government in a contradictory situation with 
regard to its constituencies.  On the one hand, the PAR structure can serve the redistribution 
(class) claims of agrarian unions who seek greater governmental economic support for their 
individual productive projects.  On the other hand, it creates tensions within indigenous group 
organizations, weakening their efforts for structural change through collective governance and 
cultural recognition as in mode four of power. 
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Improving capacit ies and self -governance to demand state support  
 
Once farmers are grouped into market-oriented associations, the PAR officials visit the 
communities to explain how to formalize the association and to build capacities and skills, 
different from those involved in social movements.  For Carmen, the PAR social specialist for 
the department of Santa Cruz, this capacity-building is like the birth and upbringing of a baby.  
‘Being grouped together is not enough’  she explains to producers during her visits to the 
communities   ‘just as it is not enough for babies merely to be born’.  To be ‘brought up’ it is 
necessary to follow a series of steps so that associations can garner programme support.  First, 
just as each baby needs a birth certificate, so the association, to be recognized by the PAR, 
needs to secure a legal personality (personería jurídica) by formally registering as a 
productive organization with the signature of the governor of the department.  
Second, the association must meet certain requirements: 1) a minimum of 20 members, 2) 
at least two years’ experience in the selected productive activity, and 3) a contribution of 
about US$560.  The latter is a subtle filter to select those association members with sufficient 
economic resources and better market connections.  Additionally, the association must have a 
Tax Identification Number and be registered with the Integrated System of Administrative 
Management and Modernization (SIGMA).  When these requirements are fulfilled, the 
association can open a bank account and be in a position to receive financial resources from 
the PAR.  
Third, members have to identify business (market) opportunities on their own and submit a 
summary business plan setting out what they will buy and when.  The PAR does not provide 
any technical advice at this stage but it does offer plainly written manuals on the required 
business skills, such as how to open a bank account, write a check, prepare vouchers, manage 
bank accounts, and how to present accounts to the PAR.  Most producers lack such 
managerial skills and only a few have attended school for some years.  Some associations 
receive support from agricultural technicians in their area or rely on members with more 
experience with development projects or higher educational qualifications, to design their first 
plan. 
The use of these tools to achieve ‘self-governance’ drew heavily on the discourses on 
participation advocated by the Bank.  Central to participation is stakeholder control and 
decision-making for ownership and efficiency of the projects, giving voice to the poor and 
collective action, or ‘social capital’ (Bebbington et al., 2004).  But this participatory process 
also serves neocollectivist redistributive aims.  An official from the ministry of rural 
development related how farmers benefit from participation in the programme and learn how 
to manage public resources.  For him, this improves farmers’ access to current and future state 
resources (primarily economic) and liberates them from social exclusion.  He added:  
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We do not want technicians managing money or for the NGOs to manage their 
resources.  We want farmers entering the formal system, that when there is an 
interesting business they can invoice.  [we want them] to decide (…) decide which 
technicians to hire, that they take risks, that they decide the things they want to buy, 
and that they carry out all the processes (Interview, July 7, 2011).   
 
This quote illustrates the continuity between neoliberal governance (self-governance) and 
the transition to post-neoliberal neocollectivism and its concerns to incorporate social 
movements’ demands into the state apparatus.  Farmers must be prepared to handle and 
manage resources and to be citizens capable of having a direct relationship with the state 
without the mediation of external actors like NGOs.  
Two actors are important in bringing association members closer towards ‘self-
governance’ and in incorporating the social movements into the state: the facilitator and the 
acompañante (companion).  With the participation of the association, the facilitator, hired by 
PAR, develops a technical proposal.  This proposal sets out a technological package that 
includes a market and environmental assessment and the association’s strengths and 
weaknesses.  Facilitators call themselves ‘proyectistas’ (project designers) because they are in 
charge of rallying the associations to submit the technical proposal for PAR approval and of 
bringing the association into contact with buyers.  The buyer does not participate except to 
specify product characteristics: quantity, quality and frequency.   
Once the proposal is approved, PAR appoints the acompañante to provide technical 
services to the association.  Acompañantes, usually individual technicians who help 
associations choose technology packages and innovations, are seen as ‘the eyes of the PAR in 
the communities’, since they permanently monitor and report to PAR.  However, contrary to 
the image of ‘extensionist’ or ‘technician’ associated with top-down methods, farmers 
associate the word ‘acompañante’ with being more bottom-up and less controlling.  This 
shifts the professional’s stance away from directing farmers’ opinions and decisions towards 
facilitation. 
The PAR programme ends the participatory development process with an evaluation 
workshop guided by PAR officials.  This workshop is seen as the end of the contractual 
relationship with the PAR, i.e. with the state.  We accompanied a PAR team for eight closing 
evaluations in different communities in the municipalities of Comarapa, La Guardia and El 
Torno.  These workshops had a festive air, association members providing food for the PAR 
representatives as a sign of reciprocity for the support received.  A PAR official calculated the 
economic impact that the PAR had had on the association, including investment of the 
project, costs, sales prices, and transaction costs.  Efficiency in the use of project resources 
was calculated by quantifying investments and profits and converting them into the format 
required by PAR.  Participation was understood in terms of the average number of members 
Chapter 5: Articulations between post-neoliberal politics and neoliberalism 
111 
 
who participated in association meetings and the percentage of women or indigenous people 
involved in the project, illustrating the project’s intention that they should benefit from the 
intervention.  Participants regarded one of the most important results in terms of 
empowerment to be the fact that they managed resources by themselves and decided on the 
destination and distribution of these resources within the group.  They also highlighted the 
credibility and transparency of the PAR, which allowed them to view the allocation of the 
budget.  An association member spoke about the contribution of the PAR in the following 
way:  
 
I learned how to manage resources, though it has been difficult since the vast 
majority of us do not have a high level of education.  Many institutions came, did 
things, and left.  But with the PAR things are clear, this and this were bought, and 
this money was left over.  I like it, there is no one to distrust, not as in other 
institutions’ (Fieldwork notes). 
 
At the evaluation workshop, Carmen, the PAR official, again used the metaphor of 
comparing the associations to raising children.  She reminded the producers that the 
association, like a child, is now walking and that further steps forward depend on them.  
Finally Carmen said: ‘today you have ended the contractual situation with the PAR because 
your association is now established, the PAR helped you to improve your product.  Now you 
have to seek other resources to help you to improve other aspects, seek other financing 
opportunities’.  In these evaluation sessions the PAR was described as a learning process that 
empowers farmers to interpellate the state and present claims for projects. 
We observed strong support for the programme’s aims among participating associations 
and agrarian union representatives.  People were enthusiastic about the PAR programme 
because of the financial resources provided, which they could not get through the banks.  
Many producers had entered PAR to obtain more cattle or to extend or improve their cropping 
systems.  According to the union members interviewed, the greatest contribution of PAR was 
that it allowed access to productive assets (purchase of animals, seedlings, agrochemicals, 
tools, productive infrastructure), as opposed to past interventions, especially those of NGOs, 
in which project resources were mainly devoted to training and technical support.  PAR 
support was, instead, tangible and perceived as fundamental for their productive activities.  
An agrarian union leader related that they do not defend capitalism as such. Rather ‘what we 
defend is a plebeian capitalism, a capitalism that works for the poor’ (Interview, August 09, 
2011).  Although they link their material demands to questions of rights and redistribution, 
union members do not see their interests as going against the capitalist economy (cf. Jansen 
2014).  They use the associations to access PAR resources and see this project as a way of 
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tactically organizing their operations within capitalism without aspiring to wider structural 
changes in the food system.  
 
The limits of ‘self -governance’: Confronting government failures  
 
While the PAR programme forges capacity-building through facilitating participation, its 
relationship to the provision of technical support is ambiguous.  When we asked a senior 
member of staff of the Bank in Bolivia about the neglect of technical aspects in the PAR 
projects, he argued that PAR resources only suffice to improve meagre productive conditions 
in the country and that these productive investments do not require strong technical support to 
be effective since producers know what they need and how they will use these resources. 
While in PAR, technology is reduced to the minimal conditions needed to ensure 
production, programme participants struggle to access even these minimal services.  In the 
transition to neocollectivism, the NGOs’ role as providers of technical services has been cut 
back (Córdoba and Jansen, in preparation).  PAR has few relations with municipal 
governments, neither do these provide a source of funding for hiring technicians.  (Although 
assigned a role in strengthening technical services in rural areas, municipal governments lack 
the required capacity and resources; Kay, 2004).  For example, the Association of Potato Seed 
Producers (APROSEMCO) in Comarapa has experienced serious problems in continuing their 
PAR project due to the lack of local technicians.  They have put out seven invitations to hire a 
potato seed production expert.  The association leader told us: 
 
We need the technician; we could not find one with the required experience in the 
area. (…) The problem with technical support is that there are no technicians in the 
area and the ones that are here do not meet the requirements, with the terms of 
reference.  Those from Santa Cruz ask for a lot of money and are not interested in 
moving to live here’, (interview, 19 February, 2011).   
 
The PAR recognized that the lack of technical support is a crucial constraint, especially in 
remote locations.  One of the PAR’s strategies for solving this problem is the creation of a 
database of service providers.  However, as an APROSEMCO leader commented, as farmers 
have to contribute 30 per cent of the costs of technical support, they could not attract 
technicians from other regions who are only willing to move for a good salary.  
Local NGOs, who are the only providers of technical service in many regions, criticize the 
PAR intervention.  According to an NGO technician in the Chaco region:   
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The MAS government is not interested in the technical side; they are interested in 
giving things and making politics.  It’s very nice that they give things; this was never 
seen with previous governments (…) before it was the other way around, you got 
good technical support and the projects only spent money on the technical part.  This 
has drastically changed, but it should not be an extreme change’ (interview, 9 
August, 2012).  
 
PAR has shifted the nature of support from one extreme to the other, away from providing 
technical support and knowledge towards giving material goods such as animals and 
agricultural inputs.  According to this critical view, the role of the ‘gift’ is driven by the MAS 
government’s desire to exchange material resources for votes to stay in power.  Material 
goods foster local production and are perceived by producers as tangible aid.  Therefore, PAR 
support affects the political fortunes of the MAS government.  The problem is that capacity 
building, farmer participation and productive material goods, although important, do not 
compensate for the government’s failure to provide farmers with the necessary technical 
support.   
 
A r t i c u l a t i n g  E m p o w e r m e n t  a s  C a p a c i t y - B u i l d i n g  w i t h  
S t r u c t u r a l  E m p o w e r m e n t  
 
The previous section discussed the implementation of PAR and its empowerment 
strategies.  In this section, we examine how these strategies articulate with the MAS 
government’s view on empowerment.  The problem of this articulation can be illustrated by 
the encounter between the Minister of Rural and Land Development Nemecia Achacollo, 
members of the association Junta Piraí and PAR technicians during a project evaluation in El 
Torno in August 2011 (see Figure 5.2).  The Junta Piraí association grouped together twenty-
five producers who had requested the construction of two warehouses with a production 
capacity of 15,000 broiler chickens.  About ten members of the association were waiting for 
us sitting on wooden benches in a makeshift shelter near the newly constructed warehouses.  
Another three were adding finishing touches to a commemorative plaque which thanked the 
PAR, the Bank and President Evo Morales for their support.  PAR technician Marcelo 
installed a banner with the image of the PAR programme.  The minister arrived accompanied 
by the mayor of El Torno (from the MAS party).  Four producers, including the association 
president, the treasurer and the secretary spoke words of appreciation for the programme, the 
government and the president for the support given to small producers.  They mentioned that 
it was the first time that resources had been transferred directly to them and that they had 
received concrete goods.  Cesar, representing the PAR, took the floor and said that the project 
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would not have been successful without the producer organizations and that it was the 
associations not the government, who should take the credit for this. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 The Minister of Rural and Land Development Nemecia Achacollo (right) 
uncovers the commemorative plaque. 
 
Marcelo, who privately expressed his disagreement to us with what he called the 
‘politicization’ of an event that should be about technical evaluation, intervened to highlight 
the productive nature of the project.  While for Marcelo the objective of the project was to 
assess compliance with and effectiveness of productive goals, for the minister, the project 
meant something else.  Having remained silent during the earlier interventions, the minister 
only started talking once the public television cameras arrived.  She hailed the PAR as 
President Evo Morales’ most successful programme, and thus a success for the most excluded 
sectors of the country.  She reminded the audience that while previous governments had not 
been concerned about peasants, this government was doing everything possible to reverse 
that.  She continued by saying:  
 
You have to thank Brother Evo Morales. The PAR exists thanks to the political 
stability that we have in our country, thanks to the credibility of the president. Today 
we are supported by many loans. So far we are working with concession credits (…). 
There are 11 decentralized units, 11 programmes like the PAR (…).   
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The minister explained that the PAR sought to provide farmers with an initial stage of 
support, a first relationship with the state and after that they were to find funding from other 
agencies created by the MAS government.  She went on to say: 
 
We have the BDP [Productive Development Bank] from whom you can continue to 
borrow money.  I think that because of this, brothers, you have managed a project.  
You know how to manage a project, you have followed the path and the government 
has shown you the way.  We believe that you have to take this forward.  You, who 
have already received support, should give space to other comrades who have not yet 
received any; hand in hand we are going to make a change, to achieve food 
sovereignty. 
 
These interchanges illustrate how different views on empowerment are combined.  The 
MAS government strongly increased the role of the state in redistributing resources; the state 
being seen as the central agent and the small producer as the one who should ‘receive 
support’.  This fits into the neocollectivist perspective whereby the Bolivian state played a 
significant role in rural development by increasing expenditure on social grants (Riggirozzi, 
2010), creating or recovering state companies and development initiatives (Córdoba and 
Jansen, 2013; Domingo, 2009; Postero, 2013a). To strengthen small-scale production 
economic resources were directly transferred to productive organizations, responding to the 
demands of agrarian unions as set out in the Productive Revolution Law (Rojas, 2012).  The 
implementation of PAR is part of this wider process. 
This state-led redistribution and transfer of resources is seen as political, as a change of 
system (mode 4), because of the ties with social movements and participation of local 
organisations in the formulation of demands and implementation.  The PAR intervention 
helps the MAS government regulate contentious politics, or what Tapia (2008) calls the 
‘política salvaje’ (wild politics) of social movements in Bolivia, i.e. collective action that 
goes beyond both state spaces and those social spaces that normally serve to organize state-
society relations.  These wild politics question the expansion of state politics and may 
collectively imagine alternatives.  Once in power, the MAS government has to channel this 
opposition or keep the wild politics within certain limits in order to be able to govern amidst 
the deeply contradictory claims of the different participating social movements.  Being a 
social movement and a government at one and the same time is potentially conflictual.  As 
part of the state, the MAS government encourages demands to be made through the 
established channels so as to impose some order over the ‘wild politics’.  PAR is one of these 
ordering mechanisms.  It binds the MAS constituency to the MAS ruling power by 
demonstrating that there is a flow of resources from the state to local communities. 
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As the case of El Torno shows, the MAS government wants farmers to regard the PAR as a 
mechanism freeing them from social exclusion and enabling them to become the country’s 
providers of food sovereignty.  The measure of success seems to lie in how much support the 
state gives to local communities.  In contrast, the PAR team emphasizes a different measure 
of success of the programme, one which relies on efficiency and entrepreneurship.  According 
to this view, producers have to learn to deal with modern bureaucracies and to adhere to the 
rules of the market economy by managing bank accounts, budgets and cash flows.  PAR 
officials must evaluate project efficiency under the guidelines established by the Bank, i.e. in 
terms of improvements in productivity and business opportunities.  In this view, the state is 
basically a facilitator, enabling individuals to assume responsibility for their own 
development (neoliberal governmentality) rather than being dependent on the state. 
At the time of this study (2012), both the government and the PAR administration seemed 
satisfied with the programme’s impact despite adopting different measures.  However, 
neocollectivism, like similar post-neoliberal projects elsewhere on the continent (Radcliffe, 
2012), has not been able to make a definitive break from neoliberalism.  The PAR programme 
reinforces a market-centred approach to rural development in ways that echo neoliberal and 
colonialist policies of the past.  The PAR market spaces are not designed to change the basis 
of economic power and the dominant patterns of production as in mode 4 of power.  
Furthermore, the balance between political and economic spheres, mentioned by Morales in 
the ceremony in Tiawanaku and referred to in the introduction, may present a risk for the 
MAS government in the long-term.  Producers quickly learned that to gain real access to 
resources they had to integrate with productive associations and not political ones; 
associations had to de-emphasize their collective claims. 
 
C o n c l u s i o n s  
 
This chapter examines how the different ideas of empowerment of the MAS government 
and the Bank articulate in practice through the PAR programme.  Using an analytical 
distinction of four modes of power, we argued that the MAS government and the Bank 
represent two different ways of framing empowerment.  The MAS government advocates a 
post-neoliberal framework in which the state collaborates directly with social organizations to 
achieve structural social change (a mode 4 view on power).  By contrast, the Bank’s emphasis 
on strengthening capacities to meet markets requirements and self-governance means that it 
largely upholds a non-relational view of power (mode 1).  The implementation of the PAR 
programme in Bolivia combined three strategies related to the issue of empowerment: a) 
depoliticizing social movements by supporting market-oriented associations, b) focusing the 
participatory process on capacity building, and c) redefining project support as a ‘gift’ which 
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would benefit the MAS government politically, despite PAR’s efforts to promote bottom-up 
processes and local capacities.  The depoliticization of social movements is at times 
disempowering (a shift from mode 4 to mode 1) as social organizations to receive PAR 
support have to trade in collective values and political aspirations for more individualist 
perspectives.  At times, however, it is also empowering as when producer associations 
collaborate with social movements (especially agrarian unions) to prepare tactically the 
political agenda for social change (as in mode 3 of power).  One could argue that for the MAS 
constituency the PAR programme implies a shift from discursively propagated structural 
change in power relationships (mode 4) to that of improving farmers’ economic and political 
position vis-à-vis other actors without changing the rules of the game (modes 2 and 3).  
Rather than being contradictory, strengthening farmers’ capacities (mode 1) is very helpful for 
achieving this aim.  
The case of the PAR programme shows that neocollectivism has not been able to imagine 
alternative options for development practice which go beyond neoliberal mechanisms of 
governing (e.g. self-governance).  This confirms the position of those scholars who argue that 
the MAS government has not been able to synchronize its rhetoric and practice (Bebbington 
and Humphreys-Bebbington, 2010; Kennemore and Weeks, 2011).  However, this does not 
necessarily mean that neocollectivism is completely submissive to neoliberalism.  One could 
argue that the trajectory being followed is what is currently needed to achieve success.  The 
image from Greek mythology of Ulysses who ties himself to the mast to resist the lure of the 
sirens, may be appropriate here.  By binding social organizations to the government, the 
managerial tools embedded in the PAR programme and the reduction of empowerment 
aspirations to capacity-building and technological efficiency, as well as the strategic alliance 
with the Bank, may help the MAS strengthen, or at least maintain, state-social movement 
relations and avoid the ‘madness’ that might result from pursuing the contentious politics of 
the Sirens.  This could lead to chaos and undermine the MAS government.  Furthermore, the 
trajectory followed furthers the distributive aims of neocollectivism.  The contradiction is that 
by doing so the MAS government disengages with the alternative path to development based 
on food sovereignty, Living Well and Mother Earth rights.  
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
 
This thesis set out to investigate what are, and what sustains, the differences between two 
views on participation: on the one hand, a politicized view, in which participation is seen as a 
means to generate social transformation and radical changes; on the other hand, a view on 
participation as a ‘social technology,’ in which participation is seen as a managerial tool for 
project development efficiency.  I chose the case of Bolivia to analyse these differences in 
practice through specific project interventions.  These two views on participation have been in 
tension since the rise to power of Evo Morales and his Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) 
party in 2005.  Morales’ government defends what I have labelled a ‘neocollectivist’ approach 
to participation that favours the direct relation between the state and social movements and 
grassroots organizations to generate a radical political process of social transformation.  I 
contrast this politicized view on participation with the interventions conducted by PROINPA, 
a national NGO focused on research and development initiatives.  Specifically, I analysed its 
interventions using participatory methodologies in Morochata and Padilla municipalities.  
My investigation on the differences between these two views on participation has focused 
on answering the following three sub-questions:  
1) How does the MAS government shape participation as a political project? 
2) How does participation as a managerial tool contrast with participation as a political 
project? 
3) What are the articulations between these two approaches to participation?   
In this final chapter, I propose to go beyond the dichotomy between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
politics in participatory practices, as suggested by some authors who seek to re-politicize 
participatory processes.  I argue instead that each view on participation represents different 
and autonomous but complementary spheres for social transformation.  Whereas a politicized 
view on participation is essential to define the ‘what’ to do in rural development, participation 
as a social technology provides the ‘how.’  Next, based on the empirical chapters of this 
thesis, I answer the research questions proposed in the introduction.  I then summarize the 
main argument about participation raised in this thesis.  Finally, I offer a short discussion of 
what could be done in further research.  
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T h e  M A S  G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  N e o c o l l e c t i v i s m  i n  R u r a l  
D e v e l o p m e n t  I n t e r v e n t i o n s   
 
For centuries, peasant and indigenous movements in Bolivia have organized to challenge 
the structures of social exclusion that came from colonial times.  As suggested by different 
authors, collective rights based on class and ethnic demands have been achieved by steps in a 
process that included struggles, tensions, and alliances with the state and power (e.g. alliances 
with power elites) (Rivera-Cusicanqui, 1984; Assies, 2005; Postero, 2007).  These steps 
include the Tupac Katari uprisings in the seventeenth century, and the national revolution of 
1952 that granted the right to vote to indigenous and peasant people and fulfilled some of 
their demands through land reform and other various reforms in the 1990s that allowed the 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ territories and rights, especially in the lowlands.  Although 
these efforts have been important for distributing rights to excluded sectors of society, some 
people/groups continue to be excluded, especially in the political sphere, from processes of 
decision making. 
How does the MAS government shape participation as a political project? The MAS 
government has tried to bring together, in one political project, different models of collective 
action of different excluded sectors, vis-à-vis neoliberal politics, to generate a comprehensive 
view of social justice and a concept of citizenship that is more meaningful for Bolivians.  In 
the process of giving voice to the voiceless, or as Rancière (1999) calls them ‘the part with no 
part’ (p. 64), the MAS government gathered different sectors of society to rewrite the 
constitution and to participate in what it calls ‘the re-foundation of the state.’  In the 
Communitarian and Productive Agricultural Revolution Law approved in 2011, the MAS 
government reinforced these intentions.  These attempts to politicize rural development 
reflected the recognition of indigenous peoples’ demands, peasants’ class demands, and the 
demands for political representation of popular sectors in general to participate in the 
decision-making process.  This research shows that in rural development these different 
demands can be classified into three tendencies or visions of social justice (Chapter 2): first, a 
vision of indigenous and sustainable development, whose central demand is the 
‘decolonization’ of the state and the adoption of the ‘Living Well’ concept of collective rather 
than individual well-being; second, the left anti-imperialist tendency favouring a ‘strong state’ 
capable of defending the nation against the dominant food systems managed by transnational 
companies and neoliberalism; and third, the popular tendency defending a farmer-based 
vision of rural development based on the principles of food sovereignty.   
The MAS government has struggled to balance the three spheres of social justice: 
recognition, representation, and redistribution.  The fact that the MAS political programme 
met different and sometimes contradictory demands has provided grounds for disagreement.  
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This disagreement has been characterized by the practice of a ‘radical’ democracy à la 
Boliviana, in which different social movements deal with each other in seeking ways to 
cohabit with neoliberalism and change it.  The tendencies within neocollectivism are not fully 
subordinated to Morales’ authority; on the contrary, they measure their strengths in the streets 
through manifestations and confrontations.  One example of this was the case of the TIPNIS, 
referred to briefly in Chapter 2, where lowland indigenous communities’ claims for 
recognition and respect of their territory conflicted with peasant movements’ demands for 
rural development.  Protests and marches guided this ‘disagreement’ in a dispute that has not 
been resolved.   
The neocollectivism proposed by the MAS government contrasts with the characterization 
that some authors have made of ‘post’-neoliberalism.  Some scholars, adopting a 
poststructuralist understanding of post-neoliberalism, point to a scenario where development 
would no longer exist (Escobar, 2010).  Others, instead, see it as a space-time where there is a 
process of deconstruction and decolonization of the liberal and Western ideas of society, 
including the state (Mignolo, 2012).  This research showed, instead, that neocollectivism 
brings the state back into the centre of the debate (Chapters 2 and 3).  The state has a 
prominent role in rural development as an arena of power where the social organizations 
reclaim space for their own purposes.  It is not seen as opposed to civil society as two 
different and autonomous spheres, but in mutual relation.  This is illustrated in Evo Morales’ 
famous phrase on the night of his first election to the presidency: ‘Indigenous Comrades, for 
the first time, we are Presidents!’ (quoted in Postero, 2007).  The analysis of EMAPA, as the 
MAS government’s most important rural development project, shows the return of the state as 
a strategic actor in rural development and the shift from neoliberal to neocollectivist agrarian 
development (Chapter 3).  EMAPA’s intention is to change the power relations between 
regional elites in Santa Cruz and small producers, giving the state a strong role in the 
economy, while seeking to create conditions for national food sovereignty. 
Throughout the process of strengthening the state, neocollectivism has been faced with an 
inability of the state apparatus to govern.  This thesis highlighted the EMAPA case and the 
inability of the state to offer adequate technical assistance services, agricultural production 
storage, and distribution of necessary resources for production.  This generated not only 
dissatisfaction among its constituents, but also unexpected consequences.  On the one hand, 
the MAS government, rather than weakening the dependence relationship between small 
producers and agribusiness, as was its intention, has strengthened this dependence.  
Technology transfer and the path of technological development for agricultural production 
depend on the latter.  On the other hand, because state intervention remains under pressure 
from agribusiness, the MAS government has been forced to reverse some of its political 
decisions and negotiate with the Santa Cruz elites. 
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The success of the neocollectivist project in rural development will depend not only on 
achievements in the political sphere, but also on the capability of the state and farmers to 
solve their different technical problems.  So far, the MAS government has not given sufficient 
importance to participation either as a social technology to facilitate project management or as 
a way to achieve innovative agricultural technologies to solve acute problems affecting 
productivity (pests, diseases, soil erosion, and so forth).  It has relegated the provision of these 
services and the solution to these problems, including the decision-making processes, to 
external actors, whether agribusiness (Chapter 3) or international institutions like the World 
Bank (Chapter 5).  Neocollectivism has not attempted to generate technologies to shape rural 
development alternatives.  On the contrary, it has preferred to travel the same path towards 
technological development as the dominant food regime ruled by agribusiness, relying heavily 
on the principles of the Green Revolution (Chapter 3).  
Representations of post-neoliberal options as ‘post’-capitalist and ‘post’-development 
often fall short of representing the complexities, connections, and demands of different social 
movements, in this case those movements that make up the MAS party.  This thesis has 
shown that the adoption of the agribusiness technological development path and the image of 
‘success’ based on capitalist principles do not necessarily contradict the demands of agrarian 
unions, especially in the lowlands.  Agrarian unions, key supporters of the MAS government, 
have had long-standing claims of sovereignty over the use and redistribution of natural 
resources in order to release the great majority of the country from poverty and solidify their 
class claims.  Interventions like EMAPA (Chapter 3), financed by the revenues of state-owned 
extractive industries, make up part of this new form of redistribution of resources.  Some 
academics and environmentalists, instead, have called this a ‘neo-extractivism’ common to 
the progressive governments of the continent, where social justice aims are combined with 
exploitation of non-renewable natural resources and reproduction of global capitalist patterns 
(Gudynas, 2010; Postero, 2013a).  This is posited as contradictory to Living Well, food 
sovereignty, and the ‘rights of Mother Earth’ principles, and consequently to a real post-
neoliberal option.  This thesis has presented neocollectivism as an open-ended process where 
the possibilities of creating technological alternatives that go in line with these principles will 
depend on the contending forces within the MAS government and its technological ability to 
put post-neoliberal ideas into practice. 
 
P a r t i c i p a t i o n  a s  a  M a n a g e r i a l  T o o l  a n d  P o l i t i c a l  
P a r t i c i p a t i o n   
Participatory methodologies have been actively deployed in Bolivia since the 1970s.  
NGOs have been important actors in the use and dissemination of these methodologies to 
Chapter 6: General Conclusions 
124 
 
meet different purposes, from political empowerment in times of dictatorship to serving as an 
instrument for the implementation of projects in neoliberal times (Chapter 2).  Since then, 
participatory methodologies used as a managerial tool in project intervention have been 
increasingly associated with the mode of governance established by neoliberalism.  It has 
been argued that these methodologies were used as instruments to put neoliberal ideas into 
practice and that they have become a ‘Trojan horse’ for disempowering and de-politicizing 
civil society initiatives (Harriss, 2002).  In this research, we have argued that this is not 
inherent in participatory methodologies, but that it has been possible because of their 
malleability to serve different purposes (Chapter 4).  
Participation is not only useful to fit different actor or project objectives; it is also 
malleable in the sense that each actor is involved in finding new balances between technical, 
economic, and political considerations.  Neoliberalism in Bolivia, for instance, stressed 
participation as a managerial tool for project efficiency, to focus on solving local problems as 
well as to strengthen farmers’ capacities to have better control of daily life.  Farmers needed 
to become more self-reliant and less dependent to be able to take better decisions to escape 
from poverty.  Neocollectivism, in contrast, politicized development by questioning and 
challenging the structures that lead farmers into oppression.  It highlighted participation as a 
political project to address collective problems and connect them with power and power 
asymmetries.  As this thesis tries to elucidate, these contrasting approaches are reconciled in 
practice.  Project interventions, either under neoliberalism or neocollectivism, pass through 
processes of politicization and de-politicization where actors need to play politics and 
introduce technical considerations for project efficiency.  Here, participation is not only about 
power but also about finding a balance with the material conditions and expertise fundamental 
for project implementation and success.  The emphasis on the political and technical aspects 
of participation, however, will depend on the political context in which project interventions 
evolve. 
This thesis introduces the case of PROINPA to illustrate how participatory technologies in 
Bolivia have taken hold since the neoliberal political project began to unfold (Chapter 4).  I 
analyse PROINPA interventions specifically in the town of Morochata-Cochabamba to 
explore the progressive state retirement from agricultural research and the transformation of 
PROINPA from a public project on potato research into an NGO.  Morochata became a place 
of experimentation for different participatory methodologies, especially participatory plant 
breeding (PPB).  This method was envisioned as an alternative to previous top-down research 
and technology transfer models, but also as an effective way to involve farmers in agricultural 
experimentation and to teach them different techniques, build their capacities, and promote 
more sustainable farming systems.  Participatory methodologies for monitoring and 
evaluation were also used to improve project efficiency by providing information on the 
implementation of project activities and by contributing to the achievement of project 
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objectives.  In the case of PROINPA, this thesis has shown how participatory methods were 
essential for project success and implementation as well as to imagine technological solutions 
adapted to local problems and farmers’ desires.  
Taking the case of PROINPA, Chapter 4 showed that the implementation of neoliberal 
ideas was not one-way.  On the contrary, PROINPA researchers played politics. The rolling 
back of the state in agricultural research generated the deployment of different ‘technologies 
of governance’ (Chapter 4).  Researchers adopted participatory research and development 
methodologies to work with farmers and drew from their experiences to accommodate to an 
agricultural research system that was actively changing around them.  They reworked the 
different forces of power from above and below, enabling transformations from within.  
PROINPA researchers were active interpreters of neoliberal ideas.  At times they contested 
them, and at times they engaged with them.  The concept of governmentality is critical to 
explain this, because it helps to elucidate the links between the expressions of power, in the 
case of PROINPA, the reforms made to the agricultural research system and the state, and the 
lived experience of researchers and agricultural research and development practices.  
Neoliberal reforms failed, however, to connect these reforms with power issues, with local 
political demands and ideas, and with a concept of citizenship and democracy more 
meaningful for Bolivians. 
 
N e o c o l l e c t i v i s m  a n d  i t s  A r t i c u l a t i o n  w i t h  N e o l i b e r a l  
G o v e r n a n c e   
 
Left-wing critics of the MAS government – and of progressive governments in Latin 
America in general – have also claimed that there is no real intention to decolonize 
development.  On the contrary, they argue that these governments seek only to reform the 
neoliberal project (Webber, 2011).  From my research, I agree with these sceptical authors 
that, even though the take-off of neocollectivism was caused principally by social 
movements’ rejection of neoliberal economics and political projects, implementation of these 
political ideas was not an interruption of neoliberalism.  The MAS government has not 
produced a revolution that will radically change the established patterns of development.  In 
contrast to these critics, I argue, however, that the neocollectivist project has tried to ride two 
horses at once.  On the one hand, it has sought to generate an open-ended process of social 
transformation that can reconcile the different demands of social movements towards 
neocollectivism.  On the other hand, it has resorted to certain modes of neoliberal governance, 
such as self-governance and capacity-building processes (Chapter 5), in order to facilitate 
government.  
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The MAS government articulates with the World Bank’s neoliberal ideas of empowerment 
to enable producers’ self-governance and to teach them to interact with the state apparatus 
within the available policies (Chapter 5).  Self-governance refers to the ability and skills of 
farmers and their organizations to find solutions to their own problems.  The development of 
this self-governance by producers is fundamental to push project interventions forward, from 
the bottom up.  In the Rural Alliances Project (PAR) intervention (Chapter 5), the World 
Bank offered the necessary participation tools to generate self-governance through a capacity-
building process.  This process allowed farmers to cooperate for the success and efficiency of 
projects, assuming certain tasks and organizing themselves to be eligible for state aid. 
The MAS government, however, does not see self-governance by individuals as the 
solution to historical inequities in the country.  It has tried to complement interventions such 
as PAR with an increasing role of the state in rural development, particularly in redistributing 
resources (Chapter 3).  State-led redistribution and transfer of resources is seen as political by 
this government as small producers are targeted as the ones who should receive support.   
The MAS government’s articulation with neoliberal governance involves a risk to the 
processes of social transformation (as argued in Chapter 5), as it restricts state intervention to 
the context of development projects, while structural factors change slowly.  Although the 
MAS government wants farmers to see state support as a mechanism to free them from social 
exclusion and as a means towards Living Well and food sovereignty, neocollectivism, like 
similar post-neoliberal projects on the continent (Radcliffe, 2012), has not been able to make 
a definitive break from neoliberalism.  Interventions are based on ideas of progress influenced 
by historical colonist policies and have done little to change the basis of economic power and 
dominant patterns of production.  In addition, an important void, as mentioned above, is the 
lack of importance placed by the MAS government’s interventions on agricultural technology 
that facilitates the generation of technical assistance and training and alternative technological 
trajectories.   
Neocollectivism is not free of contradictions and tensions between rhetoric and practice.  
Fabricant (2012), for example, shows how social movements have adopted certain indigenous 
ways and customs to access ‘political and agrarian practices of distribution’ (p. 185).  This 
includes the co-option of historical collective structures of governance such as the ayllu.  
Other scholars point out that the creation of a new indigenous language and the idealized 
Andean Living Well concept are hard to find in ‘the empirical reality of the country’ (Radio 
Paris La Paz, 2013, radio interview).  The activist and sociologist Rivera-Cusicanqui, for 
example, says in an interview (Erbol, 2014) that in the MAS government there is a ‘show of 
decolonization’ in which certain spectacles of indigenousness have been reinvented and 
distorted in practice to strengthen the MAS government’s political project.  Along these same 
lines, this thesis found that, even though the MAS government discourses have defended the 
development of communitarian economies – for example, represented by the Community 
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Economic Organizations (OECOMs) – based on collective values and cultural difference, in 
practice it has tried to combine or balance the historical forms of collective organization of 
peasant of indigenous origin with associations with a productive focus and organized around 
specific agricultural projects.  This can be seen as a process of de-politicization: grouping 
social organizations in associations is meant to speed up economic development and facilitate 
government in the policy sphere.  At the same time, it shores up Bolivian radical democracy 
based on these social movements (Chapters 3 and 5).  This top-down process of the MAS 
government, driven in interventions like EMAPA and PAR, has brought conflict to the 
collective political organizations.  First, some social organizations see this strategy of de-
politicization as a threat and a division of their organizations.  Second, because the generation 
of development interventions necessarily involves the selection of beneficiaries, a process of 
social differentiation emerges to a point where the social movements feel that they are 
breaking with communitarian organizations.  Third, the process of de-politicization of 
collective organizations carries the risk of reducing or extinguishing the desire for 
transformation and social change born within these organizations. 
In summary, this thesis has highlighted three aspects of the neocollectivism project for 
rural development: the strengthening of the state to satisfy the MAS government 
constituency’s demands for social justice, a radical political democracy that seeks to continue 
in a strategic relation with the state, and the adoption of certain neoliberal governance 
mechanisms, like self-governance and capacity building, to be able to facilitate government 
and effective resource management. 
 
P o l i t i c i z e d  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  v s .  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  a s  a  S o c i a l  
T e c h n o l o g y ?  I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t  p r a c t i c e  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, several scholars in critical development studies have complained 
about the de-politicizing power of external interventions.  In contrast to this criticism, this 
thesis argues that even the political processes of development must necessarily go through a 
process of governing, and in consequence to de-politicization.  Thereby, taking as our starting 
point Rancière’s distinction between politics and policy, we can argue that participation that 
facilitates the involvement of citizens in the political sphere is distinct from participation as a 
social technology contributing to a mode of governance that operationalizes policies.  These 
two forms of participation are interrelated and should not be analysed in isolation.  Politics 
produces participatory processes that are part of the disagreement, where different societal 
groups present their parameters of social justice for discussion.  These participatory processes 
are linked to historical struggles and are therefore contextual.  
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Participation used as a technology could improve project results and enable the conditions 
for social transformation.  Intervention projects for rural development are in consequence the 
result of intertwined processes of politicization and de-politicization.  For example, politics 
defines the scope of a project and its beneficiaries, but the operationalization of this project 
requires the use of participation as a social technology (e.g. participatory methodologies to 
facilitate capacity building, monitor and evaluate projects, stimulate the participation of 
underrepresented groups within society).  This version of participation can help to prepare the 
enabling environment (the required skills and capacities people need to face agricultural 
problems) and the appropriate technology to trigger changes for social transformation.  It is 
necessary to find a balance between political and technical strengths to achieve success.  
In the Bolivian case, this thesis has shown the MAS government’s efforts to politicize 
agrarian development practice.  The country is facing a historic opportunity to generate 
socially just transformation processes.  A new constitution enacted in 2009 was intended to 
meet the demands of indigenous people and peasants and build the base for a pluri-national 
state.  The Communitarian and Productive Agricultural Revolution Law approved in 2011 
prioritizes national food production, creates incentives for local production via state food 
purchases, and proposes state support to small producers in technical assistance, agricultural 
insurance, and rural credit through rural financing networks.  Poverty reduction in rural areas, 
however, does not simply require the enactment of generic laws and rights.  This, although 
important, is not enough to produce social justice outcomes.  As this thesis has argued, the 
MAS government has not been able to generate a mode of governance that allows its 
proponents to govern according to their political principles.  Productive aspects and technical 
questions are becoming subordinated to political positions.  
In my view, the terrain of action lies as much in the political as in the technical field.  In 
practice, and outside the heated moments of politically charged participation by social 
movements, the relationship between reaching technical efficiency and social justice is largely 
contingent; there is no one-to-one relationship between politics and technology.  As this thesis 
shows, concrete interventions like EMAPA and PAR have technical aspects where both 
versions of participation have to collaborate.  This is expressed in the necessity of the MAS 
government to work with the World Bank and implement participatory development to realize 
rural development interventions.  In the case of EMAPA, where the use of certain 
technologies to generate social participation has not been so clear or was missing, this kind of 
intervention has been accused by social movements of being authoritarian, and, as this 
research shows, also increases the ties of dependence with powerful actors in the dominant 
food system.  It also means that technological views on participation, such as those embodied 
in PROINPA, could be adapted and shaped to different political contexts and, therefore, 
would be of great value for agrarian development with social justice in Bolivia.  From this 
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research, I delineate four aspects that in my view must be taken into account to push forward 
the neocollectivist political project for agrarian development.  
First, the technical aspects of agrarian development for rural transformation must be 
addressed.  Pests, disease, indiscriminate use of agrochemicals, deforestation, erosion, and 
climate change are just some of the problems plaguing the Bolivian food system and agrarian 
society.  To foster neocollectivist politics, it is necessary to incorporate a productive 
efficiency criterion.  The transformation of rural production will implicate, therefore, the 
promotion of research with a long-term vision and strong state support.  Here, however, state 
intervention will not be enough.  It will be necessary to work with different actors (producers, 
scientists, technicians, and policymakers) at different scales to inventory and validate native 
technologies, adopt external technologies, and promote the participative adoption of 
technological knowledge under the identified social justice criteria. 
Second, the MAS government should take a look at areas like the market, which have been 
dismissed and made nearly invisible in their policies.  In the case of EMAPA (Chapter 3), the 
market was limited to state purchases.  In the case of PAR (Chapter 5), its scope was limited 
to preparing farmers to respond to market demands.  This research found no initiatives by the 
MAS government aimed at transforming the unequal power relations that exist in the markets 
to which small producers have access.  The MAS government has equated the market to a 
‘free market’ with neoliberal policies, ignoring market realities and constraints, insisting 
instead that producers must meet market demands (supplies and services) and offer their 
produce for sale. 
Third, the tendency within the social movements that make up part of the MAS 
government is to assume that the ways in which they will affect poverty pass through the 
state.  I suggest that the use of power towards social justice needs to operate at different 
levels, according to the definition of power given by Wolf (1998:5), ranging from power as 
individual capacity (mode 1) to power to realize transformation of social structures (mode 4).  
Change might occur in the structural domain through an active engagement with the state by 
recognizing and changing the underlying causes of social exclusion (mode 4); by shaping the 
conditions for political practice to provide resources for contestation (mode 3); and by 
supplying the capabilities, skills, and change of attitudes required to incorporate people into 
the political and policy spheres (modes 1 and 2).  
Finally, this thesis advocates in favour of the laborious task and art of governing 
proactively as a political process to prepare an adequate environment for a more just society.  
Governing mechanisms are necessary to facilitate the inclusion of – sometimes contradictory 
– views and interests of different grassroots organizations in the participation platforms.  This 
will help to avoid these views being squeezed out from development practice by power 
relations.  Advocating for governing mechanisms does not mean being against endogenous 
and bottom-up development.  Rather, to my mind, these processes are the ones that finally 
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lead to development at local level  the place where development ideas and concepts need 
most to be implemented.  I suggest that a strategic relationship between the state and 
grassroots organizations is now necessary.  This will involve not only a deepening of 
democratic processes in the political sphere but also better policies and technologies at local 
level. 
 
W h a t ’ s  N e x t ?  
 
Much is currently happening in the fields of politics and technology in Bolivia, and in 
Latin America in general.  In this final section, I outline three ways in which the findings of 
this thesis can be taken further and interrogated in these fields.  A first theme that deserves 
further analysis is how post-neoliberal alternatives perceive science and technology, and to 
what extent they are able to break with colonial conceptualization of science and 
technological progress.  In 2008, the MAS government established the National Institute of 
Agricultural and Forestry Innovation (INIAF) under the coordination of the Ministry of Rural 
Development.  This is the first step taken by this government to regain public leadership of 
agricultural research.  Are such organizations able to produce and design alternative 
approaches to science and technology based on local knowledge and Western science and 
expertise?   
A second area of interrogation is the strong influence of an extractive vision of 
development in the progressive governments of the continent (Gudynas, 2010), which 
promotes the reproduction of historical patterns of natural resource exploitation in 
combination with social justice aims.  The recent conflict between the MAS government and 
lowland indigenous groups because of the proposed building of a road that would split the 
TIPNIS territory shows the deep contradictions between environmental discourse and 
protection of the rights of Mother Earth and what is done in practice.  Other progressive 
governments on the continent face similar contradictions.  One example is Ecuador, and the 
conflict between the government and Amazonian indigenous groups and NGOs who oppose 
to government’s intentions to exploit oil in the Yasuni National Park.  An investigation of the 
ways in which this new extractivism shapes, for example, development technological 
trajectories conflicting with different social movements’ claims could provide rich 
perspectives on the limitations to creating post-neoliberal options. 
Finally, this thesis has already described the limitations to creating alternative food 
regimes.  Agribusiness, which retains its protagonist role and participation in national 
agricultural production, increasingly influences the MAS government, pressuring it to roll 
back the possibilities for changing the food system.  In the same line, Urioste (2010) stated 
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that the ‘foreignization’ of land has increased in recent years as part of the rapid expansion of 
soybean cultivation.  More research is needed to underscore the complex relations between 
transnational capital and local elites.  Such investigation will shed light on how these 
processes of alienation affect the MAS government’s redistribution intentions and the 
country’s technological trajectories and visions of rural development, especially in line with 
the goal of achieving food sovereignty and Living Well.  
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A p p e n d i x  1 . 1  L i s t  o f  I n t e r v i e w s  
No. Complete name Place Date 
1 Gonzalo Colque La Paz March 22, 2010 
2 Juan Pablo Chumacero La Paz March 22, 2010 
3 Javier Guzmán  La Paz March 23, 2010 
4 María Quispe La Paz March 23, 2010 
5 Gilberto Aguanta Saavedra April 4, 2010 
6 Rene Sanchez Santa Cruz April 12, 2010 
7 Florencio Flores Santa Rosa del Sara April 12, 2010 
8 Nestor Velasco Santa Rosa del Sara April 13, 2010 
9 Ximena Sandy La Paz April 14, 2010 
10 Tiberio Pizarro Santa Rosa del Sara April 16, 2010 
11 Gladys Velasco Yapacani April 20, 2010 
12 
Jerónimo Mamani 
Huanca 
San Pedro 
April 21, 2010 
13 Eduardo Castro San Pedro April 21, 2010 
14 Carlos Ordoñez Litoral April 26, 2010 
15 Celso Huaylla Sagrado Corazón  April 27, 2010 
16 Marco Mejía Teherán San Pedro April 29, 2010 
17 Angélica Martínez Santa Cruz May 4, 2010 
18 Javier Rivera San Pedro May 5, 2010 
19 Fredy Garnica Yapacani May 15, 2010 
20 Widen Abastaflor Santa Cruz May 18, 2010 
21 Raul Aguirre Santa Cruz May 18, 2010 
22 William Holsters Santa Cruz May 18, 2010 
23 Bernardo Cruz   Santa Cruz May 20, 2010 
24 Eulogio Nunez Santa Cruz June 14, 2010 
25 Margot Valverde Santa Cruz June 16, 2010 
26 Alcides Vadillo Santa Cruz June 16, 2010 
27 Claudia Montaño Santa Cruz June 17, 2010 
28 Rolando Cuellar Santa Cruz July 11, 2010 
29 Elbin Gonzales  Muyupampa July 14, 2010 
30 Marcelo Amaya Muyupampa July 15, 2010 
31 Gustavo Salazar Muyupampa July 15, 2010 
32 Jose Luis Urseda Lagunillas July 16, 2010 
33 Patricio Ortiz Lagunillas July 16, 2010 
34 Pablo Chavez Lagunillas July 17, 2010 
35 Jocias Coria San Pedro July 27, 2010 
36 Rufino Yuera San Pedro July 27, 2010 
37 Faustino Aramayo Lagunillas July 28, 2010 
38 Dionisio Vivarico Lagunillas July 29, 2010 
39 Fisser Burgos San Pedro August 11, 2010 
40 Hernan Carvallo Santa Rosa del Sara August 12, 2010 
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41 Leoncio Mamani Segovia Sagrado Corazón August 13, 2010 
42 Jorge Rosales  Santa Cruz August 19, 2010 
43 Agapito Montaño Santa Cruz August 19, 2010 
44 Antonia Rodriguez Litoral August 19, 2010 
45 Jorge Valverde Yapacani August 26, 2010 
46 Cecilia Aguilar San Pedro September 7, 2010 
47 Cecilia Aguilar Santa Rosa del Sara September 8, 2010 
48 Melean Espinoza Santa Rosa del Sara September 9, 2010 
49 Jairo Palomino Santa Rosa del Sara September 9, 2010 
50 Aniceto Segovia Santa Rosa del Sara September 10, 2010 
51 Victor Hugo Vasquez Santa Rosa del Sara September 11, 2010 
52 Janeth Miranda Santa Rosa del Sara September 14, 2010 
53 Zacarías Anagua Santa Rosa del Sara September 15, 2010 
54 Silvia Quispe Yapacani September 20, 2010 
55 Cyntia Castellón Yapacani September 21, 2010 
56 Nicolas Romero Yapacani September 21, 2010 
57 Alfredo Moya Yapacani September 22, 2010 
58 Grover Sotar Yapacani September 22, 2010 
59 Emilio Chileno Yapacani September 23, 2010 
60 Segundino Suazo Yapacani September 30, 2010 
61 Perico Pérez La Paz October 4, 2010 
62 Primo Nina La Paz October 4, 2010 
63 Vivian Polar La Paz October 5, 2010 
64 Hernán Zeballos La Paz October 5, 2010 
65 Fernando Rivero La Paz October 5, 2010 
66 Elba Terceros La Paz October 6, 2010 
67 Marta Arciniegas La Paz October 6, 2010 
68 Roberto Ordoñez Santa Cruz October 7, 2010 
69 Rodolfo Soriano La Paz October 7, 2010 
70 Jorge Albarrazin  La Paz October 7, 2010 
71 Bishely Elias La Paz October 8, 2010 
72 Einstein Tejada La Paz October 9, 2010 
73 Gonzalo Vásquez Santa Cruz November 17, 2010 
74 Jhonny Delgadillo La Paz November 18, 2010 
75 Alvaro Tapia La Paz November 18, 2010 
76 Luis Morales La Paz November 26, 2010 
77 Alberto Florez La Paz November 27, 2010 
78 Erwin Cruz La Paz November 28, 2010 
79 Juan Carlos Lopez La Paz November 29, 2010 
80 Roberto Zambrano Santa Cruz December 3, 2010 
81 Bernardo Torres Santa Cruz December 4, 2010 
82 Maria Ligia Montaño  Santa Cruz December 5, 2010 
83 Rodolfo Ayala Santa Cruz December 8, 2010 
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84 Roger Taboada Santa Cruz December 9, 2010 
85 Limbert Burgos San Pedro December 12, 2010 
86 Paulino Moreira Comarapa February 19, 2011 
87 Paulino Moreira Comarapa February 20, 2011 
88 Antonio Mérida Comarapa February 21, 2011 
89 Nancy Llano La Guardia February 22, 2011 
90 Rolando Cabrera Santa Cruz February 22, 2011 
91 Jose Crispin Arnez, La Angostura February 25, 2011 
92 Álvaro Flores Santa Cruz March 3, 2011 
93 Nelson Romero Santa Cruz March 3, 2011 
94 Marco Escalante El Torno March 4, 2011 
95 Josías Coria San Pedro April 26, 2011 
96 Luis Cuellar Santa Cruz May 18, 2011 
97 Juan Carlos Benavides La Paz July 7, 2011 
98 David Tuchschneider La Paz  August 1, 2011 
99 Maria Helene Collion Washington D.C. August 2, 2011 
100 Teresa Chávez El Torno August 3, 2011 
101 Yolanda Soliz Padilla August 3, 2011 
102 Isidoro Barrientos Cuatro Cañadas August 9, 2011 
103 Tito Villaroel Padilla August 12, 2011 
104 Walter Fuentes Sucre August 15, 2011 
105 Alberto Carvallo Padilla  August 16, 2011 
106 German Ovando Padilla  August 16, 2011 
107 Valentín García Padilla August 17, 2011 
108 Constantino Nina Padilla  August 18, 2011 
109 David Pérez Santa Cruz August 23, 2011 
110 Alejandro Bonifacio Cochabamba September 2, 2011 
111 Enzo Pacheco Cochabamba September 6, 2011 
112 Rodrigo Paz Cochabamba September 6, 2011 
113 Eloy Salas Padilla  September 9, 2011 
114 Faustino Fermín Cochabamba September 9, 2011 
115 Juan Arévalo Cochabamba September 9, 2011 
116 Claudia Sáenz Padilla  September 11, 2011 
117 Ariel Ayllon Padilla  September 12, 2011 
118 Milenka Ruiz Padilla September 12, 2011 
119 Agustín Vega Padilla  September 13, 2011 
120 Federico Cárdenas Padilla  September 13, 2011 
121 Enrique Roda Padilla  September 15, 2011 
122 Eulogio Rodas Padilla  September 15, 2011 
123 Juan Cárdenas Padilla  September 15, 2011 
124 Ramiro Ortiz Padilla  September 15, 2011 
125 Romelio Chinaut Padilla September 15, 2011 
126 Santiago Serrudo Sucre September 17, 2011 
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127 Rodrigo Burgoa Muyupampa September 22, 2011 
128 Orlando Gutiérrez Yapacani September 23, 2011 
129 Yolanda Ortiz Yapacani September 23, 2011 
130 Roger Rojas Padilla September 25, 2011 
131 Sabino Salazar Padilla September 26, 2011 
132 Julio Gabriel Cochabamba September 26, 2011 
133 José Salazar Padilla  September 27, 2011 
134 Teresa Ramírez Padilla September 27, 2011 
135 Miguel Machaca Cochabamba September 27, 2011 
136 Magaly Salazar Cochabamba September 27, 2011 
137 Pablo Mamani Cochabamba September 28, 2011 
138 Justo Lopez Morochata September 28, 2011 
139 Crescencio Calle Cochabamba September 28, 2011 
140 Felicidad Rodríguez Morochata September 29, 2011 
141 Jaime Herbas Cochabamba September 30, 2011 
142 Epifanio Villarroel Morochata October 4, 2011 
143 Crispin Ruiz Padilla  October 5, 2011 
144 Geronima Vega Padilla  October 5, 2011 
145 Edmundo Soliz Padilla October 5, 2011 
146 Jorge Villarroel Morochata October 5, 2011 
147 Benedicto Almanza Morochata October 6, 2011 
148 Cristina Villarroel Morochata October 13, 2011 
149 Jorge Antezana Morochata October 14, 2011 
150 Gunnar Chavez Morochata October 15, 2011 
151 Judith Antezana Morochata October 18, 2011 
152 Miguel Florido Cochabamba October 21, 2011 
153 Juan Cerda Morochata October 25, 2011 
154 Jose Espinoza Morochata October 26, 2011 
155 Saulo Suarez Morochata October 28, 2011 
156 Ademar Salazar Mendoza Padilla  November 8, 2011 
157 Alcides Ovando Padilla  November 9, 2011 
158 Ramiro Alvarado Morochata November 9, 2011 
159 Celestino Vegamonte Morochata November 9, 2011 
160 Juan Ruiz Morochata November 10, 2011 
161 Dario Andia Morochata November 10, 2011 
162 Juan Lopez Morochata November 11, 2011 
163 Jorge Buendia Morochata November 11, 2011 
164 Antonia Benavidez Comarapa November 16, 2011 
165 Enrique Ormachea La Paz November 22, 2011 
166 Marco Octavio Ribera.  La Paz November 24, 2011 
167 Wilfredo Rojas La Paz November 24, 2011 
168 Edson Gandarillas Cochabamba December 6, 2011 
169 Juan Vallejos Morochata December 8, 2011 
Appendix 
153 
 
170 Rudy Torrez Cochabamba December 9, 2011 
171 Carlos Jiménez Yapacani December 14, 2011 
172 Salome Tupa Santa Cruz December 14, 2011 
173 Ana Ortiz Santa Cruz December 16, 2011 
174 José Luis Soto La Paz July 18, 2012 
175 Paola Flores La Paz July 25, 2012 
176 Lucio Tito La Paz July 28, 2012 
177 Silvia Coca La Paz July 28, 2012 
178 David Morales La Paz July 29, 2012 
179 Nemesia Achacoyo El Torno August 3, 2012 
180 Rodrigo Burgoa Padilla August 7, 2012 
181 Max Cuba Lagunillas August 9, 2012 
182 Segundino Salazar Padilla August 9, 2012 
183 Noel Ortuño Cochabamba August 9, 2012 
184 Gualberto Villarroel  Padilla August 11, 2012 
185 Pastor Ovando Padilla August 11, 2012 
186 José de la Cruz Cochabamba August 15, 2012 
187 Antonia Olpo Yapacani August 17, 2012 
188 Eusebio Zipe Yapacani August 17, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
S u m m a r y  
This thesis analyses what are, and what sustains, the differences between two views on 
participation: on the one hand, a politicized view, in which participation is seen as a means to generate 
social transformation and radical changes; on the other hand, a view on participation as a ‘social 
technology,’ in which participation is seen as a managerial tool for project development efficiency.  I 
chose the case of Bolivia to analyse these differences in practice through specific project interventions.  
These two views on participation have been in tension since the rise to power of Evo Morales and his 
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party in 2005.  Morales’ government defends what I have 
labelled a ‘neocollectivist’ approach to participation that favours the direct relation between the state 
and social movements and grassroots organizations to generate a radical political process of social 
transformation.  I contrast this politicized view on participation with the interventions – conducted by 
the Promotion and Research of Andean Products (PROINPA) Foundation, a national NGO – that 
focus on research and development initiatives.  I concentrate on three aspects to elucidate the 
differences between these two views on participation: a) how the MAS government has shaped 
participation as a political project, b) how participation as a managerial tool relates to participation as a 
political project, and c) the way in which these two approaches to participation articulates in rural 
development interventions.  The research design combines analysis of interviews at national and 
regional level and detailed case studies of the following project interventions: on one side, the 
Company for the Support of Food Production (EMAPA) and the Rural Alliances Project (PAR), the 
MAS government’s most important rural development intervention projects in terms of funding 
(EMAPA) and coverage (PAR); on the other side, PROINPA’s intervention using participatory 
research in Morochata and Padilla municipalities  
Using the term neocollectivism to characterize the MAS government politics on agrarian 
development, the second chapter explores the confrontation between this government and NGOs.  
Despite the heated and politicized moments that have led to public discursive confrontation between 
the MAS government and NGOs, this chapter argues that NGOs have found ways to adapt to the MAS 
government politics by realigning their interventions.  More technical NGOs start to play politics and 
search for ways to negotiate and adapt to neocollectivism, whereas more political NGOs stress their 
technical aspects to provide services to social organizations in order not to be seen as a political threat 
to the MAS government.   
The third chapter analyses the EMAPA case as an example of the neocollectivist approach to 
participation and agrarian development.  This project, presented by the MAS government as an 
alternative to neoliberal food regimes, combines the use of state power and intervention in primary 
production and trade through the creation of state companies that interact with politicized social 
organizations (agrarian unions, associations, communitarian companies).  EMAPA aims to become the 
cornerstone of an alternative agrarian structure that will undermine the power of the Santa Cruz-based 
agri-industrial capital.  It seeks to forge a productive alliance between the state and small producers 
organized in associations to increase food sovereignty towards redistributive goals.  This chapter 
shows that the MAS government has been unable to develop an independent alternative to the 
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agribusiness model of the agri-industrial elites.  This is due to the complex relationship between the 
state and civil society that influences state capacity and to the lack of an alternative technological 
trajectory to defeat elites’ control over technology.  Furthermore, this chapter shows how EMAPA’s 
current intervention serves to strengthen rather than weaken dependency ties between supported 
producers and the agri-industrial sector. 
The fourth chapter analyses how neoliberal restructuring in Bolivia embraced an increased use of 
participatory methods in agricultural research.  It studies the case of PROINPA and its process of 
transformation from a public research institution into a research NGO under neoliberalism.  PROINPA 
used participatory methods to build farmers’ capacity and skills to contribute actively to project 
success as well as to facilitate the design and adaptation of technologies to solve local problems.  
Although these participatory processes prioritized technology development, capacity building, and 
project effectiveness, they also reconnected and sought new balances between reshaped subjects, 
technical and economic considerations, as well as political strategies and actions.  This chapter argues 
that participation designed by technically oriented NGOs like PROINPA is not just ‘technical’ as its 
professionals would like to perceive it, or simply ‘political’ as in critical views on participation.  
Instead, it is malleable in the sense that each actor is involved in finding new balances between 
technical, economic, and political considerations.  As this thesis tries to illustrate, this is true for both 
PROINPA’s technicians and EMAPA’s politicized interventions.   
The fifth chapter examines how two contrasting views on empowerment, that of the MAS 
government and that of the World Bank, articulate in practice through the PAR program.  The PAR, 
one of the MAS government’s most important interventions for rural development, aims to support 
small farmers with financial resources and technical assistance, and to create productive alliances to 
comply with market requirements.  In the PAR intervention, there is a mixture of these contrasting 
views on empowerment.  The MAS government seeks to achieve structural empowerment by 
strengthening the role of the state in redistributing resources, and by positioning the small producer as 
the one who should receive support.  In programme implementation however, the managerial tools and 
model of rural development handed down by the World Bank reduce empowerment aspirations to 
capacity building and technological efficiency oriented towards generating farmers’ self-management 
to link them to markets.  This chapter concludes that there is an imbalance between political power 
shifts and technical progress that limits the possibilities of making a definitive break from 
neoliberalism towards an alternative path to development. 
This research shows how participatory development and political participation are different but 
interrelated spheres of development.  The changes in the political sphere, and consequently in the role 
of the state and society in development, influence the conditions in which participatory technologies 
occur.  Such conditions might enable or constrain the scope of participation in development projects.  
This investigation indicates, however, that even the political processes of participation and 
development must necessarily go through a process of governing, and consequently of de-
politicization.  In practice and outside the heated moments involving the politically charged 
participation of the social movements, the relationship between reaching technical efficiency and 
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achieving social justice is more contingent; there is no one-to-one relationship between politics and 
technology.  Concrete interventions like EMAPA and PAR have technical aspects where both views 
on participation have to collaborate.  This also means that technological views on participation, such 
as PROINPA, could be adapted and shaped to different political contexts and, therefore, would be of 
great value for agrarian development with social justice.  In conclusion, the purpose of separating the 
political from the technical is not necessarily to analyse them in isolation, but to make visible different 
aspects embedded in planning interventions and to point to the need to take them both into account.   
  
 
  
S a m e n v a t t i n g  
Deze dissertatie analyseert wat de verschillen tussen twee visies op participatie zijn, en hoe deze in 
stand worden gehouden: Enerzijds een gepolitiseerde visie, waarin participatie wordt gezien als een 
middel om sociale transformatie en radicale verandering te bewerkstelligen; anderzijds een visie op 
participatie als een 'sociale technologie', waarin participatie wordt gezien als een bestuurlijk 
gereedschap voor het ontwikkelen van project efficientie.  Ik koos de casus van Bolivia om deze 
verschillen te analyseren in de praktijk door specifieke project interventies.  Deze twee visies op 
participatie verhouden zich gespannen tot elkaar sinds het aan de macht komen van Evo Morales en 
zijn Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) partij in 2005.  Morales’ regering verdedigt wat ik heb 
genoemd een 'neocollectivistische' benadering van participatie, die de voorkeur geeft aan de directe 
relatie tusen de staat en sociale bewegingen en lokale organisaties om een radicaal politiek proces van 
transformatie te genereren.  Ik contrasteer deze gepolitiseerde visie op participatie met twee 
interventies - uitgevoerd door de Promotie en Onderzoek van Andes Producten (PROINPA), een 
nationale NGO - die zich richt op onderzoek en ontwikkelingsinitiatieven.  Ik concentreer me op drie 
aspecten om de verschillen tussen deze twee visies op te helderen: a) Hoe de MAS regering 
participatie heeft vormgegeven als politiek project, b) hoe participatie als een bestuurlijk gereedschap 
zich verhoudt tot participatie als een politiek project, en c) de manier waarop deze twee benaderingen 
van participatie tot uiting komt in rurale ontwikkelings interventies.  Het onderzoeksontwerp 
combineert analyse van interviews op nationaal en regionaal niveau en gedetailleerde casus studies 
van de volgende project interventies: aan de ene kant de Onderneming voor de Ondersteuning van 
Voedsel Productie (EMAPA) en het Rurale Allianties Project (PAR), de belangrijkste rurale 
ontwikkeling interventieprojecten van de MAS regering in termen van financiering (EMAPA) en 
bereik (PAR); aan de andere kant, PROINPA‘s interventie gebruik makend van participerend 
onderzoek in de gemeenten Morochata en Padilla.   
Gebruik makend van de term neocollectivsme om de politiek van de MAS regering over agrarische 
ontwikkeling te karakteriseren, exploreert het tweede hoofdstuk de confrontatie tussen deze regering 
en NGO‘s.  Ondanks de verhitte en gepolitiseerde momenten die hebben geleid tot publieke 
discursieve confrontatie tussen de MAS regering en NGO's, beargumenteert dit hoofdstuk dat NGO's 
manieren hebben gevonden om zich aan te passen aan de politiek van de MAS regering door hun 
interventies opnieuw en anders af te stemmen.  Meer technische NGO's beginnen politiek te spelen en 
zoeken naar manieren om om te gaan met en zich aan te passen aan neocollectivisme, terwijl meer 
politieke NGO's de nadruk leggen op hun technische aspecten om diensten te verlenen aan sociale 
organisaties, om niet te worden gezien als een politieke bedreiging voor de MAS regering.  
Het derde hoofdstuk analyseert de EMAPA casus als een voorbeeld van de neocollectivistische 
benadering van participatie en agrarische ontwikkeling.  Dit project, gepresenteerd door de MAS 
regering als een alternatief voor neoliberale voedselregimes, combineert het gebruik van staatsmacht 
en interventie in primaire productie en handel door het creëren van staatsbedrijven die interacteren met 
gepolitiseerde sociale organisaties (agrarische vakbonden, verenigingen, communitaristische 
bedrijven).  EMAPA streeft er naar om de hoeksteen te worden van een alternatieve agrarische 
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structuur die de macht van het in Santa Cruz gebaseerde kapitaal zal ondermijnen.  Het probeert een 
productieve alliantie tussen staat en kleine verenigde producten te smeden, om de 
voedselsoevereiniteit te verhogen voor re-distributieve doelen.  Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat de MAS 
regering niet in staat was om een onafhankelijk alternatief voor het agribusiness model van de agro-
industriële elites te ontwikkelen.  Dit is te wijten aan de complexe verhouding tussen de staat en het 
maatschappelijk middenveld die overheidsbevoegdheden beïnvloed en het gebrek aan een alternatief 
technologisch traject om de controle van de elites over technologie te overwinnen.  Verder laat dit 
hoofdstuk zien hoe EMAPA’s huidige interventie dient om de afhankelijkheidsbanden tussen 
ondersteunde producenten en de agro-indusrtriële sector te versterken in plaats van te verzwakken. 
Het vierde hoofdstuk analyseert hoe neoliberale herstructurering in Bolivia een toenemend gebruik 
van participerende methoden in agrarisch onderzoek heeft omarmd.  Het bestudeert de casus van 
PROINPA en diens transformatieproces van een publiek onderzoeksinstituut tot een onderzoeks-NGO 
onder neoliberalisme.  PROINPA gebruikte participerende methoden ter verbetering van de 
capaciteiten en vaardigheden van boeren om actief aan project-succes bij te dragen, evenals het 
faciliteren van het ontwerp en de aanpassing van techniek om lokale problemen op te lossen.  Hoewel 
deze participerende processen technologische ontwikkeling, capaciteitsopbouw en project-effectiviteit 
prioritiseerden, verbonden ze ook opnieuw en zochten ze nieuwe balansen tussen opnieuw gevormde 
subjecten, technische en economische afwegingen en politieke strategieën en acties.  Dit hoofdstuk 
beargumenteert dat participatie, ontworpen door technisch georiënteerde NGO's zoals PROINPA niet 
slechts 'technisch' is zoals professionals dat graag zien, of simpelweg 'politiek' zoals in critische visies 
op participatie.  In plaats daaran is het smeedbaar in de zin dat elke acteur is betrokken bij het vinden 
van nieuwe balansen tussen technische, economische en politieke afwegingen.  Zoals deze dissertatie 
probeert te illustreren, is dit juist voor zowel de technici's van PROINPA's als voor EMAPA's 
gepolitiseerde interventies. 
Het vijfde hoofdstuk  onderzoekt hoe de contrasterende visies op empowerment, die van de MAS 
regering en die van de Wereldbank, in de praktijk tot uitdrukking komen in het PAR programma.  De 
PAR, een van de belangrijkste interventies van de MAS regering voor rurale ontwikkeling, probeert 
kleine boeren met financiële bronnen en technische ondersteuning te ondersteunen en om productieve 
allianties te creëren om aan de eisen van de mark te voldoen.  In de PAR interventie bestaat een mix 
van deze contrasterende visies op empowerment.  De MAS regering streeft er naar om structurele 
empowerment te bereiken door de rol van de staat in het herverdelen van hulpbronnen te versterken en 
door het positioneren van de kleine producent als degenen die ondersteuning zouden moeten krijgen. 
Echter, in de implementatie van het programma reduceert het bestuurlijke gereedschap en het model 
van rurale ontwikkeling zoals verstrekt door de Wereldbank empowerment aspiraties tot 
capaciteitsontwikkeling en technologische efficiëntie in de richting van het genereren van zelf-
management van boeren om hen aan markten te koppelen.  Dit hoofdstuk concludeert dat er een 
onbalans is tussen politieke machtsverschuivingen en technische vooruitgang die de mogelijkheden 
van een definitieve breuk van het neoliberalisme richting een alternatief pad naar ontwikkeling 
limiteert. 
Samenvatting 
161 
 
Dit onderzoek laat zoek hoe participerende ontwikkeling en politieke participatie verschillende, 
maar onderling gerelateerde sferen van ontwikkeling zijn.  De veranderingen in de politieke sfeer, en 
daarom in de rol van de staat en de maatschappij met betrekking tot ontwikkeling, beïnvloeden de 
voorwaarden waaronder participerende technologieën voorkomen.  Zulke condities zouden de omvang 
van participatie in ontwikkelingsprojecten mogelijk kunnen maken of beperken.  Dit onderzoek laat 
echter zien dat zelfs het politieke proces van participatie en ontwikkeling noodzakelijk door een proces 
van besturen gaan, en daaropvolgend van depolitisering.  In de praktijk en buiten de verhitte 
momenten van de politiek geladen participatie van de de sociale bewegingen, is de verhouding tussen 
het bereiken van technische efficiëntie en het bereiken van sociale rechtvaardigheid meer contingent; 
er is geen een-op-een relatie tussen politiek en technologie.  Concrete interventies zoals EMAPA en 
PAR hebben technische aspecten, waar beide visies op participatie samen moeten werken.  Dit 
betekent ook dat technologische visies op participatie, zoals PROINPA, kunnen worden aangepast en 
gevormd aan verschillende politieke contexten en daarom van grote waarde zouden kunnen zijn voor 
agrarische ontwikkeling inclusief sociale rechtvaardigheid.  Tot besluit, het doel van het scheiden van 
het politieke van het technische is niet perse om ze opzichzelfstaand te analyseren, maar om de 
verschillende aspecten die komen kijken bij het plannen van interventies zichtbaar te maken en om het 
belang van beiden te benadrukken. 
  
  
R e s u m e n  
Esta tesis analiza cuáles son, y qué sostiene las diferencias entre dos enfoques sobre la 
participación: por un lado, una visión politizada, donde la participación es vista como un medio para 
generar un proceso de transformación social y cambios radicales en la sociedad; por otro lado, un 
punto de vista sobre la participación como “tecnología social”, en el que ésta es vista como una 
herramienta de gestión para mejorar la eficiencia de los proyectos desarrollo.  Para analizar estas 
diferencias en la práctica a través de intervenciones de desarrollo específicas se presenta el caso de 
Bolivia. Estos dos enfoques sobre la participación han estado en tensión desde la llegada al poder en 
2005 de Evo Morales y su partido el Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS).  El gobierno de Morales 
defiende lo que he denominado un “enfoque neocollectivista” sobre la participación que favorece la 
relación directa entre el Estado y los movimientos sociales y organizaciones de base para generar un 
proceso político radical de transformación social.  Esta visión politizada sobre la participación es 
comparada con las intervenciones realizadas por la Fundación de Promoción e Investigación de 
Productos Andinos (PROINPA), una ONG nacional que se centran en iniciativas de investigación y 
desarrollo.  Para dilucidar las diferencias entre estos dos enfoques sobre la participación, esta 
investigación se concentra en tres aspectos: a) la manera en que el gobierno del MAS ha dado forma a 
la participación como un proyecto político, b) cómo la participación como herramienta de gestión se 
relaciona a la participación como un proyecto político, y c) la forma en la que estos dos enfoques se 
articulan en intervenciones de desarrollo rural.  El diseño de la investigación combina el análisis de 
entrevistas a nivel nacional y regional y los estudios de caso detallados de los siguientes proyectos de 
intervención: por un lado, la Empresa de Apoyo a la Producción de Alimentos (EMAPA) y el 
Proyecto de Alianzas Rurales (PAR), las dos iniciativas de intervención para el desarrollo rural más 
importantes del gobierno del MAS en términos de financiación (EMAPA) y cobertura (PAR); por otro 
lado, la experiencia de PROINPA en investigación participativa en los municipios en Morochata - 
Cochabamba y Padilla – Chuquisaca.  
Usando el término neocollectivismo para caracterizar la política del gobierno del MAS en el 
desarrollo agrario, el segundo capítulo analiza el actual enfrentamiento entre este gobierno y las 
ONGs.  A pesar de los momentos de politización que han llevado a una álgida confrontación en la 
esfera pública entre el gobierno del MAS y las ONGs, este capítulo sostiene que las ONGs han 
realineado sus intervenciones para adaptarse a la política del gobierno del MAS.  ONGs con una 
orientación más técnica comienzan a jugar a la política buscando formas de negociar y adaptarse al 
neocollectivismo, mientras que las ONG con una historia más política subrayan sus aspectos técnicos 
para proporcionar servicios a las organizaciones sociales, con el fin de no ser visto como una amenaza 
política para el gobierno del MAS. 
En el tercer capítulo se analiza el caso de EMAPA como ejemplo de la implementación del 
enfoque neocollectivista y de sus visiones sobre la participación y el desarrollo agrario.  Este proyecto, 
presentado por el gobierno del MAS como alternativa a la visión neoliberal sobre la producción de 
alimentos, combina el uso del poder del Estado para intervenir en la producción primaria y la 
comercialización a través de la creación de empresas estatales que interactúan con organizaciones 
sociales con una orientación política (sindicatos agrarios, asociaciones, empresas comunitarias).  
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EMAPA aspira a convertirse en la piedra angular de una estructura agraria alternativa que logre 
socavar el poder del capital agroindustrial basado en el departamento de Santa Cruz.  Esta intervención 
busca forjar una alianza productiva entre el Estado y los pequeños productores organizados en 
asociaciones para aumentar la soberanía y seguridad alimentaria y generar procesos redistributivos.  
En este capítulo se muestra cómo el gobierno del MAS ha sido incapaz de desarrollar una alternativa 
independiente al modelo de agronegocios impuesto por las élites agro-industriales.  Esto se debe a la 
compleja relación entre el Estado y la sociedad civil que influye en la capacidad del Estado así como a 
la falta de una trayectoria tecnológica alternativa para derrotar el control de estas elites sobre la 
tecnología.  Además, este capítulo demuestra cómo, paradójicamente, la intervención de EMAPA 
sirve para fortalecer en vez de debilitar los lazos de dependencia entre los productores apoyados y el 
sector agroindustrial. 
El capítulo cuarto analiza cómo durante el periodo neoliberal de ajuste structural en Bolivia se 
adoptaron y usaron un mayor numero de métodos participativos en la investigación agrícola.  Se 
estudia el caso de PROINPA y su proceso de transformación durante el periodo neoliberal, de una 
institución pública de investigación a una ONG de investigación.  PROINPA uso métodos 
participativos para fortalecer la capacidad y las habilidades de los agricultores para que estos 
contribuyan activamente al éxito de los proyectos, así como para facilitar el diseño y adaptación de 
tecnologías para resolver problemas locales.  Aunque estos procesos participativos priorizaron el 
desarrollo de tecnologías, creación de capacidades y la eficacia de los proyectos, también lograron 
conectar y crear nuevos equilibrios entre los actores, las consideraciones técnicas y económicas, y las 
estrategias y acciones políticas. En este capítulo se argumenta que la participación diseñada por una 
ONG con orientación técnica como PROINPA no es sólo “técnica” como a sus técnicos les gustaría 
percibirse, o simplemente “política” como en las visiones críticas sobre la participación.  En cambio, 
es maleable, en el sentido de que cada actor está involucrado en la búsqueda de nuevos equilibrios 
entre las consideraciones técnicas, económicas, y políticas.  Dado que esta tesis trata de ilustrar este 
punto, esto es cierto tanto para los técnicos de PROINPA como para intervenciones más politizadas 
como EMAPA. 
El capítulo quinto examina cómo dos puntos de vista contrastantes sobre el empoderamiento, la 
del gobierno del MAS y la del Banco Mundial, se articulan en la práctica a través del programa PAR.  
El PAR, una de las intervenciones más importantes del gobierno del MAS para el desarrollo rural, 
tiene como objetivo apoyar a los pequeños productores con recursos financieros y asistencia técnica, y 
crear alianzas productivas para cumplir con las exigencias del mercado.  En la intervención del PAR, 
hay una mezcla de puntos de vista contrastantes sobre el empoderamiento. El gobierno del MAS busca 
lograr el empoderamiento estructural mediante el fortalecimiento del papel del Estado en la 
redistribución de los recursos, prioriando al pequeño productor como sujedo de apoyo.  En la 
ejecución del programa, sin embargo, las herramientas de gestión y modelo de desarrollo rural 
impuestos por el Banco Mundial reducen las aspiraciones de empoderamiento al desarrollo de 
capacidades y la eficiencia tecnológica orientada a la auto-gestión de los agricultores para vincularlos 
a los mercados.  En este capítulo se concluye que existe un desequilibrio entre los cambios de poder 
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político y el progreso técnico que limita las posibilidades de hacer una ruptura definitiva con el 
neoliberalismo hacia un camino alternativo al desarrollo. 
Esta investigación muestra cómo el desarrollo participativo y los procesos políticos de 
participación aunque representan diferentes esferas, están estrechamente relacionados en las 
intervenciones de desarrollo.  Los cambios en la esfera política, y en consecuencia, en el papel del 
Estado y de la sociedad en el desarrollo, influyen en las condiciones en que se producen las 
tecnologías participativas. Tales condiciones podrían permitir o restringir el alcance de la participación 
en estas intervenciones. Esta investigación señala, sin embargo, que incluso los procesos de 
participación política deben necesariamente pasar por un proceso técnico, y por consiguiente de 
despolitización, para generar gobernabilidad. En la práctica y fuera de los momentos álgidos de 
confrontación política liderados por los movimientos sociales y grupos contestatarios, al final la 
relación entre la eficiencia técnica y los logros en términos de justicia social es más contingente; no 
existe una relación de uno a uno entre la política y la tecnología. Intervenciones concretas como 
EMAPA y PAR tienen aspectos técnicos en que ambos enfoques sobre la participación tienen que 
colaborar. Esto también significa que visiones técnicas sobre la participación como las de PROINPA 
se podrían adaptar y moldear a diferentes contextos políticos y, por lo tanto, podrían contribuir 
enormemente al desarrollo agrario y a la justicia social. En conclusión, el propósito de esta 
investigación de separar lo político de lo técnico no es necesariamente para analizar estos dos aspectos 
de forma aislada, sino para hacer visibles diferentes aspectos involucrados en la planeación de los 
procesos de intervención para el desarrollo y para resaltar la necesidad de tener a ambos en cuenta. 
 
 
  
  
  
A b o u t  t h e  A u t h o r  
Diana Marcela Córdoba was born in Palmira, Colombia on May 31, 1980.  She received a BSc in 
Sociology at the Universidad del Valle in 2003.  Parallel to her studies in Sociology, she actively 
participated in local politics in Florida, her small town in Colombia and was selected as President of 
her Department Council.  Since then, she felt the need to prepare and improve her capacities to better 
influence development and therefore she joined the Master in International Development at 
Wageningen University in 2005.  Her master thesis on ‘Innovation System in Banana Research in 
Brazil and Colombia’ was part of a collaborative research project between EMBRAPA - Brazil and 
Plan Research International (PRI) – Wageningen University. 
Before joining doctoral studies in Wageningen University at the end of 2009, she worked in several 
research and development projects in Latin America.  In Honduras and Nicaragua, she helped to 
facilitate the development of technological innovation processes to improve small-farmers market 
oriented strategies using an agro-chain approach.  In Colombia, she worked closely with peasant 
organization in creating alliances among different actors to enable post-harvest process and market 
innovations in cassava crop.  She spent two years working with the International Centre for Tropical 
Agriculture (CIAT) and carried out collaborative research with National Agricultural Research 
Systems (NARS), universities and farmers organizations in Uruguay, Argentina and México on 
participatory processes and rural development.  She also assisted the CGIAR Challenge Program on 
Water and Food and its local projects in Colombia on issues such as collective action, participatory 
evaluation and communitarian water management.  She received several scholarships and research 
grants including Social Science Latin-American Council (CLACSO) and Comparative Research 
Program on Poverty (CROP) fellowship in 2004; Netherlands Organization for International 
Cooperation in Higher Education (Nuffic) fellowship in 2005, Wageningen University PhD 
Scholarship in 2009; and McKnight Foundation - Collaborative Crop Research Program research grant 
in 2011.  
Diana is interested in interdisciplinary research that combines natural science with social science 
approaches and the use of applied sociology in agricultural science and food system analysis.  Her 
major research interests include international development and agrarian change, and participatory 
processes for community and technology development. 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
WASS Trainig and Supervision Plan 
Diana Marcela Córdoba Blandón  
Completed Training and Supervision Plan 
Wageningen School of Social Sciences (WASS) 
Name of the learning activity Department/Institute  Year ECTS* 
A) Project related competences 
Proposal Development and Literature Review WUR 2010 6 
Social Movements in the South WASS 2011 1.5 
Rural Property, Inequality and Exclusion Roskilde University, 
Denmark 
2011 4 
Visiting Research Fellow at CCCBE, 
University of Victoria, Canada 
CCCBE 2012 4 
B) General research related competences 
Review of Literature on research methods on 
social sciences and data analysis 
WUR 2010 1.5 
“Participation and Social Justice Conflicts in 
Rural Development Projects during the MAS 
Era in Bolivia” 
Conference, University of 
South Florida, Florida, USA 
2011 1 
Brown Advance Research Institutes: 
Development and Inequality in the Global 
South  
Brown University, 
Providence, RI, USA 
2011 4 
“Participation and Social Inclusion in Research 
and Development Projects in Rural Areas in 
Bolivia” 
CoP7, McKnight 
Foundation, Cochabamba, 
Bolivia 
2011 1 
“From Neoliberalism to New Collectivism in 
the MAS Era in Bolivia: Contradictions, 
dissatisfactions and contestations in seeking 
alternatives for rural development”. 
Canadian Association for 
Latin American and 
Caribbean Studies 
(CALACS), University of 
British Columbia, Canada 
2012 1.5 
“The Return of the State: new collectivism and 
rural development in the MAS era in Bolivia 
WASS PhD Day  2012 1 
“Participatory approaches for agricultural 
research" Is farmer participation enough?” 
CoP8, McKnight 
Foundation, Cuenca, 
2012 1 
 170 
 
Ecuador 
“The Politics of Participation and Capacity 
Building: Socializing Agricultural Research in 
Bolivia” 
WASS PhD Day  2013 1 
“Innovation in Rural Development Policies in 
Bolivia for the empowerment of small farmers: 
the case of the Rural Alliance Programme 
(PAR)" 
CoP9, McKnight 
Foundation, Quito, Ecuador 
2013 1 
STEPS Centre Summer School  STEPS Centre, University 
of Sussex, UK 
2014 3 
Discussion groups and seminars WUR 2009-
2013 
1.5 
C) Career related competences/personal development 
Scientific Writing  WGS 2012 1.5 
Reviewing a Scientific Paper WGS 2013 0.1 
Techniques for Writing and Presenting a 
Scientific Paper 
WGS 2013 1.2 
Total    35.8 
*One credit according to ECTS is on average equivalent to 28 hours of study load 
 
 
  
  
 
The research described in this thesis was financially supported by Wageningen University and the 
Collaborative Crop Research Program (Andes) from the McKnight Foundation. 
Financial support from Wageningen University for printing this thesis is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover design: Isaias Palencia and Diana Córdoba 
Cover photos: All from Diana Córdoba  
Printed by: GVO drukkers & vormgevers B.V. 
